

**David Kopplemann Hauss**

**Ambivalence and the Tottering Reforms  
of RJ Police Institutions**

**Dissertação de Mestrado**

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Ciências Sociais.

Advisor: Prof. Fernando Cardoso Lima Neto

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September 2023

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## **Abstract**

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This study addresses public security in Rio de Janeiro from the perspective of civic culture, following along the lines of Alexis de Tocqueville (2000), Almond and Verba (1963), Putnam (1993), José Álvaro Moisés (2010), and Elisa Reis (1995). More specifically, it seeks to understand the result of various police reforms which modeled themselves on community policing without truly changing the structure of the State's public security institutions. The study will attempt to place CONSPERJ and the Rio de Janeiro Community Security Councils within this content in order to understand why this model was chosen and what it managed to change regarding public security policy in the state. The study also seeks to understand the role that civil society plays in RJ public security policy decisions. Many studies have already focused on the cultural and structural difficulties faced when attempting police reform in the state, and a study on how civil society influences this process can provide an important perspective on public security in the state as well as potential models for a fairer, less oppressive model of public security.

## **Keywords**

Public Security; Rio de Janeiro; Nazareth Cerqueira; community policing.

## **Resumo**

Hauss, David Kopplemann; Lima Neto, Fernando Cardoso (Orientador). **Ambivalência e a Gangorra das Reformas Policiais do RJ**. Rio de Janeiro, 2023. 116p. Tese de Doutorado – Departamento de Ciências Sociais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Esta pesquisa aborda a questão de segurança pública no Rio de Janeiro a partir da perspectiva de cultura cívica, como elaborado por autores como Alexis de Tocqueville (2000), Almond e Verba (1963), Putnam (1993), José Álvaro Moisés (2010), e Elisa Reis (1995). Mais especificamente, ela procura entender os resultados das várias tentativas de reformas policiais que usaram o modelo de policiamento comunitário sem de fato mudar a estrutura do aparato de segurança no estado. Feitas estas análises, a pesquisa tentará colocar os Conselhos Comunitários de Segurança do Rio de Janeiro e CONSPERJ dentro do contexto das reformas policiais no estado para entender por que este modelo foi escolhido e o que de fato mudou na política de segurança política com esse programa. O intuito maior é entender o papel da cultura cívica nas escolhas políticas em relação à segurança pública no estado. Muitas pesquisas já elaboradas<sup>2</sup> focam nas dificuldades estruturais e culturais dentro da corporação policial, e uma pesquisa que também considera o papel da sociedade civil carioca pode fornecer uma perspectiva importante sobre as influências na segurança pública no estado e as saídas possíveis para um modelo de segurança mais justo e menos opressivo.

## **Palavras-Chave**

Segurança Pública; Rio de Janeiro; Nazareth Cerqueira; Policiamento Comunitário.

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<sup>2</sup> Vê por exemplo Soares (2019), Ribeiro (2014) e Ribeiro e Montandon (2014, 2015) e Cano et al. (2012).

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## 1. Introduction

In his classic treatise, *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990), Anthony Giddens considered the relationship between modern sociology and its subjects. He coined the term "double hermeneutic" to describe the fact that "Sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral part of that process" (1990, loc. 263). Sociological knowledge does not exist in a vacuum. Giddens focused on the idea that sociological knowledge is reinserted into the very societies it attempts to understand, and that the consequences of this can be unpredictable and counterintuitive. The English sociologist notes that "[t]he reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character" (1990, loc. 569). In other words, knowledge of a society at a given point in time will be fed back into the society and will have the potential to fundamentally alter the way the society functions.

Giddens uses economics as a concrete example of how the social sciences in general can contribute to this double hermeneutic. He notes that terms such as "capital", "investment", "markets", and "industry", among others, were initially introduced into economic thought while the field was being developed as a distinct discipline in the 1700s and early 1800s. This was an attempt to analyze economic behavior that ultimately influenced economic behavior itself. For Giddens, "[m]odern economic activity would not be as it is not for the fact that all members of the population have mastered these concepts and an indefinite variety of others" (1990, loc. 605). From its nascent beginnings, modern economic activity was influenced by economic thought, and ever since, "[t]he economic environment is constantly being altered in the light of these inputs, thus creating a situation of continual mutual involvement between economic discourse and the activities to which it refers" (GIDDENS, 1990, loc. 615).

Sociology, as a more generalized reflection upon modern social life, occupies a distinct role in the reflexivity of modernity. Giddens considers the government collection of population statistics, asserting that the "coordinated administrative control achieved by modern governments is inseparable from the routine monitoring of 'official statistics'" (1990, loc. 620). He also notes that the

very collection of these statistics is influenced by the findings of the social scientists that use them. Referencing Emile Durkheim, Giddens cites the work of coroners, responsible for informing social scientists on the collection of suicide statistics. "In the interpretation of causes/motives for death, however, coroners are guided by concepts and theories which purport to illuminate the nature of suicide" (GIDDENS, 1990, loc. 624). Even on an individual level, Giddens points out that the awareness of high divorce rates may affect a citizen's decision to marry (1990, loc. 624). This two-way influence between knowledge and action defines Giddens' double hermeneutic, leading to unintended consequences and constant renewal. The world "is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but...at the same time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised" (GIDDENS, 1990, loc 585).

Later in the same book, Giddens elaborates upon the concept of the "juggernaut". He uses this to tackle the question as to why the Enlightenment and modern society's turn toward reason has ironically led to a less stable, constantly changing world. This is largely due to two factors: "*unintended consequences* and the *reflexivity* or *circularity of social knowledge*" (GIDDENS, 1990, loc. 2043). As already noted, "[n]ew knowledge (concepts, theories, findings) does not simply render the social world more transparent, but alters its nature, spinning it off in novel directions " (1990, loc. 2053). This double hermeneutic makes the future of society unpredictable. Because our knowledge of social life affects its very foundations, "we cannot seize 'history' and bend it readily to our collective purposes...we cannot control social life completely" (1990, loc. 2053). We cannot predict the consequences of our collective actions, no matter how solid the social knowledge used to base those actions upon, because as soon as that knowledge is produced and absorbed, it, at least to some extent, becomes obsolete.

This is why Giddens conceives of modern society as a "juggernaut", a lumbering beast which can be influenced, but not fully controlled. He affirms, however, that "none of this means that we should, or that we can, give up in our attempts to steer the juggernaut" (1990, loc. 2063). While the consequences of acting upon current sociological knowledge may not be predictable, that knowledge is still our best foundation for creating lasting and needed social change.

Brazil's redemocratization can, in many ways, be seen as an attempt at steering the juggernaut. Highly influenced by the strong, organized social movements of the 1980s and marking the end of Brazil's mid-century military dictatorship, the Constitution of 1988 sought to reinstate democracy and lay the foundations for a more just society. Maria da Gloria Gohn shows how this period represents the progressive institutionalization of participative democracy in many public spaces, notably including health care and local budget planning (2007; 2011). As Giddens theorized in 1990, however, Brazil's redemocratization was and is a process that goes far beyond this legal framework. Organic social movements influenced the outcome and design of the Constitution, and the Constitution ultimately influenced the makeup and actions of these social movements by institutionalizing them and incorporating them into the policy-making process. Unsurprisingly, the result of this social engineering has been filled with unintended consequences, including the resurgence of reactionary, political forces rising against the progressive redemocratization of Brazilian society.

In Rio de Janeiro, the move towards participative democracy enshrined in the Constitution marked an important moment in a long process of police reforms aimed toward a more professionalized force designed to work within the democratic framework, rather than enforce an authoritarian form of governance. Col. Cerqueira's career represents the moment where police reforms began in earnest, and the police force was moved toward a more professionalized institution more capable of embodying the wider trend toward the redemocratization of Brazilian society which began towards the end of the military dictatorship. His reforms laid the groundwork for the more substantive move towards community policing.

The first chapter of this study will trace the theoretical history of participative democracy in order to better understand how community policing represents an important facet of participative democracy in modern society. By considering classic international authors, from Tocqueville (2000) to Putnam (1993) and Uslaner (in WARREN, 1999), as well as essential Brazilian authors, including Reis (1995), Moisés (2010), and Gohn (2007; 2011), the first chapter will situate community policing within the larger context of participative democracy. Texts from Wesley Skogan (2008) and the Vera Institute (1988) will shed light on the

origins of community policing before diving into the history of the practice within the specific context of Brazilian society.

The second chapter will follow the career of Col. Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira to better understand the origins of community policing in Brazil, as well as the difficulties faced in attempting to implement the practice. Cerqueira's intrepid attempt at harnessing the juggernaut proves the potential as well as the limitations of Giddens's double hermeneutic. Though he was successful in fomenting significant change in Rio de Janeiro's public security institutions, Cerqueira's reforms also helped lead to notable setbacks, including the election of a reactionary governor and arguably to violent reactions from within the ranks of the military police themselves. The lasting social inequalities in Brazilian society also made their mark on the coronel's reforms, despite the ideals of his vision. Ultimately, he was responsible for laying the groundwork and the first attempts at community policing in Rio de Janeiro, and more modern reforms owe much to his career-long journey.

The third and final chapter will consider more recent attempts at implementing true community policing programs in Rio de Janeiro. CONSPERJ and the regional community security councils institutionalized civil participation in public spaces, following the late 20<sup>th</sup> century trend noted by Gohn (2007; 2011) and Avritzer (2008) in the first chapter. It will demonstrate the importance of the groundwork laid by Cerqueira, as well as the similar pitfalls experienced by both rounds of reforms. Overarching theories from the first chapter, including observations from Reis (1995) and Putnam (1993), will help elucidate the successes and failures of modern community policing in Rio de Janeiro, while Avritzer (2008) will help to clarify where these reforms fit into the wider trend of institutionalized participation in modern Brazilian politics.

## 2. Participation and Community

The modern discussion on participation and democracy began with the great French writer, Alexis de Tocqueville. Authors such as Robert Putnam, Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald Inglehart updated the discussion by including empirical data and more complex concepts to the themes raised by Tocqueville. The grand themes of participation and democracy remain relevant and varied and are extremely useful when thinking about fundamental democratic institutions. That includes the discussion on public safety institutions, which can benefit greatly from being informed by and reformed based on said discussion. To create a fair, equal and representative democracy, a fair, equal and representative security apparatus is necessary. That is why it is important to return to Tocqueville in order to reflect on modern police reform.

For Tocqueville, democracy required the participation of its citizens to properly function. In his classic book, *Democracy in America* (2000), he highlights political associations in eighteenth-century America. The most obvious example of a political association would be the political party. A fundamental element in any modern government system, political parties help citizens' interests reach the national level. When analyzing North American political parties, Tocqueville defines two versions of them: a positive one and a negative one. Tocqueville describes the negative version when he states that,

There are countries so vast that the different populations that inhabit them, although united under the same sovereignty, have contradictory interests from which a permanent opposition arises between them (p. 166, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000)

The author doesn't even refer to these divisions as a party, for this antagonistic opposition is an extremely negative form of political participation. James Madison's definition of a political faction perhaps explains this form of political association better than Tocqueville himself:

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community (p. 24, MADISON et al., 1988).

Tocqueville goes as far as citing *The Federalist Papers* in this chapter, so it is not unreasonable to imagine that the French author was inspired by this source when developing his definition of a political party. For both authors, the problem occurs when antagonism arises between one's interests and the interests of other parties and/or groups of citizens. When advancing the interests of one means not only political defeat, but also significant damage to the other, the functioning of the system as a whole suffers. It is necessary to create the right means so that these antagonistic groups are able to understand each other and decide on a path that benefits all.

Tocqueville illustrates the ideal model for a political party when he states that "when citizens differ among themselves on points that interest all portions of the country equally, such as, for example, the general principles of government, then one sees arise what I shall truly call parties" (p. 166, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000). This model already shows the emphasis Tocqueville places on the means of government, rather than the ends. Government works best when the means are correct and based on the right principles - a recurring theme also present in *The Federalist Papers*. He continues this line of thought by stating, "What I call great political parties are those that are attached more to principles than to their consequences; to generalities and not to particular cases; to ideas and not to men" (p. 167, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000). What Tocqueville admired most about nineteenth-century America was the ability of its citizens to organize themselves around great ideas, rather than around great figures; to agree among themselves on the means and basic principles of the country, rather than to focus on specific and material interests.

