In this research I document a novel type of international financial contagion, whose driving force is shared financial intermediary. I study the London peripheral sovereign debt market the pre-1914 period, in which, given the absence of international monitoring agencies and substantial agency costs, financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors. Analyzing two events of financial distress - the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 - I find that the bond prices of countries with no meaningful commercial relations with the distressed countries, but which shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market just after the market learned about the crises, evidencing that investor were extracting information about the soundness of a debtor based on the financial intermediate which vouched the issued. This spillover is informational in essence, and arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: the same reason which explains why relational finance (in this case, underwriting) helps alleviate informational and incentive problems also produce contagion.