This essay formulates a critic about the supposed connection, regarding judicial review in Brazil, between judicial supremacy and constitutional interpretation. The starting point is history of Brazilian constitutionalism. In the first chapter, I try to show that historically the judicial branch, notably the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), has not been able to influence the course of political decisions in Brazil. The rise of judicial review is not the outcome of a tradition, but a recent phenomenon with many features still not yet developed. The second chapter is entitled to discuss the premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty tradition, especially the assumption that the judiciary has the last word about the meaning of the constitution. I try to demonstrate that the way in which influential theories, even the critical ones, have been addressing the question regarding the last word in constitutional interpretation diminish the roll of deliberation in a democracy, precisely because they lead to some sort of supremacy, judicial or not. Alternatively, dialogical theories of judicial review capitalize from institutional deliberation and interaction, enforcing the democratic framework. In the third chapter, I manage the discussion back to the Brazilian reality. I try to identify, based on empirical foundations, the dialogic bias of our political system. Mostly, by bringing evidence that the Federal Supreme Court is not, essentially, a countermajoritarian institution, giving the fact that its performance, in general, is more deferential than aggressive.