Employee stock options (ESOs) can be considered one of the most important compensation and retention instruments of the corporate world. The credit crunch crisis of 2008, though, has drawn society’s attention towards certain practices of corporations. In particular, the debate over the compensation packages granted to executives has gained importance. While many stand that ESOs have given incentives to the irresponsible decisions made by large corporation executives, this dissertation takes the economic crisis as a motivator and presents an option that is still barely used: an ESO with an exercise price that follows an index. Even though the value of an indexed ESO is less than the value obtained by a traditional option, its design provides stronger incentives to decisions that maximize shareholder value. In this sense, indexed ESOs appear as an interesting alternative in solving the principal-agent problem, in this case represented by shareholders and executives, respectively. This dissertation presents and develops option pricing models for indexed ESOs that are acceptable under the general guidelines defined by national and international accounting standards; such as premature exercise and option forfeiture. The objective is therefore to motivate corporations in the adoption of more adequate pricing models.