The aim of this paper is to address the phenomenon of judicial activism used by the Brazilina constitucional jurisdiction to syndicate several legislative omissions among which stands out the conduct of electoral reform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), based on the regulation of the disqualification by party loyalty by Resolution 22.610/07. The objective is to examine the negative impacts of judicial activism in relation to the principle of separation of powers and the democratic principle and the possibility of applying the theory of judicial selfrestraint Sunstein authored by Brazilian law to combat both judicial activism and asymmetrical institutionalism, which overemphasize the institutional capacity of the judiciary at the expense of the Legislature to deal with complex constitutional issues. Covers are also the potential of this theory to the practice of encouraging a dialogue between the legislative material and judicial interpretation in the context of cooperative Constitution, with powers of reciprocal assistance in enhancing the meaning and scope of the constitutional text. At the end of the work is intended to demonstrate that the application of that theory to the Brazilian constitutionalism provides the legislature with equal institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution, dealing with complex constitutional issues, which attests to their potential to combat judicial activism and encourage public debate from the ideal of deliberative democracy.