In Brazil, the three main sources of renewable energy are wind, small run-of-river hidros (SH) and biomass. The energy sale of such sources occurs mainly in the Regulated Trading Environment (RTE), through auctions, with shy occurrences in the Free Trading Environment (FTE). This is due to the fact that their natural resources are seasonal, establishing the so-called price-quantity risk in the FTE, as the surplus or deficit of energy generated relative to the contracted amount is settled at the market’s spot price, a systemic and highly volatile variable. However, the complementary nature of these sources allows risk reduction if their energy are trade jointly, through an energy hedge pool that increases the value of the portfolio in comparison to individual strategies. This work makes use of cooperative games theory to analyze ways of sharing the generated benefit, through financial quotas allocation. The set of solutions where the individual sources results in the pool are greater than its results at any possible subcoalition defines the core of the game. Thus, the challenge of finding a solution inside the core depends on the number of subcoalitions, which grows exponentially with the number of players. In this context, this work proposes to present: (i) a model of portfolio that encourages the penetration of renewable sources in the FTE; (ii) a linear programming model that pursuits the game’s core; (iii) an efficient methodology based on Benders decomposition that is capable of suppress the problem of combinatorial explosion, typical of cooperative games with many players.