In this dissertation I aim to present, analyze, and defend an inferentialist solution to the so-called rule-following problem. The first chapter works as an introduction. The second chapter sets the stage for the discussion throughout the dissertation. After introducing the very idea of a theory of meaning, I show that it can serve as a systematic basis for metaphysical and epistemological discussions – wherein the themes of realism and representationalism take center stage. In the third chapter, I tackle the rule-following problem. More precisely, drawing on Hattiangadi s seminal interpretation, I offer a reconstruction of Kripkenstein s argument leading to the skeptical solution. I also assess the plausibility of the main lines of response to the problem. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the inferentialist theoretical-conceptual machinery inspired by Brandom, drawing the general framework for an inferentialist semantic theory that combines semantic inferentialism with pragmatic normativism and logical expressivism. The final chapter tackles the rule-following problem from the perspective set out in the previous chapter, using at the same time elements brought into play in the other three chapters.