This dissertation aims to compare the works of Schelling and Hegel. Taking the difference of thing in itself and phenomenon as a starting point, Kant came up with a split between subject and object. This division is the origin of an epistemological problem, since it implies a sharp definition of the conditions for knowledge. But even more, it also suggests an ontological matter, since it proposes a change in the meaning of objectivity and, therefore, of external reality. Our research entails an analysis of the so-called Antinomies of reason that shows two opposing philosophical standpoints (arranged as thesis versus antithesis), that are constructed according to the previous distinction of phenomenon and thing in itself. Following from Kant s philosophy, Fichte not only maintains the idea of subjectivity proposed by Kant s transcendental subject, but also transforms the argument present in the Antinomies with his distinction between the I (subject) and the Non-I (object). This difference underlies two trends in philosophical thinking, one idealistic, more focused on the subject and the other realistic, which has the object as a starting point. Thus, we suggest that the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel fit into this antinomic structure both present in Kant and Fichte with the distinction between I and Not-I and, respectively, the positions of idealism and realism. Schelling develop a thought that turns more towards external reality, something that is evident when we analyze his Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Identity. And insofar it concerns an ontological explanation of reality, it is possible to understand why Schelling sees the intellectual intuition and the construction of matter as the two possible epistemological access of the Whole of Nature, as well as the original Identity. On the contrary, Hegel brings back the transcendental problem in his Phenomenology of the Spirit, not only demonstrating a historical development regarding consciousness and Spirit, but also exposing what he calls the Notion (or the Concept). Therefore, we try to consider what Hegel meant with the Notion and how it is a sort of complex medium used to organize reality. It is possible to think that Schelling and Hegel bring two opposing alternatives concerning both an epistemological perspective and an ontological plan. While Schelling values a philosophy centered on reality and its development and, thus, a more intuitive kind of knowledge, Hegel thinks of reality as organized through the Concept, which clearly implies a conceptual, or even better, logical ontology. This distinction between the two philosophers becomes more evident in the last chapter, in which we compare Schelling and Hegel. In this sense, in relation to the Kantian problem about subject and object, they try to offer a reconciliation of these two terms. And they do this by formulating two different philosophical perspectives, something that place them in an antinomic position.