What is important here is the notion that, for a democracy to work, there cannot be a purely antagonistic relationship between citizens. Division and disagreement will exist, but if the means to resolve problems between citizens are created, and if there is a culture that accepts and respects difference and respects the means to resolve them, a healthy democracy can exist. Public security institutions represent a means to solving serious problems within society. If we apply this Tocquevillean way of thinking to the issue of public security, it becomes obvious that a public security model based on oppression and violence is closer to

the notion of sectarianism than to that of a society creating solutions together. How, then, can a model that matches these democratic ideals be created?

According to Tocqueville, political parties are not the only way for citizens to organize themselves politically. The French author sees an extremely strong tradition of participating in associations in the United States, and this for him is the key to understanding the proper functioning of the American political system. He defines the term association as

An association consists solely in the public adherence that a certain number of individuals give to such and such a doctrine, and in the engagement in which they contract to cooperate in a certain fashion to make it prevail (p. 181, 2000)

He gives the example of a group of citizens meeting to discuss the problem of an obstacle in the middle of a public road. After identifying the problem, a group is called on to discuss and implement solutions. First comes the problem. Then an authority is created in the form of this group, which decides how the obstacle will be removed. For Tocqueville, this is an important political tool: "There is nothing the human will despairs of attaining by the free action of the collective power of individuals" (p. 181, 2000).

With the institution of "universal" suffrage, associations were forced to use a rational and discursive strategy of confrontation; they had to use a just means to achieve their preferred ends. This resulted in the political functioning of the United States of that time being more representative of the Enlightenment ideal than of a struggle between factions. There was an understanding that the political functioning of the country demanded collective effort on many levels, and disagreement was resolved in an effort to convince rather than to defeat. These *collective* efforts are what guaranteed individual freedom for Tocqueville:

Individual independence finds its part there: as in society, all men in it march at the same time toward the same goal; but each one is not required to march to it exactly on the same path. They make no sacrifice of their will and reason to it; but will and reason are applied in making a common undertaking succeed (p. 186, 2000)

Political and civil associations are important for confronting citizens with their dependance on each other. This is especially so in a democratic system because of its ability to isolate its citizens: "The inhabitant of the United States learns from

birth that he must rely on himself to struggle against the evils and obstacles of life; he has only a defiant and restive regard for social authority and he appeals to its power only when he cannot do without it" (p. 180, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000). There is a tendency towards individualization in democratic systems, and active participation in politics is essential as a counterbalance to this tendency: "In civil life, each man can, if he must, fancy that he is in a state of self-sufficiency. In politics he can never imagine it" (p. 496, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000). This is the fundamental role of political and civil associations: that of bringing citizens together and countering the isolation of democratic societies, thus demonstrating the importance and strength that can be gained through collective action.

This showcases the importance of associations in modern society, for "when citizens are forced to be occupied with public affairs, they are necessarily drawn from the midst of their individual interests, and from time to time, torn away from the sight of themselves" (p. 486, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000). They oppose the isolation of democratic societies, showing citizens that it is indeed important and effective to join in on collective action. Tocqueville states that "the free institutions that the inhabitants of the United States possess and the political rights of which they make so much use recall to each citizen constantly and in a thousand ways that he lives in society" (p. 488, 2000). It is the associations that keep the idea of fraternity alive in democratic societies and pull citizens out of their social isolation. If the role of associations is lost in citizens' lives, danger ensues:

if each citizen, as he becomes individually weaker and consequently more incapable in isolation of preserving his freedom, does not learn the art of uniting with those like him to defend it, tyranny will necessarily grow with equality (p. 489, TOCQUEVILLE, 2000)

For Tocqueville, a society only works if its citizens understand the importance of one another. For a citizen to advance his own interests, he has to understand that his interests also depend on the welfare and interests of his fellow citizens. This defines Tocqueville's concept of "self-interest well-understood." Angela Randolph Paiva, in her article "Civic culture in democratic consolidation: the actuality of a concept", explains the concept of this form of interest:

Para Tocqueville, a doutrina do interesse bem-compreendido era fundamental para proteger o 'homem de seu tempo' a não se



encerrar em si mesmo, ou seja, ela mitigaria o individualismo moderno e a ideia de liberdade com o inexorável gosto pela igualdade, que ele via presentes no espírito americano. Para isso, ainda segundo o autor, era preciso que a educação pudesse tirar esse indivíduo de si mesmo, afastá-lo dos excessos a que pode chegar seu egoísmo (daí ele falar em egoísmo esclarecido) (p. 194-195, 2011)

For the French author, with this comprehensive understanding of one's own interest as linked to the interests of others, North Americans "complacently show how the enlightened love of themselves constantly brings them to aid each other and disposes them willingly to sacrifice a part of their time and their wealth to the good of the state" (p. 502, 2000). The balance between individual freedom, collective action in favor of collective interests, and the ability of a citizen to understand the importance of the interests of other citizens are key to the good functioning of the United States of Tocqueville's time. The great thinker shows the importance of culture in political functioning, and that the latter depends on more than just the design of institutions. Paiva continues her interpretation of the French author's concepts,

esse interesse era qualificado como 'bem compreendido' e o egoísmo como 'esclarecido', porque ambos levavam os cidadãos americanos, através de costumes e práticas, a ter hábitos tão fortes que Tocqueville fala em "hábitos do coração", cuja sociabilidade em comunidade associativa os levava em uma direção para além do círculo familiar, condição básica para a participação mais ampla (p. 195, 2011)

With a culture open to this kind of participation, and which prioritizes the interest of society as a whole and the right means to manage the natural antagonism within society, institutions function better. This becomes extremely clear when reflecting on the role of public security institutions. Their goal is precisely to restrict individual freedom in favor of the collective, and Tocqueville's line of thought can be used to reflect on the best way to facilitate the participation of the community, and more specifically of associations, in designing public safety strategies that avoid the worst vices of democratic societies.

## 2.1. Social Capital and Trust

In *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam studies the roles of institutions and culture in the proper functioning of a democratic society. By studying regional differences in Italy after a comprehensive and uniform institutional reform, the researcher was able to compare the effect of regional cultures on these political institutions. In the 1970s, Italy decided to radically decentralize its governmental structure. The country established 15 new regional governments, in addition to the existing 5, which, at least on paper, "are virtually identical and potentially powerful" (p. 07, PUTNAM, 1993). This new policy created the unprecedented opportunity to study the creation of almost identical institutions in different regions, in which "the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts into which the new institutions were implanted differed dramatically" (p. 07, PUTNAM, 1993).

For institutions to function well, Putnam emphasizes the importance of what he calls a civic community. This refers to the political culture of a community. For the author, "Citizenship in a civic community is marked, first of all, by active participation in public affairs" (p. 91, PUTNAM, 1993). He continues the Tocquevillean tradition of emphasizing the active participation of citizens, and also of reinforcing the importance of well-understood interests, "that is, self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is 'enlightened' rather than 'myopic,' self-interest that is alive to the interest of others" (p. 92, PUTNAM, 1993). The importance of a policy that seeks the best for all, rather than the victory of one group over another, is a recurring theme in all these authors.

A fair amount of "social capital", which, for Putnam, "refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (p. 171, 1993) is considered fundamental by Putnam for the formation of a civic community. In line with Tocqueville's associativism, Putnam values the joint work done by members of a society. As they work together to improve their community, trust, norms, and networks are strengthened in a virtuous cycle that creates an ever-stronger civic community. On the other hand, by neglecting to work together, a community will experience a vicious cycle in which social capital is increasingly weakened and the community becomes less and less civic.

Putnam also describes what he identified in Italy's less civic communities. He states that "it is not the degree of political participation that distinguishes civic from uncivic regions, but its character" (p. 113, 1993). The issue goes beyond participation itself, but rather encompasses the quality of this participation. Clientelism and patrimonialism technically represent a form of political participation, and "In our 1988 survey, 20 percent of voters in the least civic regions acknowledged that they occasionally 'seek personal help with licenses, jobs, and so on from politicians,' as contrasted with only 5 percent of the voters in the most civic regions" (p. 103, PUTNAM, 1993). In this case, citizens from less civic regions participated more than citizens from more civic regions, but the quality of that participation was far from Tocqueville's ideal. Seeking out politicians to serve individualized interests does not fit the well-understood model of interest.

Furthermore, "Educated citizens in the least civic regions feel almost as impotent as less educated citizens in the most civic regions" (p. 114, PUTNAM, 1993). If citizens do not feel capable of changing policy, it is unlikely that they will organize themselves to improve public policies in their region. This lack of initiative stems in part from extremely hierarchical and centralized power structures: "Politics in less civic regions, as we have seen, is marked by vertical relations of authority and dependency, as embodied in patron-client networks" (p. 105, PUTNAM, 1993). In these regions, citizens depended on authorities. Politics in general was marked by clientelistic relations in which regional authorities ruled citizens, and managed to get elected through the exchange of favors, as describes in Victor Nunes Leal's *Enxada e Voto* (1948).

Thus, Putnam deepens the understanding of political participation, describing harmful forms of participation and vicious and virtuous cycles of politics. He managed to show that culture plays an important role in shaping public policy, and that the tradition of forming associations to deal with political problems in a cooperative manner helps to strengthen civic communities.

When discussing the role of culture in democratic societies, Ronald Inglehart and Eric M. Uslaner link the proper functioning of democratic institutions with the concept of trust. For both authors, this trust forms an integral part of any collective action, and in several ways contributes to the stability and functioning of democracy: "interpersonal trust is strongly linked with democratic institutions, as

well as with economic development" (INGLEHART in Warren, 1999, p. 93). For Uslaner, "Trust promotes cooperation. It leads people to take active roles in their community, to behave morally, and to compromise" (in Warren, 1999, p. 122). Without trust between citizens, it would be impossible to create and sustain the associations that are so important in the works of Tocqueville and Putnam. Inglehart and Uslaner analyze the importance of trust in democratic institutions, as well as the manner through which a society creates and maintains the kind of trust that leads to better functioning democratic societies.

In the chapter "Trust, Well-Being and Democracy" (in Warren, 1999, p. 88-120), Inglehart analyzes the relationship between trust and institutions, reaching the conclusion that it is not institutions alone that create trust. For him, trust is a cultural product, and there are several factors that sustain and create trust among citizens. One of the clearest proofs of this is that, "although the United States has had democratic institutions throughout the twentieth century, interpersonal trust among the US public has declined significantly during the past four decades" (INGLEHART in Warren, 1999, p. 88). If democratic institutions simply created trust among its citizens, there would be no explanation for the dwindling levels of interpersonal trust in the United States over nearly a half century.

Inglehart explores various factors that influence the level of trust between citizens, and found that economic and religious conditions are key factors in creating a culture of trust. He claims,

Analysis of the World Values Survey data reveals that those with relatively high levels of education and those with postmaterialist values show high levels of interpersonal trust. This reflects the fact that these groups contain the relatively secure members of a society. The postmaterialists consist of those who have experienced relatively secure conditions throughout their formative years, and the more educated have resources and skills that shield them from many of the risks of life and tend to be recruited from economically more secure families (INGLEHART in Warren, 1999, p. 89)

Citizens who do not have to worry about financial problems tend to have higher levels of confidence. Economic security helps to produce trust, but only if it is a pervasive condition in society, which is why economic development is often linked to high levels of trust. An extremely unequal and poorer society would find it very difficult to maintain high levels of trust even amongst its most privileged

citizens. Economic factors, however, do not fully explain the difference between levels of trust in the various countries studied. Inglehart also sees an important correlation with regards to the society's religious tradition:

a society's religious tradition seems to account for even more of the cross-national variance in interpersonal trust than does its level of economic development. Nevertheless, we need to include both economic and religious factors in order to obtain an optimal explanatory model (in Warren, 1999, p. 94)

Concurring with Weber's influential work, Inglehart sees the Protestant tradition as most conducive to the development of interpersonal trust, and thus the development of modern capitalism. This all goes to show that it is not government institutions that create and sustain democracy alone, but that various cultural factors influence the level of trust in a given society. All of these factors interact with each other in complex cause-and-effect relationships, and no single factor is capable of generating interpersonal trust.

