This essay is an account and an analysis of the failure of the Colombian peace process that took place during the presidential mandate of Andrés Pastrana from 1998 through 2002. The local reality actually became an humanitarian crisis whose solution necessarily involved abandoning shattered myths such as that of a stable democracy or that of poverty as the main root of endemic violence. The strong will to solve the armed conflict in a peaceful way has lead to reflection on the complex and unstable nature of the Colombian state, the true character of the quarrelling actors, the deepening of the social crisis and the tricky conciliation between internal and external interests. President Pastrana´s initiative falls into the area of studies of peaceful conflict resolution. The reading and interpretation of the facts will therefore be undertaken through the lenses of the literature on peaceful conflict resolution. That literature deals with the issue of the socioeconomic context in which the armed struggles occur, including its specifics. It also recommends mutual political recognition among parties and increasingly flexible demands in order to spur the smooth advance of the negotiation. The ultimate collapse of the Colombian peace process exposed the multiple obstacles to a solution to the civil war. It was not even possible to persuade either party to drop weapons. After four years of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia had passed, all these efforts were not enough to replace an ago-old, historical, and destructive social experience for a new, constructive, and beneficial experience. Such a new reality could have been possible if a peace accord had been reached.