This dissertation aims to analyze the construction of international banking regulatory standards from an International Relations perspective. Its object is the regulatory transformation observed in Basel III in the post-2007/2008 crisis as a way of accessing the broader problem of Structural Power in the International Monetary System and the political space available to peripheral countries in this context. The hypothesis that guide the study is that even though international banking regulation is aligned to US structural power, there are political spaces for action for emerging/peripheral countries in the international institutional and ideational dimensions. Therefore, it analyzes the international monetary system from its constituent elements and the political, economic and ideational processes that have shaped international banking regulation. This topic represents an under problematized space of international relations. The work departs from an epistemological analysis and follows through a theoretical analysis of Structural Power and its application towards the International Monetary System. It then considers the emergence of international banking regulation in the mid-1970s and seeks to explore how regulatory frameworks agreed upon the BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) were achieved in relation to crisis events that have characterized the international monetary system since the 1980s. In this sense, the structural and local constraints that led to the emergence of the Basel I, II and III agreements are explored. The conclusions consolidated by the study reveal the importance of ideational links and institutional action for standards definition in international banking regulation and suggest a political space for action by countries poorly positioned in the international monetary hierarchy.