In contemporary political philosophy, the issue of recognition can be approached from two perspectives: either as a matter of self-realization or as a matter of justice. Fraser and Habermas take an ethical and procedural perspective through which the claims of identity are themed in the public space, conceiving recognition as a matter of justice. Taylor and Honneth, following the Hegelian model, see recognition as a matter of self-realization and eventually emphasize the psychological dimension of recognition. We intend to present a dialogue between these authors, because their theoretical propositions are fundamental to understanding the challenges posed by multicultural societies. The issue of recognition, however, will be examined not just in its philosophical dimension, but also in view of a fundamental aspect: the judicial protection of the fundamental rights of minorities. Initially, we intend to establish the essential concepts regarding the philosophical foundations of theories of recognition; following that, such theoretical premises will be coordinated with the analysis of forms of judicial activism aimed at protecting stigmatized minorities as outlined in the jurisprudences of the Higher Court of Justice and Federal Supreme Court, and of the U.S. Supreme Court. In short, once the theoretical outlines of the philosophical theories of recognition have been set, we aim at understanding the symbolic dimension of the struggle for recognition in the legal-constitutional arena from a philosophical perspective, particularly regarding the role of the higher Brazilian courts (the Higher Court of Justice and the Federal Supreme Court) and of the U.S. Supreme Court in the protection of stigmatized groups whose normative expectations are often not met by the deliberative bodies.