Human moral cognition is one of the most recurrent topics in cognitive science nowadays, attracting more and more researchers and theorists from various fields. This dissertation presents two competingempirical approaches to the generation of moral intuitions. Authors pro linguistic analogy employ concepts and models borrowed from linguistics to describe the nature and source of moral knowledge. John Mikhail, for instance, describes operational principles of intuitive moral judgment to suggest that human beings are endowed with innate knowledge of multiple moral – and even legal – rules, concepts and principles. Others, like Joshua Greene and Jesse Prinz,provide a substantially different explanation to the nature of moral intuitions, highlighting the role of emotions in their constitution processes. Each one of these propositions, and the scientific study of morality in general, can generate many normative implications, which have not been deeply studied so far. This work aims to analyze the aforementioned accounts and their potential impact in moral, political and legal concepts, especially those framed by universalistic beliefs.