Título: | WHY LEGISLATORS WANTS TO RAISE PENALTIES? LEGISLATIVE PENAL POPULISM IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES: ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FROM 2006 TO 2014 | ||||||||||||
Autor: |
ANDRE PACHECO TEIXEIRA MENDES |
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Colaborador(es): |
JOSE MARIA GOMEZ - Orientador |
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Catalogação: | 19/JUL/2016 | Língua(s): | PORTUGUESE - BRAZIL |
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Tipo: | TEXT | Subtipo: | THESIS | ||||||||||
Notas: |
[pt] Todos os dados constantes dos documentos são de inteira responsabilidade de seus autores. Os dados utilizados nas descrições dos documentos estão em conformidade com os sistemas da administração da PUC-Rio. [en] All data contained in the documents are the sole responsibility of the authors. The data used in the descriptions of the documents are in conformity with the systems of the administration of PUC-Rio. |
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Referência(s): |
[pt] https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/projetosEspeciais/ETDs/consultas/conteudo.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=26913&idi=1 [en] https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/projetosEspeciais/ETDs/consultas/conteudo.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=26913&idi=2 |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17771/PUCRio.acad.26913 | ||||||||||||
Resumo: | |||||||||||||
This doctoral thesis aims to find evidence of the phenomenon called penal
populism in the Brazilian legislative activity, based on the analysis of the
justifications of the bills (B s) which tends to increase penalties, presented for the
period 2006-2014 in the Chamber of Deputies. This work presents as research
problem the investigation of the stated intentions and the reasons why the
legislature persists in raising penalty. Why the political insists on increasing
penalties? It is hypothesis of this work that the legislator has acted as it has
adhered to the penal populism, a phenomenon characterized by speeches and
criminal hardening practices, allegedly backed on a homogeneous public
clamoring for punishment. This violates the criminal upsurge of principles that
derives from the Brazilian constitutional model and invariably bet on the purposes
of the sentence recognized as negative general prevention (deterrence) and
retribution. So, in the theoretical plan, we have established the theoretical
premises for the analysis of B s, (i) indicated five limiting principles of punitive
power, (ii) pointed out the theories of the purposes of punishment recognized by
the official discourse of penology, and (iii) we exposed the new crime control
culture (David Garland), in which the penal populism is inscribed (John Pratt and
Julian V. Roberts). In the practical plan, we have analyzed 758 (seven hundred
fifty-eight) legislative proposals that, after purification, resulted in 191 (one
hundred and ninety-one) that fell within the scope of this research: penalty raising
for existing crime. The year 2006 was chosen as the initial term for two reasons.
First, allows embracing two terms in the Chamber of Deputies, the 53rd and 54th
respectively in the periods 2007-2011 and 2011-2015. Second, it enables the
continuity in the production of scientific knowledge on legislative production on
penal law, considering research published by the Ministry of Justice, Thinking
Series Law No. 32 (Analysis of the justifications for the production of criminal
provisions), which covered the study of legislative proposals from 1987 to 2006.
The final point at 2014 is justified for two reasons: closing the 54th Legislature
Chamber of Deputies (2011 to 2015) and the need to end the data collection phase
for this academic paper. The research findings of this scientific study, after
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the justifications of 191 B s, identified
that: (i) almost half (48.16 percent) of the proposals focus on the deterrent effect of
punishment (negative general prevention), the aim of punishment that has
characterized the penal populism; (ii) 63.35 percent of B s have made no references to
data, studies and statistics related to standard targeted to change, confirming the
penal populism process of destatisticalization, a lack of technical knowledge
and the supremacy of common sense; (iii) a fifth (20.41 percent) of B s were about
crimes against the person, while only 2.09 percent of B s made up the so-called
Economic Criminal Law, confirming the selectivity of the legislator; (iv) almost a
fifth (19.37 percent) of the proposals indicated responsiveness of the legislator to the
media, in which the criminal media repercussion affects the legislature for
bringing punitive bill, suggesting a punitive populist behavior of parliamentarians;
(v) the B s proved to be diluted among the various most representative political
parties, confirming the nonpartisan character of penal populism. The conclusion
of the thesis points to the idea that the Brazilian legislator performs irrational
legislative criminal policy, flirting with the worldwide phenomenon of penal
populism that has characterized contemporary Western democracies. Ignores the
principles for criminal law making. Bet on the deterrent function of punishment,
whose efficiency has not been proven in history. rather, produced mass
incarceration, which is incapable of reducing crime rates.
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