The model of public regulation through independent agencies was approved in the Brazilian legal system from the 90 s, under the influence of deregulation, privatization and reforms of public administration, serving the agency like guarantee of security, stability and balance in the economic and social relationships. However, the emergence of power centers such as regulatory agencies, created with autonomy from direct administration of the State, resulted in many democratic and institutional problems. For political theory, there was an inequality of access for citizens to power circulation channel, typical of representative democracies mass (vertical accountability) and deficiencies of political control of the institution by the system of checks and balances (horizontal accountability). The central hypothesis is demonstrating the character of republican and democratic regulatory intervention carried out in Brazil by means of independent agencies. Based on the new republicanism, political thought that working with efficient categories to strengthening public institutions in the service of democracy, the objective is to identify the potential of democratic legitimacy in decision-making process. To support the hypothesis, the thesis uses the transdisciplinary and comparative method, and adepts as reference and dialogue the Philip Pettit’s books, most important scholar of new republicanism.