This work carries out an investigation of sovereign (in)equality as a phenomenon that manifests itself in the different levels of institutions of the international society. The analysis departs from the case study of the process against Omar al-Bashir, acting President of the State of Sudan, at the International Criminal Court This case evokes a discussion about the authority exercised by the United Nations Security Council over post-1945 institutions, especially international criminal law. Considering that rules and norms have a social role in the multiple relations existing between agents and the structure, that is, they transform the relations in the international system, the work investigates the dispositions and principles present both in the scope of the International Criminal Court, as well as of the United Nations, which authorize a discrimination between States. This distinction implies the imposition of international rules for some actors and, at the same time, the maintenance of certain sovereign prerogatives for others. More specifically, international criminal justice is characterized by selectivity in judgments, as some countries are given certain authority over the regime. In this sense, it is defended that the sovereign (in)equality, which is present in international criminal law is simultaneously a manifestation and condition of possibility of hierarchy in the social, and therefore institutionalnormative, and political architecture of the international system. It is argued, therefore, that the presence of this sovereign (in)equality can be identified at different levels of the institutions of international society, insofar as they influence each other, so that the characteristics of one are reflected in the others.