The thesis aims at arguing that Kant s proposal to morality does not consist in an empty, and, therefore cold and without sentiment formalism as some of his commentators interpreted. According to these commentators, Kant s proposal of morality is seen as not having any connection to the real human life, given the fact that he grounds moral decision in a principle of pure reason. The thesis argues that the accusation made towards his proposal of a void formalism happened, mostly, because of a partial understanding of it, putting aside all elements which constitute reason for Kant. In this sense, the thesis defends that, if the totality of the Kant s proposal is properly taken into account, the accusation that it is a cold, and without sentiment, theory doesn t sustain itself. The thesis presents the main elements that make up that totality of Kant s proposal of morality: the faculties of reason, its powers (to know, to judge and to will), the dynamics between them, the feelings generated by this dynamics, the feeling of respect and the satisfaction named of self-contentment. The thesis especially draws attention to the rescue and greater consideration about the sense and value that the concepts of freedom, autonomy, dignity, respect and humanity present to human life. Consequently, these concepts are taken into account in the dynamic relation between the faculties, in such a way that this relation is seen according to its end: the end of every rational being. This would consist the virtuous life, that generates the feeling of respect and the self-contentment in the soul of the human beings, vivifying them. By considering these elements, the thesis argues that it is hard to accept that Kant s proposal of morality constitutes itself in a mere empty formalism.