The second key cultural piece that economic development helps to establish is that of mass legitimacy. If the economy is doing well and well-being is generally assured amongst the people, this builds confidence in the government and grants it legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. If the economy does well over a long period of time and across several administrations, this translates into trust in the system as a whole, rather than trust exclusively in the party that holds power. Thus, the economy can help to establish legitimacy to the political system as a whole, which, in turn, provides it with greater stability. Satisfaction with the economy and life in general actually have more influence on the perceived legitimacy of the system than satisfaction with the system itself:

satisfaction with one's life as a whole is far more conducive to political legitimacy than is a favorable opinion of the political system itself. Mass satisfaction with the way the political system is currently functioning has only a modest linkage with stable democracy, but satisfaction with one's life as a whole is a strong predictor of stable democracy (INGLEHART in Warren, 1999, p. 107)

What Inglehart found is that the most important effects of economic development are indirect: "the impact of economic development on stable

democracy seems to work mainly through its tendency to bring cultural and (to a lesser degree) social changes" (in Warren, 1999, p. 112).

All these factors (trust, legitimacy, religious tradition and economic development) lead to the stability of the democratic system. At the beginning of the 19th century, Tocqueville developed the germs of the ideas empirically proven by authors such as Inglehart. The French author saw hostility between political parties as detrimental to the functioning of government, and Inglehart shows how a culture of trust, which does not include factions fighting amongst each other, is key to the proper functioning of a democratic country. By preaching the importance of a well-understood interest, of fraternity among citizens, Tocqueville foresaw the need for interpersonal trust in modern democracy.

In "Democracy and Social Capital" (in Warren, 1999, p. 121-150), Eric M. Uslaner takes the concept of trust further by distinguishing between generalized trust and particularized trust: "We may trust those who are most like ourselves [particularized trust], or we may take greater risks for a more general form of trust [generalized trust]" (in Warren, 1999, p. 122). Although useful at the micro level, individualized trust does not translate into a well-functioning democracy because it is by definition exclusionary. Particularized trust easily turns into a fight between factions: "The more dependent we are on our close associates and kin, the more we think of the world in terms of 'we' and 'they'" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 122). Generalized trust, however, encompasses the population as a whole and not just members of one's own tribe, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the political system in general. It is also important in getting citizens to join in community work, such as civil and political associations: "Generalized trust makes people more willing to take part in their communities and to endorse moral commitments. Particularized trust makes people withdraw from civic life" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 123).

Generalized trust is a form of social capital, which Uslaner defines as a system of values that keep a modern democracy functioning well; it is a cultural element of society. Trust is a fundamental element of social capital, because "If societies are to do more than reproduce themselves, if they are to prosper, their members must interact with others. And they must make the rational gamble that others are trustworthy" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 124). In this he agrees with

Inglehart, for whom economic development is not possible without trust between fellow citizens. Of course, perfect generalized trust does not exist in any modern society - trust is not needed among all citizens; the point is to establish a level of trust between the majority of society: "For cooperation in a diverse society to emerge as the dominant strategy, a majority must be cooperators for the good to dominate over the nasty" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p 124). Tocqueville's view of democracy bets on the fact that the majority enjoys a relationship of trust, otherwise particular and contradictory interests will prevail and factions will take over.

For the civil and political associations that Tocqueville so valued to prevail, enough social capital in a given society, especially in the form of generalized trust, is necessary. Particularized trust, however, is harmful to the social fabric: "People who see view [sic] their own demographic groups positively are not just showing pride. They are sending a message of exclusivity" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 128). Particularized trust leads to generalized distrust. It forms a small group that tends to exclude others, further isolating citizens and embodying the dangers of Tocquevillean individualization. This is one of the reasons why "Americans have lost faith in each other. Trust in other people is a key factor in many forms of participation. When people trust only their own kind, they withdraw from civic life" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 131). For Tocqueville, this would be the inevitable rise of selfishness, carrying with it the danger of despotism.

What Uslaner has shown is that "As trust in others falls, so does participation in civic activities" (in Warren, 1999, p. 131). The decline in interpersonal trust in the United States has also led to a decline in participation in civil and political associations. For Tocqueville, this is a great danger, because, without these associations, individualism will lead to generalized selfishness and the emergence of factions, forming a government that is concerned with particularized and material interests, in such a way that the proper functioning of the government would be severely hampered. Uslaner digs deeper and investigates the possible cause of this decline in interpersonal trust.

For Uslaner, "we don't trust others as much anymore because we have lost confidence that the future will be better than the past" (in Warren, 1999, p. 136).

He believes that confidence in the future leads to confidence in people, because generalized optimism includes optimism in relation to people:

Optimism is a world view, not just a summation of life experiences. Optimists believe that other people will be helpful, are tolerant of people from different backgrounds, and value both diversity and independent thinking; they have confidence in their own capacity to shape the world (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 138)

An optimistic perspective is part of a chain of effects that starts with the sense of generalized trust, causing more civic activism, creating a more prosperous community and thus generating more optimism. Like Inglehart, Uslaner does not identify linear cause and effect in this cycle, but complex and interdependent relationships. For example, "While optimism and trust are not the same thing, a positive world view lays the foundation for interpersonal trust" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 139). This confidence also ends up generating more optimism in the cycle of causes and effects. Optimism, however, is be more capable of generating confidence than the reverse. The author shows that confidence in the future was significantly higher in the 1930s-1960s than in the post-Reagan era, and there is a strong correlation between this decline in optimism and the decline in participation in civil society.

Uslaner explores practical ways to encourage optimism and trust in a population, and agrees with Inglehart on the ineffectiveness of purely institutional strategies: "We can create new constitutional formats, but it is not so easy to develop trusting societies" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p 144). Tocqueville observed that political associations helped create civic associations and thus stronger communities. It's only in practice, at the micro level, that trust is generated, and Uslaner sees potential in an experiment conducted by Muzafer Sherif. The psychologist divided a group of children at camp into factions, and then tried to create a sense of what Uslaner would call generalized trust. To do this, he had the children work together to remove an obstacle blocking their source of fresh water. By achieving success in this task, the group recreated a sense of solidarity (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 145).

The question of cause and effect remains ambivalent: did the association create trust, or did trust make it possible to create an association? The fact, however,



remains that the proper functioning of democracy seems to depend on that groups of citizens solve practical questions of general interest. The solidarity that exists between individuals has to be encouraged through the successes of collective action, and the danger of isolation lies in the loss of people's power and the rise of authoritarianism.

The tendency of democratic societies, already pointed out by Tocqueville, is the growing loss of trust and solidarity, and the growing importance of individualized and often material agendas. All the aforementioned authors agree on the fundamental role of culture in sustaining healthy democracies, and that poorly made institutions (or well-made for evil) have a high capacity to destroy the foundations of democracy: "Democracies can't produce trust, but autocracies will destroy it" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 141). Tocqueville provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding this hopeless political landscape, but it lacks the empiricism of modern scholars such as Uslaner and Inglehart. The notion of culture is a nebulous concept, difficult to define precisely, but whose effects on modern societies are difficult to ignore without falling into the traps of reductionism and determinism.

## **2.2. Democracy and Trust in Brazil**

The situation in Brazil must be considered in light of its particular context. Based on a survey that asked young students at PUC-Rio who came both from public and private school systems about their perspectives on Brazilian democracy, Paiva found an example that explains the ambivalence that exists among some Brazilian voters. Asked about his perspective on politics in Brazil, a private school student replied,

Eu não confio em ninguém que esteja fazendo política. Não sei, olho pra televisão e não me inspiram confiança. Eu não votei. Tem aquela história de que um voto sempre faz a diferença, eu acredito que sim, mas não dá, eu não confio em nenhum deles. Minha vida gira em torno da minha família, do meu colégio... eu acho que vale mais a pena eu ir lá no morro toda 6a feira brincar com as crianças, como eu faço, do que votar nessas pessoas. Sinto que todo mundo sabe que tem alguma coisa errada e que tem que fazer alguma coisa para mudar, mas não muda. As pessoas ficam numa acomodação e não fazem nada (2011, p. 206)

With only a few sentences, the young man shows his distrust of politicians and also of other Brazilians outside his private circle - a theme that will be explored further in the analysis carried out in Elisa Reis' work. This student's ambivalence and distrust in relation to politics are made evident by his statement. A public school student's answer also lacks optimism,

Acho que a política tira muito dinheiro dos trabalhadores. Porque acontece que qualquer 'vereadorzinho' desses de município tem vários assessores, tem motorista, e o que eles fazem? Colocam a família deles toda (PAIVA, 2011, p. 206)

A general distrust of politicians remains evident in this excerpt, which also shows the issue of "amoral familism" that will be addressed more profoundly in this research based on Reis' study. For now, the ambivalence and mistrust of these two young men point to a significant problem in Brazil's civic culture.

José Álvaro Moisés, in his book *Democracia e Confiança: por que os cidadãos brasileiros desconfiam de suas instituições públicas* (2010), takes the debate about trust and ambivalence in Brazil to the macro level. Analyzing Latinobarometer data collected between 2002 and 2004, the Brazilian author asks three fundamental questions:

qual o grau de adesão dos brasileiros ao regime democrático como um ideal e como um sistema prático? Em que medida a sobrevivência de atitudes autoritárias compromete a aceitação do regime, e como a experiência dos cidadãos com as instituições democráticas influi sobre suas atitudes políticas? (2010, p. 77).

Like Putnam, Uslaner and Inglehart, Moisés seeks to understand the dynamics between institutions and culture in democratic societies. By tracing the history of redemocratization in 1980s Brazil, the Brazilian author points out that this

democratização resultou de iniciativas de liberalização de dirigentes do antigo regime seguidas de negociações com as liderança democráticas, mas o nosso primeiro presidente civil foi escolhido pelo Congresso Nacional segundo regras estabelecidas pelos governos militares. Essa ambiguidade marcou a fase final da transição, e a votação da Constituição de 1988 foi fortemente influenciada tanto por manobras de um presidente egresso do autoritarismo, como por pressões dos militares em torno de disputas sobre a duração do mandato presidencial, o sistema de

governo, as relações entre o legislativo e o executivo, e o papel do Estado na economia (2010, p. 90-91)

Thus, modern Brazilian democracy was born from a process with strong authoritarian traits. The Brazilian Constitution itself was influenced by a president who was not democratically elected, and by the military who refused to give up undemocratically obtained power. This resulted in the fact that "although it ensured important advances in terms of individual and social rights, the new Brazilian Constitution institutionalized a political system that tends to jeopardize its governance (Moisés, 2010, p. 91): the "coalition presidentialism". With these roots, it is not surprising that democratic institutions face severe limitations:

mesmo analistas que reconhecem os avanços do país no terreno da competição e da participação políticas classificam o Estado brasileiro como incapaz de fazer cumprir plenamente a lei e as exigências do regime constitucional vigente (Moisés, 2010, p. 92).

Although the author sees no reason to believe in the end of democracy in Brazil because of these institutional problems, he understands that these problems affect citizens' perceptions of democracy.

To go beyond purely institutional problems, Moisés sought to investigate whether these traits of authoritarianism also existed within the political culture of the country. Using data from the Latinobarometer, the author aimed to establish three typologies among the interviewed: democratic, authoritarian, and ambivalent. To establish these typologies, the author used the answers to two specific questions:

1) Você concorda muito, concorda, discorda ou discorda muito da seguinte afirmação: 'A democracia pode ter problemas, mas é o melhor sistema de governo'; 2) Com qual das seguintes frases você concorda mais: 'A democracia é preferível a qualquer outra forma de governo'; 'Em algumas circunstâncias, um governo autoritário pode ser preferível'; ou 'Para pessoas como eu, dá no mesmo um regime democrático ou um não democrático'. (Moisés, 2010, p. 99)

Democrats correspond to those who answered positively to the first statement, and who agreed more with the first sentence of the second question ("Democracy is preferable to any other form of government"). Authoritarians are those who disagreed with the first statement, and who agreed with the phrase, "In some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable." Ambivalents

agree with the first statement, and with the sentence "For people like me, it makes no difference whether it's a democratic regime or a non-democratic one." Between 2002-2004, 40% of interviewees in Brazil were of the democratic typology, 6.3% authoritarians, and 53.7% corresponded to the ambivalent type. In Latin America as a whole, Brazil was among the three countries with the lowest percentage of democrats.


### **2.3. Update**

Data from the more recent 2018 Latinobarometer show an even more worrisome picture. The questions weren't exactly the same, but they were similar enough that comparing results is a reasonable exercise. Rather than simply agreeing or disagreeing with the statement "Democracy may have its issues, but it is the best system of government", the interviewee could strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or state that they did not have an answer. 25.8% strongly agreed, and 30.6% agreed. In the first poll, when adding the ambivalent and Democrats, 93.7% of the interviewed in 2002-2004 agreed with the democratic phrase. Now in 2018, adding up those who answered affirmatively, whether strongly or not, only 56.4% agreed. In 2018, 37.7% disagreed or strongly disagreed in comparison to the 6.3% identified as authoritarian in 2002-2004. All in all, in 2018, 56.4% of respondents thought democracy was the best form of government, while in 2002-2004 93.7% did - a decline of almost 40% in 14 years.


