In legal and political theory, Leviathan is its scary monster. However another reading is possible; a reading that avoids that dread: one that reaveals a concept of sovereignty without all the mythifications that it usually brings together. It s even possible to sense a certain hobbesian irony which shows that the dread was within the reader himself when he faces sovereignty as a taboo. This becomes possible when we rescue Hobbes first philosophy, recovering many strategies proposed by the philosopher that allow us to deconstruct discourses of authority. And Hobbes does that to refute those that, in general, consider themselves wiser than the others, like scholars, jurists and scientists. By that reading, either there is a big contradiction in Hobbes political theory, or a hidden meaning, namely, that, at the same time Hobbes proposes the sovereign authority, he demotes it to a mere taboo. Adopting the latter, we obtain a theory that makes possible to rebut authority discourses based on transcendental and logocentric categories. This rebuttal may be applied in contemporary political contexts, as those categories are recurringly used to impose limits on democracy. At the same time, by demythifying sovereignty, Hobbes allows us perceive it only as an initial and terminal nodal connector in a system conceived to extract political decisions, one that in a democracy must be the demos itself. It s by this reading of Hobbes philosophy that this work presents its conclusions and at the same time refutes a traditional intepretation of the same: one that perceives Hobbes only as another natural law philosopher.