Since its inception in 1944, the International Monetary Fund has suffered major crises of legitimacy; however, after periods of rejection and limb, the institution was always able to rise from the ashes. It will be argued that this apparent immortality of the Fund is due to its ability to adapt to the new normative cycles that emerge from financial crises. This ability could be traced to the relation between the legitimacy of the institution and the justification of its acts in coherence with the purpose for which it was created. In this sense, if the discourse that emerges — as a consensus from the analyses of the crises — accuses the institution of having had a part in the causes of the instability, the realignment of the IMF to the new ascending norm may result in changes in its practical orientations, as it happened, for instance, after the Asian crisis, when the Fund had its relevance significantly reduced with the adoption of a policy of market-led financial liberalization throughout the decade of 2000, replacing the former model of IMF-led orderly liberalization. Finally, the crisis developed by the end of the first decade of the XXI century and that originated in the largest producers of macroeconomic policy consensus — the United States of America and the European Union — presents itself as an opportunity for readjustment of the Fund s role once again in a central position, allowing for the analysis of the diverse interests that this institution — with its 187 member-States and potential for raising hundreds of billions of dollars in a few days — is able to meet in a scenario of greater financial balance among emerging markets, along with the instability of the great centers.