The objective of this research is to investigate whether the introduction of time into thinking is what allows Gilles Deleuze to affirm that thought produces the new. Such a task involves the constitution of time from passive synthesis, which Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, associates with the notions of habit in Hume, of pure memory in Bergson and the thought of eternal return in Nietzsche. The first synthesis of time, Habitus, or living present, refers to contemplations and contractions, constituting the foundation of time. Mnemosyne or pure past is the second synthesis that establishes itself as basis that allows for the passing of the present. However, the repetitions of Habit and Memory only reach their end in a third synthesis, unique in its capacity to affect the absolute new, expressed by the intriguing Deleuzian conception of eternal return as repeat of the future. With the interpretation of Klossowski as support, Deleuze understands that there is in the eternal return a selective aspect that allows only the Difference to return. So much, according to how Deleuze reads (following Hölderlin), that it happens in Sophocles tragedy: by the death of the hero, the present as an agent and the past as a condition disappear and the future opens up as a pure and empty form in which the eternal return produces only the new and singular. In other words, Deleuze states that what is in play in thought are the intensive differences or, as he says in The Logic of Sense, inspired by the ancient Stoicism, events and not the essences or things. These are conveyed in things and express themselves as well in the propositions. But such effectuation does not happen by mere similarity, i.e., pure Event or Idea is never reduced to things or propositions. Therefore, it is impersonal, neutral, neither general nor particular, but productive and genetic. A becoming: always already past and eternally yet to come.