The 2018 results also show a decrease in democratic values regarding the second question in Moses' study, although the difference is less dramatic this time around. The format was essentially the same, in which the subject was asked to agree with one of three sentences. The only difference was the inclusion of the answer "I don't know" as a possibility. In 2002-2004, 40% of respondents in 2002-2004 identified as democrats, agreeing with the phrase "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government", whereas in 2018 only 33.9% agreed - a decline of 6.1%. Authoritarians, who agreed with the phrase, "in some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable", summed up to 13.8% in 2018, an increase of 6.3% in comparison to 2002-2004. In 2002-2004, the ambivalents were 53.7% in 2002-2004, while in 2018 they summed up 40.5%. 11.8% either answered

that “I don’t know” or simply did not answer. Adding those who were ambivalent to those who did not know or did not answer summed up 52.3%, almost equal to the number of ambivalents in 2002-2004. While the “I don’t knows” or did not answers do not directly fit into the democratic/authoritarian/ambivalent typology, it's plausible to assume that they are more consistent with the ambivalent typology than the other two types.

Graphs: 1.1: Latinobarometer 2002-2004 and 2018




Graphs: 1.2: Latinobarometer 2002-2004 and 2018



Thus, the result that is most worth highlighting is that the number of Democrats has dropped by 6.1% over the years, and the number of authoritarians has more than doubled, from 6.3% to 13.8%. It is important to note that 2018 was marked by an extremely polarized election and a growing wave of authoritarianism, and it is highly possible that that year's results will stand out from the curve. It will

be extremely prudent to study the results of the next Latinobarometer to understand whether the 2018 results represent a trend, or more likely, an exception in terms of the growth of authoritarianism. Analyzing data from 2005-2018, those who agreed with the statement "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government" vary between 55.1% (2009) and 32.4% (2016), but in 2015 this number was of 54.4%. Over the studied period, there appears to be a general downward trend with regards to those identified as democrats. As for the growth of authoritarianism, numbers vary between a 19.4% high (2011) and a 13% low (2016). A significant drop between 2011 and 2018 was identified, although both results are significantly higher than those of 2002-2004. Regarding the ambivalents, the peak during this period was in 2016, in which they reached 41.8%, and the minimum was in 2010 in which they accounted for 15.4%. In 2016 and 2018 alone, this number figured above 30%, generally ranging between 15% and 30%.

Graphs: 1.3: Latinobarometer 2002-2018, percentage of agreement with sentences about democracy.



Graphs: 1.4: Latinobarometer 2002-2018, percentage of agreement with sentences about democracy.



It is difficult to establish a fixed trend for those identified as authoritarians and ambivalents. It seems that authoritarianism has indeed increased, but it would not be prudent to affirm that it will continue to grow. The numbers on ambivalents are ambiguous, but it seems that there has always been a significant and relatively consistent portion of Brazilians who do not have strong opinions about democratic institutions.

The decrease of belief in democracy, however, cannot be ignored, especially since a 40% drop in those who affirmatively agreed that democracy is the best form of government is significantly problematic. The clearest trend among these numbers is the fact that Brazilians seem less and less actively committed to their democratic institutions, which resembles Putnam's vicious cycle. The number of those who agreed with the first sentence, "Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government", has varied between 82.3% (2008) and 56.4% (2018), with a clear downward trend since 2004. In relation to this survey, what matters most is that the results show that Brazil continues to be a country with a high number of ambivalent and authoritarian voters, and that the democrats seem to be progressively less numerous. This shows that the research carried out by Moisés is still relevant almost twenty years after the Latinobarometer edition he initially analyzed, and more than a decade after the publication of his book.

The importance of democrats in a democratic society cannot be underestimated. Moisés found that, "*os indivíduos autoritários são os mais*

*identificados com valores antidemocráticos, mas os ambivalentes [...] vêm em seguida, indicando que as incertezas quanto à escolha dos regimes políticos reforçam as atitudes que dificultam ou bloqueiam a aceitação da democracia"* (2010, p. 101). This level of ambivalence is in part because "*um grande número de cidadãos latino-americanos considera que a democratização não está cumprindo a sua promessa*" (2010, p. 101), creating a gap between citizens' idealized vision of democracy and how democratic institutions are working in practice. When inquiring the interviewees more closely, Moisés discovered that "*atitudes ambivalentes e autoritárias são determinadas tanto pela cultura política como por percepções sobre o funcionamento das instituições democráticas*" (2010, p. 102). In an attempt to measure the effect that institutions have on citizens' democratic values, Moisés analyzed the perception that Brazilians have of their democratic institutions.

Moses found that the authoritarian and the ambivalent are the most dissatisfied with democracy and would be most open to incomplete democratic regimes, such as a democracy "without Congress" or "without political parties." He dialogues with Inglehart's text by confirming that those who would accept a democracy without Congress also tend to have a high level of interpersonal distrust (MOISÉS, 2010, p. 112), but disagrees with regard to the importance of faith in political culture. For Moses,

O contraste entre a adesão normativa majoritário ao regime e o severo julgamento dos cidadãos sobre a democracy-in-action indica que o grau de incongruência existente entre a oferta institucional de democracia e a demanda cultural dos cidadãos pelo sistema não está sendo superada com o passar do tempo (2010, p. 115)

There is "*uma conexão entre a ambivalência a respeito de valores político, a insatisfação com a democracia e a desconfiança de instituições como os partidos e o Congresso Nacional*" (p. 116, MOISÉS, 2010, p. 116).

Moisés shows that there is a fluid dynamic between the effects of culture and political institutions on citizens' adherence to democratic regimes. The gap between the desired ideal of democracy and the problematic functioning of democratic institutions in Brazil undermines the citizens' faith in their government. On the other hand, a mostly ambivalent political culture with a significant dose of



authoritarianism hinders the population's active participation, which could otherwise help create and sustain a more solid democracy. The downward trend in the number of convinced democrats in Brazilian society is a highly worrisome fact, especially since, following the authoritarians, "*os indivíduos ambivalentes são também os que mais preferem um tipo de regime democrático incompleto ou incapaz de atender a princípios fundamentais de participação e representação*" (MOISÉS, 2010, p. 109). The picture painted by Moisés is one of a democracy with a precarious foundation, and the updated data does not leave much room for optimism.

Elisa Reis deepens this discussion by examining the lack of participation in Brazilian democracy. In the article, "Inequality and Solidarity", she analyzes *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, written by Edward Banfield in 1958, focusing on how his findings apply to Brazil. Banfield's book, an antecedent to Putnam's (1993) influential research, draws on a study in Italy, and Reis particularly explores his concept of "amoral familism." This concept is similar to that of particularized trust as developed by Uslaner. For Reis, "*Banfield se voltava primordialmente para as implicações de um ethos que impedia as pessoas de agirem de modo conjunto em função do bem comum. Assim, o familismo amoral designava um ethos que excluía a colaboração fora do círculo restrito da família*" (1995, p. 35). Reis links the concept of amoral familism to societies with "high levels of inequality", such as Brazil, and the difficulty in perfecting the "art of association" in these societies.

For Banfield, amoral familism resulted in the pursuit of material and immediate advantages for the nuclear family and in a lack of concern for the common good. Although Banfield's text includes certain antiquated and pseudo-evolutionary perspectives, a problem that stems from the time in which the text was written, Reis elaborates a valuable, relevant analysis while drawing on the American sociologist's findings:

Banfield definiu em poucas palavras o dilema da ação coletiva: em Montegrano, as pessoas não viam razão alguma para colaborar nas campanhas coletivas. Durante as entrevistas, elas freqüentemente demonstravam não acreditar na existência de qualquer vantagem decorrente da participação em ações na esfera pública (REIS, 1995, p. 37)

This isolationism hinders the development of a strong and functional civic culture, and shows how “*uma falta de confiança generalizada levava os membros da comunidade a considerar o recuo para a esfera privada como sua escolha mais racional*” (REIS, 1995, p. 37). While Banfield saw amoral familism as the cause of the lack of socioeconomic development in Montegrano, Reis paints a more complex and more modern picture. Moisés pointed out the dynamic relationship between political institutions and culture in general, Reis, on the other hand, argues that “*os princípios morais predominantes podem ser tomados como parâmetros tanto quanto as condições econômicas: eles é que definem os contornos da situação em que as escolhas são feitas*” (1995, p. 37). Reis's intent is to expand and modify Banfield's findings and better understand the relationship between unequal "resource scarcity" and a solidarity that is restricted to the nuclear family.

Reis begins her analysis by exploring the history of public space and identity in Latin America. She states that the “*construção de uma arena pública na América Latina, assim como em outras sociedades do Terceiro Mundo, esteve historicamente associada ao processo de desenvolvimento e modernização sob a liderança do Estado*” (1995, p. 38). The state would have played an integral role in shaping both the economy and national identity.

Sob uma ou outra forma de governo, o planejamento governamental e os investimentos estatais diretos serviram a dois propósitos: proporcionar os meios pelos quais puderam ser instituídas condições adequadas de mercado para os empresários privados e para os trabalhadores; e, ao mesmo tempo, criar condições para a incorporação de massas urbanas cada vez mais numerosas na arena política (REIS, 1995, p. 38)

This socioeconomic history provided Latin America as a whole with a “*concepção particular de sociedade civil*”, which created a close relationship between citizens and the State, thus eliminating free competition between specific segments of society, such as particular classes and associations. The socioeconomic development that resulted from this model progressively expanded the “*hierarquia socioeconômica*” with the promise of incorporating more and more citizens into the political community. As a result, the social solidarity that resulted from this process meant that, “*despeito das enormes disparidades sociais, a invocação da comunidade, contida na noção de Estado-nação, agiu no sentido de impedir a emergência de identidades sociais concorrentes*” (REIS, 1995, p. 39). From the

perspective of Tocqueville, a variety of interest groups that could debate and discuss issues pertinent to society as a whole never emerged. In Reis's view, the key element of participatory democracy – according to the Tocquevillian perspective - never fully formed in Latin America.

The State's promise to incorporate and benefit increasingly larger numbers of citizens made it difficult to create social groups with specific interests that would fight for their demands: "[o] fracasso do pluralismo na América Latina está inversamente relacionado com a institucionalização do corporativismo de Estado" (REIS, 1995, p. 39). In the end, this model promoted "*uma identidade coletiva em torno do Estado-nação que colocava a autoridade acima da solidariedade*" (1995, p. 42). With this promotion of state authority as the ideal formation of national identity, the legitimacy of private interests, fundamental to the formation of associations and political participation, was highly questioned at the cultural level.

Analyzing the effects of history in Brazil specifically, Reis states that, despite the existence of spontaneous and collaborative associations in the country, they tend to follow the model of amoral familism. Among the poorest, "*a analogia com o familismo amoral se sustenta exatamente porque essas iniciativas são mantidas na esfera privada e definidas em termos limitados*" (1995, p. 41). While not necessarily confined to the nuclear family, these associations do not tend to spill over into the public sphere where members help one another anonymously. Among the richest, there is a gap that separates them from the less favored social segments:

aqueles que têm alguma coisa a perder associam diretamente a violência e a insegurança com seus temores frente à pobreza e à desigualdade, enquanto, na prática, a incapacidade do Estado para garantir a ordem, a segurança e o bem-estar incentiva à adoção de medidas de proteção privada (REIS, 1995, p. 41)

This creates a vicious cycle in which the mutual distance between social classes gives rise to a fear of using the public space, pushing citizens further and further towards the private sphere, where they feel safe. For Reis,

A exortação à prática da fraternidade social e de princípios semelhantes, numa tentativa de dar combate à pobreza, tende a obscurecer o fato de que a privação aguda e a desigualdade excessiva podem funcionar como impedimentos à solidariedade (1995, p. 41)

Without understanding this, strategies implemented to encourage solidarity can end up fueling this vicious cycle. For Reis, "*iniciativas tomadas na esfera privada para compensar o fracasso do Estado na manutenção da ordem pública e da segurança acabam por agravar o problema*" (1995, p. 42). She explicitly cites the contracting of private security services, both legal and illegal, which ends up monopolizing security resources and undermining the legitimacy of public authority at the same time.

