This thesis is composed of three theoretical essays in Finance. In Chapter 1, I explore the effect of product market structure on the liquidation value of industry assets. I show that the contest for the gains from market concentration among firms with financial constraints leads to their expending of insufficient efforts to redeploy assets across industries and to significant liquidation discounts when compared to an efficient benchmark. Equilibrium distress costs and private costs of leverage should increase with the rents associated to market concentration in the product market. In Chapter 2, I revisit the canonical costly state verification model. I show that financial intermediation in a costly state verification model has a cost not yet analyzed: it allows for the existence of multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by borrowers defaulting on their loans because they expect other borrowers to do the same (i.e. bad equilibria arise due to strategic complementarities in entrepreneurs actions). I propose two mechanisms that fully implement the desired equilibrium allocation. Finally in Chapter 3, I analyze a continuous time principal-agent model where a risk-neutral agent protected by limited liability is hired to perform multiple tasks. In this setting, I show that economies of scope naturally emerge as combining multiple tasks into a unique job relaxes the agent s limited-liability constraint. The analysis has several implications for job design i.e. the optimal grouping of several tasks into a unique job.