With the growth of votes against some candidate and not in favor, the so-called tactical vote, a game that represented the opinion dynamics between the tactical vote and the ideological vote was thought, with the objective of analyzing, using the Evolutionary Game Theory, the long-term tendencies of each strategie. Two models were made, one with 1 population and the other with 2 populations. In both cases it was considered the existence of a candidate that players intend to prevent from winning and the scenario is a conversation between 2 people about their voting strategies. By the created model, the society can resort in its totality to the tactical vote or the ideological vote. Another study on opinion dynamics inpublic debates was discussed and ancomparative analysis with the model of this work was done. Finally, it was concluded that there should be cooperation between people so that the tactical voting strategy has a greater effect and that the payments of each strategy can influence the final result.