Reis summarizes, "*quanto mais orgânicas e holistas foram as concepções tradicionais das identidades coletivas, mais provável se torna hoje em dia encontrar sentimentos de alienação, e mais razões existem para que as pessoas se refugiem em suas redes privadas de relações*" (1995, p. 43). With the emergence of neoliberalism as the prevailing model economic development model in the late 20th century, both the economic model and the model of national identity embodied in Latin American forms of developmentalism suffered drastic setbacks. Without the promise of political and economic incorporation on account of the progressive expansion of the economy encouraged by the State, the formation of a holistic national identity was put in check:

A mística do desenvolvimento nacional proclamava que os frutos da modernização seriam repartidos entre todos, mas, quando essa ideologia foi descartada, não restou aos menos favorecidos outra alternativa estratégica de sobrevivência senão recorrer a redes defensivas privadas. Mesmo os mais favorecidos muitas vezes reagem ao aumento das taxas de criminalidade com estratégias defensivas, que reduzem o alcance da solidariedade social. (REIS, 1995, p. 43)

The vicious cycle in which the less advantaged are forced to adopt amoral familism as a rational survival strategy, and the more advantaged resort to private security to secure their private space, undermines the legitimacy of State authority and provokes fear among people of different social classes.

## 2.4. Modern Trends

Maria da Gloria Gohn, however, in her article, "Participação de representantes da sociedade civil na esfera pública na América Latina" (2011), points to a more optimistic, modern trend in Brazilian politics, focusing on two

specific phases at the turn of the twenty-first century. The article follows and continues upon her findings from *Conselhos gestores e participação sociopolítica* (2007), in which she explores the institutionalization of civil participation in public spaces. Gohn states that,

a temática da institucionalidade de práticas civis em espaços públicos constitui-se em um processo sociopolítico relevante em vários países da América Latina nas duas últimas décadas...de um lado criam-se novas relações, oportunidades e consolidação de espaços democráticos; de outro, há impactos e resultados diferenciados para os entre setores da sociedade civil organizada que participam daqueles processos (GOHN, 2011, p. 224)

Before Brazil ended its military dictatorship in the late 1980s, social movements and activists tended to remain consciously independent of State institutions:

A não institucionalização era uma forma de 'estar de costas para o estado', mais como ato defensivo, ou de resistência, do que por crenças ou fundamentos ideológicos ou filosóficos do comunitarismo/basismo (GOHN, 2011, p. 229)

With the 1988 Constitution, which formally put an end to Brazil's military dictatorship, civil participation in government affairs changed dramatically. Social movements now enjoyed legally provided mechanisms, enshrined in the Constitution, which would allow them to actively participate in State institutions in order to make their demands heard and their solutions considered. Ensuring that these mechanisms were faithfully implemented, however, was not a given. For Gohn, the institutionalization of social movements in Brazil was

construído historicamente no desenrolar do processo de democratização da sociedade brasileira. Podemos dividir este processo em dois momentos: o primeiro, nos anos de 1990, resulta de uma trajetória de luta para implantar as conquistas constitucionais, destacando os conselhos gestores e outros espaços institucionais, com destaque para o OP – Orçamento Participativo. O segundo, a partir do ano 2000, promove a ampliação das formas de gestão deliberativas, criando inúmeras inovações no campo da participação popular democrática (2011, p. 230)

While community and popular councils had existed and even been prevalent before the 1990s, there were "*compostos exclusivamente de representantes da sociedade civil, cujo poder residia na força da mobilização e da pressão, e não*

*possuíam assento institucional junto ao Poder Público*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 230). A major change that proceeded Brazil's redemocratization was the creation of so-called management councils (*conselhos gestores*), which, "*por força de lei, integram-se com os órgãos públicos vinculados ao Poder Executivo, voltados para políticas públicas específicas, responsáveis pela assessoria e suporte ao funcionamento das áreas em que atuam*" (2011, p. 230). Management councils officially institutionalized active public participation in the formulation of State policy, allowing for concrete, direct social control over the State.

Despite the promising beginning of these managing councils, "*[c]om o passar do tempo, inúmeras avaliações foram sendo feitas sobre os conselhos e as otimistas expectativas iniciais não se generalizaram...A almejada participação popular ainda não teria sido conquistada.*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 231). Just because an idea looks good on paper, does not mean it will necessarily work in practice. It would take the better part of a decade to see significant progress with the implementation of managing councils in Brazil, and only with the use of an important legislative tool: "*A legislação em vigor no Brasil preconiza, desde 1996, que, para o recebimento de recursos destinados às áreas sociais, os municípios devem criar seus conselhos. Isso explica porque a maioria dos conselhos municipais surgiu após esta data*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 231). The use of economic sanctions was necessary to inspire Brazilian municipalities to adopt this model on a larger scale. Even with these sanctions, however, "*vários pareceres oficiais assinalaram o caráter apenas consultivo dos conselhos, restringindo suas ações ao campo da opinião, da consulta e do aconselhamento, sem poder de decisão ou deliberação*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 231). In the municipalities that lacked a strong, associationalist culture, these councils were often toothless, ignored, or used by the local executive branch as another clientelist resource.

Starting in the year 2000, the councils began to receive more attention and improved greatly in practice: "*não se trata apenas de construir ou implementar os canais institucionais, trata-se da gestão dos mesmos*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 232). Building these channels was an important step forward, but if demands and solutions directed through these channels were not leading to real change in the first phase of Brazil's institutionalization of civil participation in public spaces, the fundamental progress made in the second phase was to allow for the true spirit of

the managing councils to be respected. For Gohn, "*As formas institucionalizadas, do tipo conselho ou câmara de representação, aumentaram quantitativamente, ampliando também o leque das temáticas tratadas*" (2011, p. 236). Another important improvement in the second phase of Brazil's institutionalization of civil participation was "*o papel que determinados movimentos e representantes da sociedade civil organizada adquiriram para a formulação de políticas públicas*" (GOHN, 2011, p. 236).

In "Instituições participativas e desenho institucional: algumas considerações sobre a variação da participação no Brasil democrático" (2008), Leonardo Avritzer considers the forms of institutionalized participation that arose in this period and evaluates their effectiveness. For Avritzer, "*O Brasil se transformou ao longo do século XX de um país de baixa propensão associativa e poucas formas de participação da população de baixa renda, em um dos países com o maior número de práticas participativas*" (2008, p. 44). He agrees with Gohn in noting the long term progress the country's political institutions have made in institutionalizing participation, and considers three distinct designs of civil participation, "*desenhos participativos de baixo para cima*" (bottom up), "*processos de partilha do poder*" (power sharing), and "*processos de ratificação pública*" (public ratification) (2008, p. 44). All three are legitimate forms of institutionalizing civil participation in public spaces, with fundamental differences in both the implementation and the efficacy of each design.

The bottom up design, "*do qual o orçamento participativo no Brasil é o exemplo mais conhecido, há a livre entrada de qualquer cidadão no processo participativo e as formas institucionais da participação são constituídas de baixo para cima*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 45). The *Orçamento Participativo* (OP) of Porto Alegre allows citizens to participate in the formulation of city budgets as individuals and as representatives of civil associations, where they "deliberate and decide on projects for specific districts and on municipal investment priorities, and then monitor the outcome of these projects" (FUNG et al., 2003, p. 52). Open, regional assemblies in each of the city's sixteen districts elect neighborhood representatives and review the previous annual budget every year while counting on the presence of the city's mayor and staff. These regional delegates then meet regularly to discuss and propose projects for the upcoming budget until they meet at the Regional

Plenary, where "a vote among regional delegates serves to prioritize the district's demands and priorities and elect councilors to serve on the Municipal Council of the Budget." (FUNG et al., 2003, p. 53). The Municipal Council of the Budget then meets with representatives of the city's government to "propose and approve a municipal budget in conjunction with members of the administration" (FUNG et al., 2003, p. 53). This design allows for the direct participation of citizens in the deliberation of a city's budget. Avritzer is careful to note Porto Alegre's unique political history, which includes a strong tradition of civil organization and progressive, left-leaning tendencies that likely facilitated OP's success (2008, p. 48). The combination of a strong, organized civil society and a supportive political administration are key to the success of the bottom-up design.

The second design is that of power sharing, which occurs "*através da constituição de uma instituição na qual atores estatais e atores da sociedade civil participam simultaneamente*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 46). This design differs from the bottom up approach in two main points: "*não incorpora um número amplo de atores sociais e porque é determinado por lei e pressupõe sanções em casos de não instauração do processo participativo*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 46). Avritzer uses Brazil's health councils as a case study, and later in this study we will consider Rio de Janeiro's public security councils as another example of the power sharing design.

For Avritzer, Brazil's health councils had their origin in two separate movements: the "*movimento sanitarista*", composed mainly of healthcare professionals, and the "*movimento popular de saúde*", which began in eastern Sao Paulo and was composed of healthcare system users hoping to improve healthcare services in their region (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 52). While the *movimento popular de saúde* fought for "*controle e, eventualmente, a autonomia da sociedade civil no processo de decisão sobre os serviços de saúde municipal*", the *movimento sanitarista* was more focused on "*medicina preventiva e na reorganização do papel do Estado no sistema de saúde do país*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 52-53). At the 1986 "*VIII Conferência Nacional de Saúde*" in Brasília, the demands of these two movements became the main takeaway, and led to the acceptance of the health council model as the ideal form of participation in public health. With this, the "*proposta de um sistema unificado de saúde, descentralizado e com participação*



*popular foi apresentada sob a forma de uma emenda popular durante a Assembléia Nacional Constituinte e aprovada com algumas modificações propostas pelos setores conservadores" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 53).*

Despite the momentum and significant gains made through the 1980s, it was only in December of 1990 that, after much debate and negotiation, Congress passed "*a lei 8.142 que instituiu os conselhos na área de saúde*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 53), the result of two strong, popular movements influencing the debate on the conception of the new, democratic Brazilian State. Avritzer also points out the importance of one specific element of the councils, which is

*"a associação entre a falta da participação e sanção, expressa na suspensão da transferência de recursos públicos federais para os municípios que não praticarem a participação popular na saúde"* (2008, p. 53). He agrees with Gohn on the importance of economic sanctions in forcing local governments to adopt participative models of governance, especially when the local executive branch is not supportive of participative initiatives.

Avritzer uses the case of Sao Paulo to show how a power sharing design can be effective even in a case when a bottom-up design would likely fail to succeed. He notes that the first health council was created by the Erundina administration in 1989, even before 1990's Law 8,142 came to be. Conflict arose when more conservative administrations attempted to privatize municipal health services in the mid- and late 1990s, a policy which "*sofreu a oposição ativa do conselho municipal de saúde e resultou na aplicação da sanção prevista em lei: a suspensão dos repasses do governo federal para a cidade de São Paulo*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 54), thereby keeping the local government from using public resources to fund private health enterprises. This led to an attempt by the administration to effectively limit civil participation in the council. "*A resposta dos representantes da sociedade civil foi reelaborar o estatuto do conselho de forma a qualificar melhor o conceito de representação da sociedade civil*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 54), which guaranteed civil society's place on the council and blocked the administration's attempt to erode the institutionalization of civil participation in this public space. With a strong history of civil organization, the power sharing design does not require the government backing that the bottom up design does. Avritzer affirms,

Assim, nos casos em que as organizações da sociedade civil são fortes, é possível, através da sanção estabelecida pela lei e pelas formas de organização dos movimentos populares em questão, resistir a uma tentativa do governo de retirar poder da instância participativa. Dessa forma, os desenhos de partilha se diferenciam dos desenhos de participação “de baixo para cima” devido a sua maior independência do sistema político. (2008, p. 55)

The last design Avritzer considers is that of public ratification: *"no caso dos desenhos de ratificação pública eles envolvem mais atores sociais na ratificação e sua relação é com uma decisão tomada anteriormente pelo Estado"* (2008, p. 56). He takes the concept of a municipal plan (*Plano Diretor Municipal*) as a case study. The *Movimento Nacional pela Reforma Urbana* (MNRU), a national movement for urban reform which included a broad range of civil associations, including labor unions, NGOs, and neighborhood associations, was an important protagonist in the fight for just urban planning (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 56). As with the healthcare movements, MNRU presented an amendment to the National Constituent Assembly which included the following demands:

direito à cidade; participação popular nas decisões urbanas; direito de preempção (direito do estado de se antecipar ao desenvolvimento urbano reservando áreas nas cidades); imposto urbano progressivo e outorga onerosa (legalização das áreas públicas de até 250 metros ocupadas pela população) (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 57)

After nearly 14 years of debate, the *Estatuto da Cidade* was passed, which *"exige que todas as cidades brasileiras com mais de 20.000 habitantes tenham planos diretores municipais aprovados em audiências públicas"* (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 57). The plans would have to be ratified by vote in a public meeting.

