This dissertation presents a brief introduction to the work of Hannah Arendt based on the problem of evil. The objective is to determine, based on some of the main concepts presented by the author, a solution to the controversy, present in the philosophical literature, about the compatibility between the notions of the radicality of evil, with Kantian matrix, and the banality of evil, as developed by Arendt. To this end, the totalitarian event and Arendt s approach to the problem of evil are studied. In this context, the starting point is an analysis of the views on the question of evil in the philosophical tradition based on Augustine of Hippo, Leibniz, Kant and Nietzsche. Then, based on the totalitarian phenomenon, the radicality of evil is analyzed in order to understand the horrors practiced by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes during dark periods of the 20th century. Subsequently, Adolf Eichmann s judgment and its meaning for the author s work are studied. In that trial, three fundamental questions emerged: the judges difficulty in judging a case without precedents; Eichmann s conscience; and the phenomenon of the banality of evil. Next, the research presents a possibility of reconciling the concept of radical evil with that of banal evil, present in the Arendtian canon, based on an analysis of Arendt s correspondence with Gershom Scholem. Finally, based on the Arendtian notions of action and freedom, we will highlight the way in which it will be possible for the human being to return to himself/herself, in the form of the political animal that he/she is.