Ideal theories and non-ideal theories of adjudication are a methodological distinction within normative theories of adjudication. The latter consider that the methodology of normative theories must be adequate to what we might expect from ordinary human beings. Legal formalist scholars such as Larry Alexander, Cass Sunstein e Adrian Vermeule are associated with this methodology. The latter, in turn, believe that this is not a normatively relevant constraint. We can defend theories whose normative standards violate what we might expect from ordinary human beings. Dworkin s particularism is the chief exponent of this method. The central question is whether there is a genuine conflict between these two methods. To answer this question, I divide ideal theories into two strands: non-orienting ideal theory and orienting ideal theory. I argue that there is a methodological conflict only between non-ideals and the latter. Finally, I suggest that reflection on these issues is important to developing new normative projects, namely, ideal formalism and that such enterprise is intellectually valuable.