Avritzer takes Salvador, Bahia as a case study to show the differences between the public ratification design and the other two participative models studied in his paper. Unlike the cities mentioned so far, *"Salvador é conhecida como uma das cidades brasileiras com uma fraca presença da sociedade civil nas políticas públicas"* (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 58). In order to develop its Municipal Plan, the administration hired a private consulting firm and kept public hearings to an absolute minimum, making little effort to inform the public at large about the process. *"Associações da sociedade civil ligadas à questão da reforma urbana não foram sequer informadas da existência de uma consultoria encarregada da*

*elaboração de uma proposta de plano diretor municipal"* (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 59). Facing an administration that was clearly hostile to public participation, a group of neighborhood associations, Bahia's Order of Attorneys, the State Public Prosecutor's Office, and a few environmental groups challenged the lack of participation in the courts.

No entanto, a prefeitura de Salvador enviou a proposta de Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento Urbano à Câmara Municipal antes que este debate se viabilizasse e obrigou o ministério público da cidade a entrar com ação na qual pediu a declaração de nulidade do plano e o julgamento do prefeito Imbassai por improbidade administrativa (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 59)

The plan written by the consulting firm was then halted, forcing the administration to hold true public hearings, respecting the levels of participation enshrined in law. Despite low levels of civil organization and an outright hostile local government, public ratification was capable of ensuring public participation in the implementation of a Municipal Plan:

em contextos completamente hostis à participação, o desenho mais capaz de anular políticas particularistas é o desenho de ratificação pública. Entre os três tipos de desenhos participativos discutidos neste artigo apenas este foi capaz de operar em uma cidade fortemente anti-participativa. (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 59)

Though its level of participation is essentially limited to veto power, public ratification proved an important tool in a difficult political environment for institutionalized civil participation in public spaces. Unlike the bottom up and power sharing designs, it proved its effectiveness in a city with historically low levels of civil organization and a hostile executive branch.

Avritzer's study attempts to demonstrate the best contexts in which these three forms of institutional participation can be applied. He affirms,

os desenhos de baixo para cima como o OP são os mais fortemente democratizantes e distributivos. Os casos dos desenhos de partilhas são os mais fortemente democratizantes nos casos de oposição à participação por parte da sociedade política. Os casos de ratificação são os casos mais efetivos quando há necessidade da sanção por parte do judiciário e do ministério público para a manutenção das formas de participação previstas em lei. (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 60)

While the bottom up design allows for most direct form of participation, it also requires a friendly politically environment, including a friendly executive branch and well-organized civil support. The power sharing model still allows for fairly direct participation, though not quite as much as the bottom up model, but it is also more resilient in the face of an unsupportive administration as long as the civil support is well organized. Public ratification allows for the lowest level of direct participation, but also is the most resilient design and the only that can stand up to a hostile administration even with low levels of civil organization.

Most of the authors mentioned in this section point to the importance of associations in modern democracies, and the ability of a political culture to kickstart a vicious cycle that generates less and less general trust. Tocqueville had already pointed to the problem of individualism generated by democracy. Moisés and Réis show how the isolated and disillusioned citizen hardly contributes to a solidary community. But what solutions have been tried in order to end this vicious cycle in Brazil? Gohn and Avritzer demonstrate positive, recent trends that show how Brazil has managed to expand civil participation in public spaces since its redemocratization in the late 1980s. While Avritzer concentrated on participative budgets, health councils, and urban planning, these strategies can and have been applied to different areas in order to allow greater civil participation in public affairs. An example that at least partly illustrates this discussion about democratic participation is that of public security and the attempts to create a fairer and more effective security apparatus in the country. Specifically in Rio de Janeiro, a crucial example of an attempt to improve security in the state began with a reform conceived by Col. Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira during Governor Brizola's term in office. After studying police reforms abroad, Col. Cerqueira tried to adapt the concept of community policing to the Brazilian reality, thus starting a series of reforms in Rio de Janeiro based on this model and in other countries' experiences.

## **2.5. Community Policing**

How can these ideas about democracy and participation be applied to specific institutions within a democracy? Theoretical debate is extremely important, but so is the practice of turning theory into reality. Community policing is a way of

incorporating many of these theoretical views about participatory democracy into public security institutions. Tocqueville understood that the public space was the perfect arena to discuss issues of public interest that affect society as a whole, whether at the national level or at the level of a small community whose road has been blocked by an obstacle. In terms of public security, how can this ideal be implemented? There must be a way for the community to participate in security decisions at a closer level than simply voting for politicians. Approaching the community through public security institutions could help accomplish Tocqueville's vision. Putnam, Inglehart and Uslander discussed the importance of culture in democratic institutions. Can a strategy developed by one specific culture be transferred to a different culture? The three authors would certainly argue that this strategy would have different results if carried out in the same manner in different places.

Trust and social capital are key pieces in making a participatory democracy work, but both Moisés and Reis show the lack of these two elements in Brazil. Bringing the police closer to the community to solve problems that the community prioritizes is perhaps a way to build more trust and more social capital, but all these authors agree that institutions themselves do not have the capacity to change a culture overnight. The discussion that follows will reflect on the conception of community policing that most influenced the police reforms carried out in Rio de Janeiro in the 1980s to the present day, and later on, the way in which this ideal was imported and carried out in Brazil will be also be considered.

## **2.6. Community Policing in Theory and in Practice**

A specific strategy used in many countries to create a more participatory democracy is that of community policing. The fundamental premise is to involve the community in decisions related to public security and to decentralize public security apparatuses so that decisions are made at a level that is increasingly closer to the community and that is most affected by the effects of these decisions. Political scientist Wesley Skogan has been studying the implementations of various forms of community policing around the world for decades, and his article, "An Overview of Community Policing: Origins, Concepts, and Implementation" (2008), provides

an important summary of this practice, introducing three fundamental concepts: community involvement, problem-oriented policing and decentralization.

Community policing has a long history in the United States and encompasses many reform attempts carried out by different approaches. In the 1970s, cities across the country began experimenting with different, decentralized policing models. New York, Cincinnati, and Los Angeles began to develop the concept of team policing. The idea was for specific teams to work in the same location each day, thus creating a bond between the officers and their community. The hierarchy was also decentralized, ceding more control to the local lieutenant. By the 1950s and 60s, police officers had already begun to become more involved with communities, organizing regular meetings with activists and community leaders, but it was not until the late 1960s that citizens began to play an active role in local public security projects.

With the community crime prevention movement, direct collaboration between police and the communities they patrolled became a central component:

At the end of the 1960s, it was widely believed that rising crime could be traced to community disorganization, and reflected a decline in the factors that had shaped peoples' behavior in the past: jobs, churches, schools, families and traditional values. The solution seemed to be renewing that organization by getting neighborhood residents involved in voluntary, collective efforts to fight crime on their own (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 45)

These included volunteer neighborhood watch groups, community cleanup of neglected areas, youth groups, and actions to pressure local governments to provide better cleaning and security services. In this way, the community provided resources to which the police did not have access.

For Skogan, the wide range of reforms that can be considered within the community policing spectrum is an expected result of a decentralized strategy designed to serve local interests: "What police do when they are 'doing community policing' should vary a great deal. Communities with different problems and different resources to bring to bear against them should try different things" (2008, p. 43-44). Specific strategies are likely to change over time, and structural change that provides greater flexibility and adaptability for stations and delegates is a key aspect of this vision. That is why there are "three central strategic commitments of

community policing: citizen involvement, problem solving and decentralization" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 44).

For Skogan, "Community policing is defined in part by police efforts to develop partnerships with community members and civic organizations. Effective community policing requires responsiveness to citizen input" (2008, p. 47). Rather than having contact with community members almost solely when they have an urgent problem, community policing seeks to bring officers closer to the community they serve on a routine basis so that officers can better understand the issues that are important to the community, and thus better develop strategies to face these problems. In this sense, the responsibility for upholding the law is shared between police officers and the community at large. In this relationship, the issue of transparency also stands out: "Community policing often involves increases (sic) 'transparency' in how departments respond to demands for more information about what they do and how effective they are" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 47). The most common way to provide this transparency and increase contact between police officers and their communities is to hold regular open meetings with citizen groups.

Unfortunately, "community involvement is not easy to achieve. It can be difficult to sustain in areas that need it the most" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 49). Particularly in less favored neighborhoods, the community's relationship with the police tends to be more problematic, and even antagonistic. With a long history of ineffective and even abusive policing, these communities tend to focus more on minimizing police abuse than on building a relationship between the two groups. In the end, "There may be no reason for residents of crime-ridden neighborhoods to think that community policing will turn out to be anything but another broken promise: they are accustomed to seeing programs come and go, without much effect" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 49). This imbalance tends to create uneven outcomes, with the most privileged neighborhoods benefiting most from community policing programs, reinforcing Putnam's argument about the varied effects of institutional functioning in diverse cultural contexts. Results in these disadvantaged neighborhoods are therefore fragile, and can suffer significant setbacks due to police corruption and abuse. The police themselves tend to undervalue these programs at first: "Officers who get involved [in community policing efforts] can become known as the 'empty holster guys'" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 49-50),

minimizing the efforts of those who do not resort to violence to solve their problems.

This dynamic demonstrates the vicious cycle described by Reis, in which less favored citizens are increasingly forced to adopt the strategy of amoral familism while the more favored resort to private solutions that undermine the authority of the State. This leaves little trust between police and citizens in less privileged neighborhoods, which illustrates Uslaner's statement, "If societies are to do more than reproduce themselves, if they are to prosper, their members must interact with others. And they must make the rational gamble that others are trustworthy" (USLANER in Warren, 1999, p. 124).

The second core community policing strategy refers to the problem-solving methodology or problem-oriented policing:

Problem solving [...] calls for examining patterns of incidents to reveal their causes and to help plan how to deal with them proactively [...] Problem-oriented policing also recognizes that the solutions to those patterns may involve other agencies and may be 'non-police' in character (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 50)

Thus, this methodology assigns two non-traditional roles to police officers. Instead of simply reacting to calls and stopping criminals in the act, officers should analyze patterns of crime and proactively allocate resources based on the results of these analyses. The other role is that of recognizing problems that aren't directly related to traditional policing duties and helping to organize a response using resources from other institutions and groups, such as NGOs, local associations, or even other public institutions. The problem-solving methodology does not necessarily imply the use of all community policing strategies, as it can be used within traditional policing strategies. However, it is very important that this methodology be used within community policing programs to break away from the "reactive" pattern of policing and to confer non-traditional and active roles to the public security apparatus.

According to Skogan, the third axis of community policing is decentralization:

Decentralization is an important strategy that is closely linked to the implementation of community policing. Typically, more responsibility for identifying and responding to chronic crime



and disorder problems is delegated to mid-level commanders in charge of the geographical districts that make up a city (2008, p. 52)

Decentralization and community outreach share the challenge of implementation differing in accordance with the local context. The extent to which authority is granted to officers with lesser ranks has to be decided depending on local requirements. In general, those who make decisions that affect the community should be as close as possible to the community, in order to avoid central power making decisions without taking into account any of the specific needs of the community: "Departments do this in order to encourage the development of local solutions to locally-defined problems, and to facilitate decision making that responds rapidly to local conditions" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 53). Decentralization also means that police officers have more contact with the population, instead of responding only to emergency calls or to a central power. To understand local problems, it is crucial to listen to local actors, whether individuals or civil society associations. This facilitates the implementation of the problem-solving methodology as well, in which the police officers are able to better understand local problems and create proactive solutions to face these problems.

A major problem with decentralization, however, is that by granting local police more autonomy, it also makes fighting corruption more difficult by decreasing the accountability of local forces. Greater trust in lower ranking officers is required, but if this trust is betrayed it can be more difficult to control. This strategy also requires more resources to be allocated to the local level, placing a greater burden on budgets, especially in cities with larger police forces. Within the corporation, middle-ranking officers resist decentralization because it strips them of authority and resources.

The purpose of community policing is that this model is able to achieve greater levels of flexibility, attention to local needs, and the ability to prevent crimes without resorting to violent and reactive means. By expanding traditional policing roles, the model creates a more democratic and theoretically effective system. Strategies vary, but the three most fundamental axes are community outreach, problem-solving methodology, and decentralization. Community outreach facilitates the solution of local problems, and provides a greater level of accountability when decentralization takes control away from central power.

