In analytic philosophy, philosophers have used the word intuition several times. Faced with claims like A thing is identical with itself and Good is not evil, an analytic philosopher is likely to say that they seem to be the case, that they are obvious as seeing the truth in front of you, but without use your eyes. That is, we do not seem to make relevant use of perception, reasoning, or memory to get knowledge about such claims. Looks like we used something else. Given this, several analytic philosophers have chosen to say that we get knowledge of such facts through intuition. More recently, analytic philosophers have investigated what intuitions are, whether they are reliable, and whether they actually play a role in philosophical activity. In this dissertation, I evaluate the debate of these philosophers in search of an answer to such problems, structuring their arguments, clarifying their evidence and confronting them. Therefore, I reach an authorial conclusion regarding such problems, providing contributions for future work on the subject.