The main goal of this article is to analyse Sextus Empiricus interpretation of the initial verses of Parmenides’ proem. Since Antiquity, a reading that hierarchises the knowledge arranged in his poetry, placing truth and being on one side, and the opinions of mortals on the other, has been predominant among specialists. In Sextus Empiricus, this way of interpreting him gains strength, since the sceptic states that the Eleatic would have given up the senses in the name of reason, thus invalidating opinions in the name of truth. It will be seen throughout this text that this statement can be considered unsatisfactory and that Parmenides, contrary to what most experts postulate, elaborated a concept of truth that is superior, yes, to opinions from the strict perspective of perfect knowledge achievement, but not necessarily from the perspective of our mundane knowledge s relationship to the things around us. Therefore, truth and opinions, although distinct, should not be hierarchised in the way Sextus Empiricus does, but rather understood from a point of view that underlines their difference, both highlighting the relevance of truth and also drawing attention to the indispensability of opinions.