The Civil Code in 2002 has innovated in relation to its antecessor, inserting in its body a chapter dedicated to the right to be oneself. The point is that the typified form of such Articles is insufficient to protect one`s personality not only because they reflect a technique used for the normatization of equity rights but mainly because it fails to consider the range of the institute as to the increasing and unceasing need to protect the human individual. On such conditions it is known that the principle of dignity has a protective irradiating function, in the service of a constitutional scope of integral guardianship, which implies (implicates) its consideration of individual`s personality in a more effective manner. It is in this area of study, the Italian reformulation as to individual`s right to personality is considered. It is approached in terms of a right to personal identity, or otherwise, the right to be oneself, which means the set of attributes and characteristics which allow for individualization of a person in society. The disrespect to personal identity perpetrates with the attribution - in face of many different forms of distortion - of acts, thoughts, statements which oppose to it, thus expressing the person`s interest in verifying that their own cultural- ideological asset - constituted by their thoughts, beliefs, opinions, behaviour, which they project in the intersubjective world - is acknowledged. It is about this law, not yet sufficiently taken into consideration in Brazil, although of utmost importance, that this present study is dedicated to, with the focus on its origins, characteristics, object and limits, as well as the defense of its protection in the Brazilian judicial order.