Philosophy of law is traditionally preoccupied with the analysis of interpretative problems under the judge s point of view. A change in perspective might be beneficial: it is possible to use concepts from philosophy of language to enhance the redaction of normative texts, shedding new light on persistent philosophical questions about interpretation in law. The present thesis analyzes the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness in its multiple forms, offering a division between kinds of instrumentally desirable and undesirable vagueness to the values pursued by law. Afterwards, it presents an argument that intends to show that normative texts are ilocucionary speech acts. Finally, the thesis seeks to show ways in which ordinary language may be used to create clearer normative texts. The hypothesis that this practice may generate benefits is tested and confirmed by a questionnaire distributed to both lawyers and laymen. In its conclusion, it is argued that the application of these previous philosophical conclusions to normative texts may increase the degree of effectiveness and transparency of law and solve part of the problems of interpretation that remain unsolved after decades of philosophical debate, as happens with discussions about intentionalism and textualism.