With the ingenious constitutional superposition of autonomous political spaces of common citizens into a single national territory, the Founding Fathers have inaugurated the modern federalism. This revolution has expressed, in act, the power of a multitude that wished to establish new realities – more common and full – and new ways of living and making decisions. In its original formula – from a liberal, democratic, pluralistic, egalitarian and caring inspiration – the federal balance entrusted to the Federal Government only issues deserving special promptitude, unity or uniformity – e.g., the declaration of war, coinage, and the standardization of weights and measures. All other political powers of the former colonies, recently freed, remained decentralized. Since then, a centralist and homogenizing trend, accentuated by the demands of the Welfare State, diverts the federalism from its power-limiting, protector of freedom, conciliator of general and specific interests, and guarantor of a privileged locus of citizenship nature. In this dissertation, the irreconcilable conflict between the groundbreaking radical nature of the constituent power and the conservative structures it produces every time it changes the reality is the context in which it is evaluated any possible instrumentality of our constitutional jurisdiction in relation to a centralized and paternalistic, almost nominal, federalism in which only a few and monitored freedoms would remain for the subnational entities. In this investigation, the recent surveillance of federal political spaces by the Brazilian Supreme Court, in light of theoretical assumptions, indicates the position of the Court in federative disputes for power, and their rereading, especially from the perspective of the principle of subsidiarity – federative expression of the ideas of diversity and solidarity – reveals other interpretational possibilities.