The mind is one of the most familiar and closest objects that we have, yet at the same time, one of the most mysterious. In this context, some philosophical theories try to understand the mind, especially their metaphysical aspect, that is, the mind s nature. Between these theories, there is functionalism, which defends that a mental state is a functional state. This state could be understood as a complex network of inputs, mental states, and outputs. Although functionalism has already been popular in philosophical circles, the way he approaches mental states has raised some criticism. Among the objections to functionalism, those related to absent and inverted qualia stand out. Qualia is a technical term in the philosophy of mind that refers to the subjective, qualitative, and phenomenal experience that we undergo. In other words, criticisms of absent and inverted qualia focus on pointing out the supposed weakness of functionalist theory in accommodating qualia in its metaphysics. Therefore, this article aims to analyze in detail the criticisms related to absent and inverted qualia towards the functionalist theory and explore the possibility of overcoming them.