The war in Bosnia (1992-1995) was finished with the Dayton Agreements that gave 49 percent of the territories to the Bosnian Serbs and 51 percent to the Bosniacs and Croatian Serbs. The pact previewed the creation of a multi-ethnic State that assured a peaceful living after the bloodshed that marked the conflict among the three groups. Despite the accomplishment of ending one of the most bloody European conflicts since the end of the Second World War, the peace agreement seems not to have really solved the problems that made the three ethnic groups confront themselves during the Yugoslavian disintegration process. It means that the accord ended the war, but kept a latent warring atmosphere among the parties. In a perspective of conflict resolutions models that criticizes a traditional and utilitarian approach of the agreements signed at Dayton, this work analyzes the rights and wrongs of the first seven years of the implementation process, questioning the transference of the war to the political arena and, specially, the prolonged international interference to keep the peaceful ambiance among the communities that forms the post-war Bosnia. For the development of this work, the traditional models of conflict resolution as well as the rigid State response are questioned, with the aim to present other outcomes to put the warring parties together, with the possibility of a new political community.