Coordinating-supply-contracts are key to restoring the production-systems eficiency lost with the progressive reduction of vertical integration. The bulk of the literature on this subject focuses on the analysis of a contract between a retailer and a manufacturer, or on contracts that maximize the profit of one of the parties. However, contracts between two manufacturers are more frequent in practice, and harder to analyze because both parties have their actual sales constrained by their medium-term capacity decisions. This research analyzes a capacity-reservation contract with reward-and-penalty designed to coordinate the single-period medium-term capacity decisions of two autonomous manufacturers facing stochastic market demands. Under this contract, the supplier will sell to the buyer, at a discount price, whatever he orders up to a certain previously agreed quantity. If the buyer's order is in excess of this quantity, he will purchase this excess at market price; if it is short, he will pay an agreed per-unit penalty for what he fails to order up to this quantity. The supplier reserves the capacity for producing the agreed quantity until the buyer announces his order, and then uses the remaining capacity for selling to the market. Stochastic optimization models are used to evaluate the improvement the contract can bring to each party's profit, and also how close it can take the dyad's joint profit to an ideal maximum. Numerical analyses carried out in different settings indicate that the contract can achieve full coordination and allows different distributions of the gain between the parties.