This thesis encompasses three essays on price setting under stickydispersed information (SDI). The baseline framework mixes the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) with dispersed information models like Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007). In Chapter 1, we derive the equilibrium of the game assuming that firms face strategic complementarity on their pricing decisions. In this context, firms take their pricing decisions using information to build expectations on the prices set by other firms and on the current state of aggregate nominal demand - the fundamental of the economy. In Chapter 2, we extend the SDI model to analyze how central bank communication affects price setting. As public information help firms to infer the current state of the economy and one another s prices, it improves price synchronization. This effect makes inflation variance increase with the precision of the public information. Social welfare is affected by the fact that firms do not internalize how their prices change other firms pricing decisions. In Chapter 3, we use a SDI model to analyze how price setting changes when the interest rate is a policy instrument that not only partially drives the fundamental dynamics, but also it is understood as a public signal that informs the view of the monetary authority on the current state of the economy. Under this framework, firms use interest rate to support their pricing decisions, influencing inflation dynamics. We also obtain the optimal parameters of the policy instrument (regarding three different efficiency criteria), considering that the central bank knows that firms take information from its actions.