The present paper proposes to carry out a general reflection on the concept of divine providence present in the dialogue On the Nature of the Gods (De natura deorum [N.D.]) by the Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.). In order to do this, the following points will be presented: 1) the relevance of this subject in the text’s dramatic structure (N. D., 1, 1-5); 2) the exposition of one of the "faces" of this conception by the Stoic character Lucilius Balbus (Id., 2, 73-168); 3) and how the other "face" of this notion is made explicit by the objections of the academic character, Gaius Aurelius Cotta (Id., 3, 65-93). In view of these topics, a brief explanation will be developed of how, in the aforementioned work, Stoic Physics conceives the universe (kósmos or mundus) as being rationally organized and divine, since all natural phenomena occur through the connection between cause and effect relations, which provides the basis for the understanding that all nature is governed by the immortal gods in favor of human beings (Id., 133-153) as the center of divine providential activity (Ibid., 154-168). As a counterpoint to these notions, academic criticism sets out to examine this question, by indicating that divine providence is not capable of guaranteeing the happiness of human beings (Id., 3, 65-93), so that it is possible to argue that the rationality present in them, arising from divine reason, cannot necessarily be considered a gift, because people generally use it to practice vicious acts (Id., 3, 65-79); and, in addition, there are evident cases in which certain evils can call into question the efficacy of the care of the gods, since they seem inactive in the face of the good and bad actions of mortals (Id., 79-88), which makes it possible to consider that the gods can be negligent in the face of the evils experienced by humanity (Id., 88-93).