Título: | JUDICIAL REVIEW, INTERPRETATION AND MANIPULATION OF THE LEGISLATION THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION | ||||||||||||
Autor: |
RODOLFO DE ASSIS FERREIRA |
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Colaborador(es): |
FABIO CARVALHO LEITE - Orientador |
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Catalogação: | 01/FEV/2019 | Língua(s): | PORTUGUESE - BRAZIL |
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Tipo: | TEXT | Subtipo: | THESIS | ||||||||||
Notas: |
[pt] Todos os dados constantes dos documentos são de inteira responsabilidade de seus autores. Os dados utilizados nas descrições dos documentos estão em conformidade com os sistemas da administração da PUC-Rio. [en] All data contained in the documents are the sole responsibility of the authors. The data used in the descriptions of the documents are in conformity with the systems of the administration of PUC-Rio. |
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Referência(s): |
[pt] https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/projetosEspeciais/ETDs/consultas/conteudo.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=36402&idi=1 [en] https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/projetosEspeciais/ETDs/consultas/conteudo.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=36402&idi=2 |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17771/PUCRio.acad.36402 | ||||||||||||
Resumo: | |||||||||||||
The interpretative decisions - interpretation according to the constitution, partial unconstitutionality (reductive manipulative decision), additive manipulative decision, substitutive manipulative decision - are present in brazilian judicial review. They are treated indiscriminately and one aspect of it is linguistic: the difference between identifying a rule (interpretation(1)) and following a rule (interpretation(2)). Semantic approaches allow this kind of differentiation, but pragmatic approaches seem to have greater difficulties. Within the law, this can be translated as the opposition between the identification of the literal meaning, the ordinary meaning and the identification of the intentional meaning, the purposivism meaning of legal texts. As for following legal rules, three models are possible: strong formalism, presumptive formalism, and rulesensitive particularism. Of these, the latter two are more compatible with judicial review. However, criticisms of the lack of criteria present in these reach judicial review and especially the interpretative decisions because they lack precise parameters to justify why an interpretative decision should trump the simple declaration of (un)constitutionality. In addition, the distinction between interpretation(1) and
interpretation(2) is also useful in applying the full bench clause because it allow us to differentiate when the fractional body is only identifying what the legal text says using the constitution as a reference and when the legal text says something unconstitutional.
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