Since 2015, France has undertaken a process of normalizing practices announced during the state of emergency, through the promulgation of the Surveillance and Anti-Terrorism Law Package of 2017. Such instruments proposed the strengthening of internal security and the fight against terrorism under a logic of risk anticipation, with surveillance and control techniques informed by data and metadata. This work investigates the effects of the increasing use of computer technologies in practices aimed at preventing possible dangerous futures, seeking to explore, more precisely, how they affect responsabilization processes. The article is divided into three main analytical movements. First, I will analyze the consolidation of an institutional and normative architecture that consolidates the monopoly of supervision for the benefit of intelligence services. In addition, how the practice of building suspicious profiles through the algorithms came to be affirmed as a necessity to deal with the contingencies and uncertainties in France in the face of the threat of terrorism and radicalization. Then, I will discuss the conditions for the possibility of using algorithms in the production of intelligence knowledge, in particular, in the production of evidence that inform individual control and surveillance measures. The proposal is to analyze the connections between, on the one hand, hazard measurement practices in a technical discourse anchored on the imperative of efficiency in surveillance practices; on the other hand, the effects of control over individuals with the easing of procedural safeguards and guarantees of rights. The third movement will have its point of gravity in the layers of human and non-human practices present in control and surveillance measures to understand its effects on accountability processes. To this end, I will analyze the relationship between the production of knowledge and the enactment of non-knowledge, through secrecy and uncertainty, in the processes of contesting individual control and surveillance measures in France. The general objective here is to analyze how administrative control devices, such as the application of administrative control and surveillance measures (MICA similar to house arrest), in the context of combating terrorism in France, exemplify a system of validation of authority and dispersion responsabilization processes. The paper argues that such processes imply an active desresponsabilization of security professionals through the dispersion of responsibility between humans and nonhumans and favor the promulgation of non-knowledge, especially through secrecy.