This thesis takes as its central problem the discussion on the possibility of rupture of the constitutional order by means of the state of exception, as understood by Carl Schmitt s and Walter Benjamin s readings. It proposes the comprehension of the state of exception not so much as a legal concept, but as a moment that can or cannot break the actual juridical order. Thus, the hypothesis assumed by this thesis is that there is a blind spot in liberal constitutionalism — a point of view on law that, in general terms, assures the individual, firstly, the nonintervention of the State on private affairs, and, secondly, the possibility of taking part in the decision-making process —, that is, the state of exception. Both Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin — authors who hold opposite positions on the political spectrum — understand exception according to this meaning, that is to say, as the impossibility of liberal constitutionalism to deal with an eventual break of the order. Since it does not treat on this fissure from which law begins, it also does not discuss the violence that founds it and keeps it. In other words, the liberal constitutionalism does not faces exception because it would undermine its very existence and premises. The state of exception, considered both as a guarantor of order and as a moment of rupture, unsettles those premises, exposing liberal constitutionalism. In order to corroborate this hypothesis, this thesis is divided in three chapters. In the first one, a brief historical background of the Weimar Moment is presented, in order to contextualize the emergence of those theories. Then, it deals with the accords and discords between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt concerning the assumptions that move both authors to think of the state of exception: political theology, social democracy, and critique of technique. In the second chapter, it is proposed the hypothesis that Schmitt would be afraid of exception as a moment of rupture that could initiate chaos, hence his defense of an authoritarian constitution. For this purpose, the chapter is divided in four parts. The first one treats on the relation between romantic subject and liberalism. The second, on the tension between politics and law. Further on, it treats on sovereignty, politics and democracy, and, finally, the issue of rupture. The last chapter thinks Legal Studies on the basis of Walter Benjamin s ideas, especially those concerning law and sovereignty. First, the analysis is centered on the question of sovereignty, and, next, it develops the methodological and politic conceptions of history that moved Benjamin to think of a permanent state of exception.