Legal responsibility is, undoubtedly, one of the most relevant institutes of Law, considering its part in assuring social cohesion. Among legal tradition, the explaining models on the attribution of responsibility intend to assign, from a rational perspective, which factors should be taken in consideration in order to produce accurate responsibility judgments. According to them, such judgments should be products of a process started by the causal analysis of the harmful event, followed by the analysis of the intentions of the agent, to only later assign its blame and respective punishment. However, such traditional models miss the fact that our ability to make responsibility judgments is integrated among a complex cognitive structure from which we normatize the world. Recent discoveries from researchers of the cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy, moral psychology and social psychology fields demonstrate an inversion in the way we see the process of the attribution of responsibility. The theories and empirical researches formulated by these areas point to the interference of morality, intuitions and emotions in concepts considered as neutral by legal theory, such as the concepts of causality and intentionality, and in the way people formulate their responsibility judgments. In this work, I intend to demonstrate the influence of moral judgments and of processes of intuitive and affective nature over the decision-making about the institute of legal responsibility, focusing on criminal responsibility. At the end of this work, I trace some investigative clues about the impact of such influence on our criminal system.