The Civil Code in 2002 has innovated in relation to its antecessor, inserting in itsbody a chapter dedicated to the right to be oneself. The point is that the typified form ofsuch Articles is insufficient to protect one s personality not only because they reflect atechnique used for the normatization of equity rights but mainly because it fails toconsider the range of the institute as to the increasing and unceasing need to protect thehuman individual. On such conditions it is known that the principle of dignity has aprotective irradiating function, in the service of a constitutional scope of integralguardianship, which implies (implicates) its consideration of individual s personality in amore effective manner. It is in this area of study, the Italian reformulation as toindividual s right to personality is considered. It is approached in terms of a right topersonal identity, or otherwise, the right to be oneself, which means the set ofattributes and characteristics which allow for individualization of a person in society. Thedisrespect to personal identity perpetrates with the attribution - in face of many differentforms of distortion - of acts, thoughts, statements which oppose to it, thus expressing theperson s interest in verifying that their own cultural-ideological asset - constituted bytheir thoughts, beliefs, opinions, behaviour, which they project in the intersubjectiveworld - is acknowledged. It is about this law, not yet sufficiently taken into considerationin Brazil, although of utmost importance, that this present study is dedicated to, with thefocus on its origins, characteristics, object and limits, as well as the defense of itsprotection in the Brazilian judicial order.