This dissertation aims to investigate how the critical social theory of intersectionality, developed within the framework of black feminism and with inflections from decolonial critiques, can be used in the application and interpretation of the principle of equality. Intersectionality investigates the scenario of multiplicity and overlapping power structures that occur in the social field and generate new challenges for anti-discrimination law, especially due to the insufficiency of legal categorization. In this way, intersectional theory has a dual function that can be incorporated into legal doctrine. On the one hand, it provides an analytical paradigm capable of unveiling violence, discrimination and subalternization. On the other hand, it is a theory that has a normative bias in favor of social justice, thus guiding paths to be followed. In this sense, the first part of this dissertation investigated the theoretical assumptions of the principle of equality and the deficiencies in legal doctrine to deal with social complexity, as denounced by feminist and decolonial theory. In the second part, the aim was to present the constructs of intersectionality, essentially based on the theory developed by Patricia Hill Collins, in order to understand the ways in which this paradigm can contribute to the challenges and criticisms highlighted above, exemplified by reference cases from the Constitutional Court of Colombia and document analysis from the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia, two countries that have already incorporated the principle of intersectionality for the application of equality. Based on these analyses, it was noted that intersectionality offers legal doctrine a new tool to expand effective access to constitucional rights.