Decentralization facilitates the ability of lower-ranking officials to connect with their communities, and provides greater flexibility in crime prevention, as opposed to crisis reaction. Working in terms of prevention and problem-solving should create a more effective and less oppressive public safety apparatus, which would then also help with bringing communities closer together. It is not a simple cause and effect relationship, but a complex interaction between elements that change according to the community in which these strategies are being applied.

## **2.7. Vera Institute and CPOP**

Another extremely important figure in the international debate on community policing is the Vera Institute of Justice. Both Skogan and the Vera Institute significantly influenced Coronel Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira, an early and extremely important proponent of the practice in Brazil (RIBEIRO and MONTANDON, 2015). The Vera Institute acted as a consultant to the New York Police Department (NYPD) when the latter implemented a community policing program called the Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) in the 1980s (MCELROY et al., 1993, p. 07). This program was studied by Col. Cerqueira and informed the implementation of community policing in Brazil, a subject which will be further explored in the following chapter.

CPOP emerged in response to New York City's fiscal crisis in the 1970s. Police stations had to fire nearly 10,000 officers, but "the volume of calls-for-service received over the 911 system rose throughout the period" (MCELROY et al., 1993, p. 06). Thus, delegates were increasingly focused on reacting to these calls, and consequently dedicating increasingly less time to dealing with the city's everyday problems. The quality of life began to deteriorate for the city's citizens. In 1982, with the end of the fiscal crisis, the city began taking on more police officers, and hired the Vera Institute to help decide how to utilize these new resources.

In designing the program, the Vera Institute began by defining the main goals of a community policing program:

- (a) an improved capacity to analyze crime and disorder problems in terms of specific places, times, and situations in which they occur, as well as the people involved both as perpetrators and victims; (b) the deployment of police resources in accordance

with a problem-solving plan based on these analyses [...]; and (c) the design and implementation of these corrective strategies with input from and the cooperation of residents, merchants, and organizations immediately affected by them (MCELROY et al., 1993, p. 02)

The plan's alignment with Skogan's ideals is clear. The problem-solving methodology is specifically mentioned, and community outreach is addressed in point c in the excerpt cited above. The issue of decentralization is addressed in a list of crucial elements of community policing, where the CPOP guide states that a key principle is the "delegation of responsibility to the community police unit for addressing both the crime and order-maintenance problems of the neighborhood and expansion of the unit's discretion in fashioning solutions to those problems" (MCELROY et al., 1993, p. 08). In the specific CPOP context, this unit was formed by 10 police officers called Community Police Officers (CPOs), who worked in the same area so as to grow closer to the community. Each CPO had four key roles: Planner, Problem Solver, Community Organizer, and Information Exchange Link.

Being planners meant CPOs had to look at the big data on their community: history of crimes and in what specific areas they occurred, archives and updated community information about security in the area, and also their own observations on patrols. As a problem solver, CPOs would implement solutions to problems identified by planners. These two roles are practical strategies for implementing the problem-solving methodology. As community organizers, the CPOs were expected to approach the community and bring citizens together to identify issues that are important to them, and as information exchange links, gain the trust of informants to better tackle crime in the area.

The Vera Institute of Justice recorded some of the program's successful cases in "CPOP: Community Policing in Practice" (1988). The seventh chapter retells the story of a building located on 112th Street in New York, where CPO Ronald MacGregor pursued community policing goals in an attempt to improve the quality of life of residents in a low-income building. The building was the site of numerous complaints and crimes, and residents were generally afraid of being seen speaking to police officers. Hence, when the police received calls, most of the time, upon arriving at the location, they were not even able to identify who had placed the call (VERA INSTITUTE, 1988, p. 15).

The first step CPO MacGregor took was to visit the building and try to establish communication with the residents. Initially, residents were wary of talking to him, but he continued to visit the building each time he patrolled the area, and over time he was able to form a rapport with some of the residents. This allowed for the discovery of several problems that weren't initially known: the building owner was abusive and the building's conditions were appalling - the owner wouldn't even let unfavored residents get their mail; drug dealers operated openly in and around the site; and there were several cases of rape that were never reported because of intimidation by criminals who lived or acted within the building. He learned all of this through information exchange with residents by establishing formal information chains with resident leaders. Once he had the data, he was able to form a plan to solve the problems.

Rather than immediately trying to put criminals in jail, MacGregor tried a less traditional and perhaps more effective route. He warned the owner about the bullying allegations, and accompanied the postal service deliveries every day to immediately improve residents' quality of life, going as far as escorting the most vulnerable residents to the supermarket. He got the owner's cooperation to change the phone system inside the building to inhibit dealing, and he also made sure to ticket dealers' cars when they committed traffic violations, such as parking illegally. Rather than focusing on law enforcement and the penal system, the CPO's goals were aligned with the community's goals: improving the quality of life for residents and decreasing crime in and around the building. The solutions he found were more creative and more effective than the solutions envisaged by traditional policing. He also contacted several organizations to help residents, including organizations that provided psychological services, donated clothing and food, and offered drug rehabilitation and general social services. These organizations included local hospitals and churches and even the Municipal Health Department (VERA INSTITUTE, 1988, p. 15-16).

Hence, using non-traditional means of policing, CPO MacGregor was able to improve the quality of life in the building and reduce crime in the area: in June 1988, 9 attacks against women inside the building were registered, and not a single one the following month (VERA INSTITUTE, 1988, p. 16). The decentralization of authority allowed MacGregor to act more autonomously, creating solutions

specifically designed for local problems. As Skogan stated, “Problem-oriented policing also recognizes that solutions to these patterns may involve other agencies and may be 'non-police' in character” (2008, p. 50). This perspective allowed MacGregor to contact churches, hospitals and other social services to further improve residents' quality of life. It is clear that citizen involvement was key in this case. Without the input provided by residents, MacGregor would not have known about the most serious problems the community was facing. The continued cooperation of the building's residents, and even the owner, helped him to carry out non-traditional strategies to solve these problems without having to arrest anyone, a process that certainly would have carried on longer than the few months that led to so much positive change;

## **2.8. Conclusion**

Dating back to the 19th century, Tocqueville had already pointed out the importance of participation in the proper functioning of democracy. For the French author, the best strategy for solving social problems was through rational debate among fellow citizens. This debate should result from collective action aimed at self-interest well-understood. Putnam continued this tradition by exploring the importance of culture and institutions in the functioning of democratic governments. He agrees with Tocqueville in affirming the importance of a civic community that seeks to solve problems through participation and collective interests. The problem of participation based on particularized interests is also addressed in the sociologist's research. He also pointed out the vicious and virtuous cycles that tend to occur in democracies. Uncivic communities often sustain and worsen their vices, while participation can result in enhanced participation and stronger civic cultures. Inglehart and Uslander delved deeper into the concept of trust and its key role in creating a strong civic community, and Uslander further expanded upon the concepts of generalized and particularized trust. While Putnam pointed out that different types of participation can either contribute to or damage democracy, Uslander argues that a certain type of trust can also be deleterious for democracy.

Moisés brought the conversation to Brazil with his study on the country's democracy, in which he discussed the strong roots of authoritarianism even during the country's most recent democratic period. These roots are present both in Brazilian institutions and culture, and he explores the dynamics between these and civic culture in the region. For him, the gap between the ideal version of democracy and democracy in practice in the region generates a certain distrust among Latin American citizens. However, he argued that the cultural roots of authoritarianism are as much at play as institutional vices. Although the author's study was undertaken two decades ago, an update of Latinobarometer data on Brazil shows the enduring relevance of his research and the low adherence to the democratic regime by many Brazilian citizens. Reis discusses the concept of amoral familism (similar to Uslaner's concept of particularized trust) and inequality in Brazil. For the author, both hinder the creation of a strong civic culture in the country. In Latin America in general, and particularly in Brazil, the State played a fundamental role in the consolidation of the national identity. Thus, the State ended up occupying space that could have been occupied by associations and classes, making it difficult to form autonomous political groups. What ensued was "a collective identity around the nation-state that placed authority above solidarity" (REIS, 1995, p. 42), and a vicious cycle in which inequality and amoral familism increasingly separate classes and social groups in an atmosphere of fear and distrust.

This theoretical debate led to several attempts to put democratic ideals into practice and strengthen democratic institutions. In terms of public security, community policing embodies many of the themes present in this debate in search of a more solid and fairer democracy. Wesley Skogan pointed out the three main axes of community policing: community outreach, the adoption of a problem-solving methodology by the police, and decentralization. The first axis aims at the active participation of citizens in favor of their own security. Listening to their grievances and their goals is fundamental to any community policing program. Engaging non-police agencies and organizations expands that participation, creating ever stronger and more participatory communities. The problem-solving methodology puts collective action in the interest of the common good into practice, whereas decentralization encourages Tocqueville's local associationalism. This chapter ended with a summary of a successful case of a community policing

program in New York City, reported by an institute studied directly by one of the first proponents of community policing in Brazil: Coronel Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira.

### 3. Community Policing in Brazil

Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira was born on September 11, 1937 in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. He was a key figure in police reforms aimed at establishing a form of community policing in Brazil. According to Col. Íbis Silva Pereira,

Nos anos 1980 e 1990, Nazareth Cerqueira conduziu um processo de mudança organizacional inspirado por ideias inovadoras sobre segurança pública, democracia e direitos humanos, procurando modernizar a corporação policial adaptando-a ao estado democrático de direito, reconhecendo e enfrentando uma série de problema herdados, notadamente do regime militar, que insistem em permanecer atuais (2016, p. 9)

It was a long journey for Col. Cerqueira to become head of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), and this study does not intend to carry out extensive research on his life. However, his importance in the history of police reforms in Rio de Janeiro is such that exploring aspects of his life history is enlightening and allows for a better understanding of both the institution and the reforms themselves.

Col. Cerqueira's parents moved to Rio de Janeiro from Bahia. They lived humbly in the neighborhood of Olaria, in the northern area of the city. His father, Antônio Lourenço Cerqueira, served as a soldier in the Military Police for three years in Rio de Janeiro before becoming a market inspector and streetcar fare collector. Aware of the issue of racism, Antônio raised his son to be aware of the difficulties he would face due to the color of his skin - something that young Cerqueira experienced during his first years in school (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 20-21). An exceptional student from an early age, Cerqueira was always concerned with racial and religious issues. After flirting with careers in medicine, psychology, and even the possibility of becoming a priest, in 1953, young Cerqueira opted for a career as a policeman.

Upon entering the Officer Training School, Cerqueira was "*o único negro de uma turma composta por 28 alunos*" (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 26). At the police academy, just as he had been at school, Cerqueira was an exceptional student. In his second year, he was already first in his class, and thus earned the right to bear the standard instead of the rifle. When he graduated in 1956, he held the top spot,



which testifies to his significant and unique intelligence, especially considering that the racism of the time posed obstacles that made his path even more difficult than for the other 23 students who managed to graduate with him.

After two years on street patrol, now 2nd Lieutenant Cerqueira was transferred to the Military Police's logistical command unit. Although neither he nor his commander requested this transfer, Cerqueira saw it as an opportunity to work against corruption and to begin thinking about the trajectory of his career as a military police officer. That year he began his involvement in the political sphere, participating in the Circle of Military Police Officers (COPOM). COPOM was a *"entidade privada, sem nenhuma relação de subordinação hierárquica com a Polícia Militar, o COPOM congregava seus associados ao redor de temas do interesse da classe. A oficialidade reunida comunicava opiniões, formulava ideias, deliberava"* (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 36). This was the first public space in which Cerqueira was able to exchange ideas and reflect on the future of the corporation in a democratic and open way.

While working in the logistical command unit, Cerqueira had the opportunity to carry on with his education outside the institution. Instead of choosing the obvious path, which would be to study law, the 2nd lieutenant applied to study philosophy at the University of Guanabara (now called the State University of Rio de Janeiro - UERJ), from which he graduated in 1963.

At that time, Brasília had just become the capital of Brazil, and the military police of the city of Rio de Janeiro were given the choice of either remaining in the city, now under State jurisdiction, or maintaining their position as federal servants and being transferred to Brasília to become a part of the Special Guard of Brasília. Cerqueira chose the second option, but it would take him three years to arrive at the new capital. After the 1964 military coup, Cerqueira was briefly investigated for having allegedly taken part in a scheme that was supposedly an attempt to *"compra de armas para resistência"* (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 40). The investigation resulted in the death of the director of the supplies division of the Ministry of Justice, Dilmerano Melo do Nascimento. *"A versão oficial de sua morte sustenta que o servidor de 44 anos se atirou pela janela do 4º andar do prédio que sediava o Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores"* (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 41).

