Is perception inherently representational? This is, I take it, the most fascinating question in philosophy of perception. To answer it, I analyze two rival ways of thinking about perception, namely: representationalism and anti-representationalism or, as I would rather call it, non-representationalism. Thus, I discuss whether perception is best understood in representational or in non-representational terms. In doing so, I seek to develop a radical variety of enactivism according to which perception has nothing to do with content, representation, or semantic norms. In rejecting the view that perception always has representational content, I hold that perception must be seen in terms of biological functionality. In doing so, I distinguish two different types of normativity. The first is what many philosophers call biological normativity. The second, called semantic normativity, is the kind of normativity exhibited by our linguistic abilities, such as judgments, beliefs, and content-involving inferences. With this distinction in mind, I clarify the sense in which there are perceptual errors. As a result, I argue that there are perceptual errors, albeit of different kinds. Finally, I try to explain optical illusions, datum ​par excellence to be accounted for by any theory of perception.