The aim of the present text is to demonstrate the impossibility of the deduction of both finitude and motion in the system of Spinoza s Ethics. The interest behind this objective is to provide reasons that justify the pertinence of updating Spinoza s philosophy. To this end, the method employed will be an immanent reading of this work, trying, whenever possible, to avoid exogenous understandings of its content. Thus, the text is divided into five parts. First, there is an introduction in which the objectives, the method used, and the basic structure of the work are presented. Secondly, there is a presentation of the relevant presuppositions for the intended demonstration, such as the concepts of: substance, attributes, infinite modes, finite modes, the principle of sufficient reason and true knowledge. In the third part the problem is delimited more precisely in three steps. Initially, differentiating it from the accusation of acosmism, made by Hegel against Spinoza. Then, pointing out the epistolary exchange between Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as an instance of the precise position of the problems considered, whose formulations are polished resulting in three questions. After that, the third stage of this third chapter seeks to defend the legitimacy of posing such questions, against the claims of two contemporary commentators. Then the text proceeds to its fourth act, in a series of steps. First, thirteen contemporary attempts to solve the problem are presented and evaluated. They are grouped into three sets, each related primarily to one of the three questions reached in the previous step. From the consideration of these attempts, further criticism arises in the interest of establishing the impossibility of demonstrating motion and finitude in the system of the Ethics. Thereafter, all the results obtained in this stage are consolidated, in an individualized treatment of the three questions cited, each subjected to four stages. Initially, the legitimacy or not of the question is explained. Next, the assumptions relevant to the issue under consideration are shown. After that, what the interpretation advanced by this thesis believes can be demonstrated according to Spinoza is positively demonstrated. Finally, the polemical demonstrations are included, in which the inadequacies of the positive demonstrations proposed in light of the presuppositions advanced and other arguments are presented. At this point in the text, the fourth chapter moves on to its last two stages. First the presentation of two more critiques of the notions of motion and finitude in Spinoza. After this, to close this stage, a diagnosis is included, where it is intended to determine what has caused the difficulties treated. Finally, in fifth place, the text concludes by recapitulating the contributions of this work and proposing in brief principles for a philosophy that gives up the assumptions considered problematic and that, therefore, could deal differently with the themes of movement and finiteness. In addition, some questions that this direction of thought leaves open are presented, pointing to further developments, finally closing this work.