The nuclear bombings over hiroshima and Nagasaki have deeply changed the concept of war among national States. From the moment the two atomic mushroom clouds spread in the sky over the Japanese cities, the inclusion of the nuclear threat in interstate conflicts has become a mandatory worry to the nations that would struggle for influence areas during the Cold War.Stimulated by these worries, the international community has taken several measures over last 50 years in order to curb the use of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been one of the main initiatives aimed at this purpose. Its articles instituted the proscription of developing and acquiring nuclear weapons after 1967, besides motivating the expasion of civil nuclear technology and heartening the progressive disarmament of states. The agreements signed by the end of the 60s, however, were not able to predict the advance of nuclear technology. If the peaceful use of the atom was allowed back in 1968, today the development of dual-use technology- such as uranium enrichment, even for peaceful reasons - is still frowned upon.The difficulties to examine the true intentions behind developing and using this technology have changed the possibility of its proliferation into a truly fearsome problem. The blossoming of rogue nuclear programs, and, therefore, of new nuclear states, allied to the growing threat of nuclear terrorism, has shaken the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. In order to control the damages induced by this problem, several review conferences have been trying to mend the gaps that challenge the regime.This paper tries to show which are the main tensions inside the regime and how the international community and the Internatonal Atomic Energy Agency are trying to cope with these matters. The analysis of Articles IV of the NPT seems to demonstrate that if the treaty provisions are not equally observed by all member states, it will be extremely hard to overcome the problems of non-proliferation.