The present dissertation analyses the retaking of the debate over Brazilian Nuclear Program´s recovery by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva government, based on the defense of the utilization of an already acquired technology of its own to enrich uranium. In spite of the intrinsic duality on this subject and having in mind the pacific ends concerning the utilization of such technology by Brazil, the hypotesis sustained in this work is that the Program´s defense is considered a strategy of sovereign international insertion with relative autonomy and an instrument of national valorization against other powers. In order to verify the hypotesis outlined above, we will analyse the actual government, comparing it to two other moments in Brazilian History in which the nuclear issue also acquired preponderance on the national agenda, namely, Geisel and Sarney governments. Although these three moments differ in relation to their internal political regime, our goal is to identify their similarities once they keep some continuities about their strategies of external action.