The aim of this work is to evaluate the criticisms of J. R. Searle (1932 -) of the Classes of Illocutionary Force of J. L. Austin (1911-1960). The fact is that at the conference on the work when to say is to do: words and actions, Austin set out, provisionally, to list the illocutionary forces of performative utterances whose verb does not appear in an explicit manner. According to Searle, this classification covers illocutionary verbs, and not illocutionary acts, as the author criticizes in the article A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In this text, the most scathing criticism is that Austin s classification does not have clear and well defined principles. The vision of language defended by Searle is focused on syntax and on semantics, a point that is far from the pragmatic notion of language. He follows a prescribed direction that supposes a syntactic-semantic basis that is stronger than the one supposed by Austin. In the face of this, the following question is established: Searle s criticisms of the classes of illocutionary force are well founded? To answer this enquiry it is necessary to highlight the points that contribute to the groundlessness of Searle s criticism of Austin s classification, We examine here. We do not wish here to deny the contribution of Searle to the field of philosophy in general. Nevertheless, as regards the Philosophy of Language, the result of this evaluation shows that Searle, on concentrating at the conference on the classes of illocutionary force, ends up reducing the Theory of Speech Acts to the classes: Veredictive, Expressive, Behabitive, Commissive, and Expository. Basically, it is through the work How to Do Things with Words, at each conference, that Austin presents the criteria and principles of the classes of illocutionary force, even if subjected to revision.