Autonomy and norm of law is a reflection on the norm of law. Its starting point is of that the legal thought, its concepts of norm and autonomy, is surrounded by the paradigm of modern science e, for consequence, to the inherited ontological conception. By means of this agreement, the critique is oriented to the modern thought and the ontology that it estimates. The construction of the argument approaches the strangeness to the nature that represents the philosophy to the emergency of the right as practical philosophy. In this process, argues the removal perspective of the norm in relation to nature, to assay that the disjunctive estimated one does not possess a definitive bedding in the tradition, that the metaphysics that if consecrated no old thought reconciles, in its same ontology, nature and norm. In movements that aim at object the same, it intends to identify the elements of the dialogue of the modern thought with the tradition. The emergency of the modern thought was firmed under the beddings of the ontology that consecrated for the Socratic tradition: the permanence of the Roman law, gave continuity to the natural law and allowed its re-appropriation as reason; modern science constitutes affirming itself for the violence of the method, but keeping unbroken important proper beddings of the classic philosophy. Thus, law and science lead antique assumptions and it keeps them by means of the resignificance of its structural elements. This inheritance appears entire in the paradigm of modernity and allows understanding what Boaventura de Souza Saints calls specular crisis of science. Autonomy and norm of law approaches this critique to the ontological reflection, to reach the content of the crisis of science and law, on the basis of the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis. The present work, faces, therefore, the norm, since an ontological reflection, identifying the norm not exactly in what the norm is human creation, but highlighting the region where the norm, as human creation, is nature.