This thesis aims to critically address the encounter between the way memory is understood in the field of transitional justice, on the one hand, and, on the other, how it is conceived from the work of Walter Benjamin, and conveyed by Primo Levi s literature. This is, more precisely, an attempt to draw from Benjaminian theory and Primo Levi s literature to think critically about the form of memory and its limits when embedded in the field of transitional justice. This is because, we argue, there are certain assumptions implicit in this field that give rise to questions about its transitory nature, and that delimit the power of memory as a means to critique the present and, thus, to drive the creation of the new. To address the theme, we address, in the first part of the thesis, conceptual and genealogical contours of transitional justice; the forms of expression of memory, from the understanding of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); and some of the assumptions of the field. In the second part of the paper, we present some of the aspects that mark the conception of memory in Benjamin, in order to achieve another perspective on the potency of the relationship between the transmission of past experience and the present. Then, we approximate Benjaminian conception of memory, and the literary form created by Primo Levi to transmit the memory of the offense.