The work seeks to assess the institutionality of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism through an empirical analysis of the 336 cases filed in its first ten years in practice (1995-2005). The cases are broke down into five categories of disputes - (1) developing vs developing; (2) developed vs developed; (3) developed vs developing; (4) developing vs developed; (5) and mixed - as patterns of dispute resolution are brought into light. The aim is to verify if developing countries are able to benefit from the mechanism, ultimately reaping the benefits of a liberal world trade order. The international trade regime is supposed to work for developed and developing countries alike but in a world of political and economical asymmetries, issues of power may interfere, allowing actors to influence dispute outcomes in the service of private interests. The theoretical background is provided by questions arising from the debate between realism and neo- liberalism about the role of institutions - a sheer instrument for the powerful or collective tools that allow mutual gains for their members, and also, just how important are distributional issues in this scenario.