This work aims to contextualize the concept of epistemic injustice formulated by the philosopher Miranda Fricker in a society marked by racial biases, as well as to investigate its application to the Brazilian penal system, with emphasis on the distribution of credibility in the production and evaluation of evidence that supports a conviction referring, mainly, to the crimes found in law 11.343/2006. The research is based on a theoretical review of the forms of epistemic injustice, incorporating contributions from José Medina and Jennifer Lackey to broaden the discussion. The collection of empirical research, first, investigates whether, as socially situated subjects, we are capable of curbing racial biases. Secondly, research aims to investigate whether law enforcement agents – both police officers and judges – use prejudice and stigma in the function of their positions. Research as a whole seeks to demonstrate and problematize how racial issues interfere in the practice of epistemic injustices. Brazilian judicial cases with evident epistemic injustices will be analyzed, deepening the risks of attributing excessive credibility to the police narrative and automatic reduction of the weight attributed to the defense s versions. The jurisprudence of the STJ that explicitly addresses the subject will also be commented on. The results reveal the presence of asymmetric epistemic practices that contribute to the perpetuation of both social and judicial inequalities. Finally, the work proposes reflections on ways to mitigate epistemic injustice and build a more inclusive justice system, aligned with democratic principles.