In this work we study empirically the role of the electoral accountability in affecting political parties’ behavior. We explored differences in voter’s access to corruption’s information to test if political parties are accountable to voters and the accountability’s effect on political parties’ choices (politician’ discipline and political selection). The design of an anticorruption program generates the exogenous variation on the voter’s access to information. The program selects by lotteries municipalities to be audited publicly releasing the audit report. The time frequency of the lotteries allow us to compare municipalities with the same corruption level which have the audit report released before and after the municipalities’ election. First, we found evidence that when voters were informed about corruption level they punished political parties in the executive and legislative municipalities’ elections. Besides that, the access of information increases the probability that politicians remains in disadvantageous parties - small parties and parties that differs from the president’s party. These results suggest that parties discipline politicians. The release of information effects candidate’s characteristics. The candidate supported by the mayor’s party is younger and less educated , which suggests that the information limit the party’s capacity to attract politicians.