This dissertation focuses on the governmental policy adopted in 2009 to contract wind power energy in Brazil through auctions and its impacts on the decision to invest in the wind power industry, and is organized into three separate but interconnected studies. The first study discusses the incentive policies adopted in Brazil and worldwide and the benefits and difficulties of increasing the stake of wind power in the country, identifying potential problems in the current policy and proposing changes. In the second part, the decision on the optimal amount of power to offer at auctions - and at what price - is analyzed based on the wind risk at the project’s site and on the specific rules for wind power in Brazil that were prevailing in 2009. For this purpose, the Omega measure (KEATING & SHADWICK, 2002) was adopted as decision criterion. The use of the Omega measure is still new to the corporate world and has not yet been used in the wind industry. The main conclusion is that entrepreneurs have incentives to sell slightly more than the expected output of the wind farm, given that the purchasing rules are asymmetric for situations in which a farm is underperforming or is above expectations. This result is useful for legislators and potential investors in wind power generation in Brazil. Finally, considering that some projects with lower wind potential have won over others with higher potential, the third part of this work attempts to identify to what extent the uncertain scenario and investors’ different outlooks of the market’s potential may have influenced this result. Assuming that losers and winners of the auction had asymmetries not only in terms of the investments necessary to enter the market and build their portfolio of wind farms, but also in terms of their views on how the market for wind power will evolve in Brazil, this dissertation analyses this problem in light of the Option-Games Theory, deriving the decision to invest in wind projects under uncertainty and competition. The theoretical frameworks of this analysis are the works by Huisman (2001) and Pawlina & Kort (2006) for asymmetric duopolies, extending their theory to consider three asymmetries: asymmetry in the investment to enter the market, in the value of each player’s portfolio, and asymmetry in the stochastic process adopted by each player to describe the market prospects for wind farms. A sensitivity analysis to the parameters of the model identified the thresholds above which less viable firms preempt the market. The main conclusion is that minor asymmetries in the views about the future may have been sufficient to make more viable firms quit the auction earlier. The risk of less viable firms preempting the market drops when their opponent’s beliefs are not known, but at the expense of higher energy prices for consumers. When uncertainty is low and beliefs are symmetric, a feasible scenario when the governmental policy for the sector is clearer, the result can be lower energy tariffs as well as a stronger wind industry in Brazil.