Cerqueira, on the other hand, made it through the investigation unscathed and moved to Brasília in 1966 for four months. Apparently dissatisfied with his decision to join the Special Guard of Brasília, he soon returned to Rio de Janeiro and began working at the Recruit Training Center, after which he moved onto the Enlisted Training School and eventually to the Officer Training School at the end of the 1960s. During the most oppressive period of the dictatorship, he dedicated himself to the bureaucratic part of the corporation, returning to college once more in 1967, this time to study psychology at Gama Filho University, from which he graduated in 1971. In 1968, his interests outside the corporation influenced his final monograph centered on the professional development of officers: Future of an illusion: psychosocial analysis of the Military Police of Guanabara. *"Trata-se de um estudo da própria estrutura do curso de aperfeiçoamento, estabelecendo uma análise da situação educacional da Corporação"* (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 45). For Pereira, the monograph points to the *"linha de defesa corporativa, que marcará a maior parte de sua trajetória, ao lado da constatação de uma realidade institucional que demandava mudança, transformação que jamais seria alcançada sem o envolvimento da sociedade"* – an argument that characterized Cerqueira's line of thought at the time (2016, p. 45).

The article severely criticized the Corporation's leadership at the time. It

pretendia demonstrar a estagnação na qual se encontrava a corporação, tecendo críticas duras ao tipo de liderança em vigor na Polícia Militar, bem como ao próprio curso que finalizava, ao se sentir incapaz para o exercício de uma liderança que ele qualifica no texto ora como democrática ora como reformista (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 55).

This criticism of the high ranks of the hierarchy resulted in his punishment. Cerqueira was arrested for ten days and then taken to the 4th Battalion. The article, however, reverberated in the Corporation, especially among younger officers.

In 1968, the now Major Cerqueira began to head the teaching section of the Officers' Training School. He diminished what he considered an overemphasis on law courses, created a psychology section to monitor and support students, and tackled the culture of hazing and bullying. It was at then that Cerqueira went on his first international trip to study at the French Gendarmerie (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 46), which would later inspire the reforms aimed at fairer and more democratic policing.

He also faced corruption within the corporation, and not for the first time. Upon discovering, along with his future collaborator, Celso de Oliveira Guimarães, a system of fraud in the selection process that facilitated the entry of the children of high-ranking officers, and ousting these students from the course, both Cerqueira and Guimarães were banished from the Unit in 1973.

After some transfers, Cerqueira ended up taking on the "responsibility of devising all operational planning" of the 3rd section of the general staff of the Military Police (PM/3) (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 47). He also became responsible for the Corporation's education policy. Faced with difficulty finding national literature on teaching military police, the then major began to look for international alternatives.

At this time, in 1975, then President Geisel decreed the merger of the State of Guanabara with Rio de Janeiro, along with their respective Military Police. With the emergence of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Cerqueira maintained his post despite several political changes, and, in 1976, he took on the command of the 4th Military Police Battalion. Soon after, he was transferred and took on the command of the 19th Battalion. With this, Cerqueira more intimately experienced the reality of police officers who worked outside the administrative area. Reflecting on this acquired knowledge, he wrote "A PM e as tensões sociais". For Pereira, in this "*obra, Cerqueira faz uma incursão pelos campos da filosofia e da sociologia para pensar o papel reservado à polícia numa sociedade em crise de valores*" (2016, p. 51). The text problematized the role of the police in a context of social disorganization.

A consistent problem throughout Cerqueira's career was *jogo do bicho*, a popular lottery game run by organized criminals. According to Cerqueira, corruption, especially that of the civil police, garnered the fight against this illegal game almost impossible. According to Pereira,

Nos anos 1970, a situação do jogo [do bicho] no Estado envolvia a tal ponto as forças de segurança, por suas imbricações complexas com outras modalidades criminosas, que Oswaldo Inácio Domingues, primeiro secretário a ocupar a pasta da segurança pública, depois da fusão em 1975, chegou a propor sua legalização através da Caixa Econômica Federal (2016, p. 51).

This opinion was also shared by Cerqueira, who also conceived it as the only way to control the activity and limit the illegalities surrounding clandestine gambling. Cerqueira did not spare his own corporation from criticism.

In 1979, now Lt. Col. Cerqueira was transferred and took on the role of deputy head of the general staff. "*Nazareth Cerqueira ocupava agora um lugar central na direção da máquina; no ápice do sistema, por assim dizer, onde as ações policiais são programadas e os rumos da organização definidos*" (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 53). It was a time of tension in the Corporation, a tension depicted, in part, by the text written by Cerqueira in 1968, *Futuro de Uma Ilusão*, and aggravated by low wages and difficult working conditions. In April 1980, "*um grupo de aproximadamente 500 oficiais da Polícia Militar e do Corpo de Bombeiros Militar, a maioria composta de tenentes e capitães, ocupa os Jardins do Palácio Guanabara, a fim de pressionar o governador Chagas Freitas*" (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 58). Although the situation was resolved with a salary increase and light punishments, this was just one concrete example of the tension that prevailed at the time. Police officers were unhappy with their pay and working conditions, and civil society was unhappy with the poor performance of the institution and the city's increase in crime. In this context, in 1981, Cerqueira was promoted to the rank of colonel.

One of the first responsibilities of now Col. Cerqueira was to command the first female military police corps in the state, inspired by the success of similar programs carried out in São Paulo and in other countries (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 60). He held the post of Teaching Director until 1982, when Nilton Cerqueira resigned as general commander of the Corporation. With the changes that followed the change in command, Col. Cerqueira became PMERJ's chief of staff, now responsible for coordinating the operational, administrative and disciplinary areas. In this powerful post, Cerqueira's goal was to change the "Corporation management methodology" to professionalize the process and break with the excessive focus on the personal figure of the commander.

It didn't take long for Cerqueira to face problems such as strikes and abuse of power by his subordinates, greatly stimulated by the tension that continued to mark the police forces at the time. He worked in favor of greater autonomy for the PMERJ in relation to civil police officers and also to the Army (PEREIRA, 2016,

p. 71). With the ongoing redemocratization process, there were several changes that affected the PMERJ. In 1983, without any explanation, the then General Commander of the Military Police resigned his post before the inauguration of the newly elected Leonel Brizola. Col. Cerqueira was in prime position to take his place: "*Pela primeira vez, o comando-geral [da PMERJ] era exercido por um negro*" (PEREIRA, 2016, p. 73)

### 3.1. General Commander of the Corporation

In the 1980s, Brazil began a redemocratization process, having come to the end of a decade in which,

Não somente insegurança e medo mas também descrédito em relação às instituições policiais se imiscuíram na atmosfera fluminense nos anos setenta e ganharam canais de expressão à medida que os meios de comunicação readquiriram maior controle sobre as pautas do que se podia veicular ao grande público (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 5)

With the growing debate on public security, which included harsh criticism of the military police's performance,

Brizola captava o deslocamento operado na discussão sobre os direitos humanos e sobre a violência do Estado, condenando as ações policiais nas favelas e nas áreas mais pobres do estado. Reivindicava o respeito igual aos direitos de inviolabilidade privada e denunciava os abusos dos órgãos de segurança. Condenava as blitz discricionárias e as manifestações explícitas de racismo manifestadas no tratamento dado às populações negras e pobres (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 6)

The moment was propitious for a significant change in the area of public security, and the military police themselves understood the opportunities that arose when the people began to demand the redemocratization of their country. In this environment, "*os ocupantes das patentes mais elevadas da corporação policial promoveram uma ampla consulta aos seus pares, como forma de escolher entre os oficiais existentes aquele mais apto a ser o porta-voz de uma organização cuja legitimidade precisava ser reconstruída*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 63). Lieutenant Colonel Cerqueira ranked first with 45.33% of the votes,

followed by Lieutenant Colonel Rosette (15.33%) and Lieutenant Colonel Elísio (7.33%) (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 287).

This "election", however, lacked institutional legitimacy. It was held in 1981, still under the military regime, in which Army approval was required in order to nominate any candidate for the position of General Commander of the corporation. When Leonel Brizola was elected governor of Rio de Janeiro in the first free and direct election since 1965, he had to perform "a certain degree of institutional engineering". To escape the need for the Army's endorsement, "*o governador recém-empossado (1983) extinguiu a Secretaria de Segurança, que coordenava a ação da Polícia Militar e da Polícia Civil, dando lugar ao aparecimento das secretarias de Polícia Civil e Polícia Militar*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 287). With that, the Military and Civil Police general command no longer existed. There were now two separate secretariats, one for each corporation. Hence, the Army's approval was no longer required, and Governor Brizola appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Cerqueira to the position of General Commander of PMERJ. Thus, Brizola fulfilled his campaign promises and opened space for a necessary reform in State public security policy, "*Nomeando um oficial negro, altamente respeitado em sua própria corporação e comprometido com a ação policial pautada pelo respeito à lei, Brizola reiterava o princípio que nortearia sua política de segurança*" (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 7).

For researchers Ludmila Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro and Ana Maria Alemão Montandon, "*em seus dois comandos, o cel. Cerqueira empregou a categoria policiamento comunitário como forma de empreender uma mudança ideológica na Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, em que pese a continuidade de sua arquitetura militar*" (2015, p. 67). Cerqueira was aware of the extreme difficulty in changing the military structure of the police, but he yearned to bring to Brazil a form of community policing that would ensure a much more democratic form of public security. With the ongoing redemocratization, it took the corporation's reform to distance it from the Army and the authoritarianism of the dictatorship. Hence, the "*tônica do primeiro comando de Cerqueira consistia em transformar a instituição policial militar em uma agência prestadora de serviços de segurança pública desde uma perspectiva eminentemente cidadã*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 67). This task proved hard, especially given that, during

the dictatorship, "*o único modelo de policiamento existente era o militar*", which obeyed the "*princípios de guerra ao inimigo*" (2015, p. 67). A policing that saw any citizen as a potential enemy in a regime that ignored basic human rights was far from Skogan's ideal. The unofficial election of Cerqueira, however, represented an important step, which, fortunately, Governor Brizola took advantage of.

Ribeiro and Montandon's research, "*Reformar a polícia ou reformar o seu discurso?*" (2015) was carried out by analyzing Col. Cerqueira's documents, which were gathered and archived at the *Instituto Carioca de Criminologia* (ICC) after his death. According to the colonel's own words, "*o modelo comunitário para a polícia é o que pretende substituir o modelo militar, o do enfrentamento segundo uma visão de guerra*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 68). The similarity between Cerqueira's vision and Skogan's research is the result of Cerqueira's international travels,

Esses documentos indicam que antes de assumir o comando da PMERJ, Cerqueira teria viajado a Nova Iorque, onde visitara alguns institutos de pesquisa que realizavam trabalhos com a polícia, como o Vera Institute of Justice e o Police Foundation, além das próprias organizações policiais (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 68-69)

The influence that inspired Cerqueira's models did indeed come from his international experience, and more specifically, from his studies of community policing models experienced abroad. According to Ribeiro and Montandon, Cerqueira's main concern

foi trazer para o Brasil documentos que explicassem como viabilizar a constituição de iniciativas desse gênero, as quais, em seus próprios termos, levariam à substituição da lógica de enfrentamento pela prestação de serviços à comunidade (2015, p. 69).

He did not aim to change the structure of the institution itself, but rather start a reform of the corporation's culture through education,

com cursos de formação em polícia comunitária, Cerqueira acreditava estar construindo novos policiais, que poderiam 'fazer escola dentro da polícia', disseminando a ideologia de direitos humanos em detrimento da ideologia de guerra típica das forças militares (2015, p. 69).

Throughout his career as a police officer, education was always important to Cerqueira, whether as a tool to better understand the corporation through studies or as a means of putting his ideals into practice during his work at the Recruit Training Center. Not surprisingly, one of the emphases of his reform was the education of new recruits.

Cerqueira was very clear about his goals. For him, it was "*preciso, com a volta da democracia, reaproximar a população e a polícia, que deve agir na prevenção do crime. É preciso que haja uma desvinculação da PM do Exército e uma vinculação mais forte com o Governador*" (2015, p. 69-70). He specifically refers to growing closer to the community. Also, crime prevention figures as a crucial element of the problem-solving methodology. By distancing the PM from the Army, he aimed at taking a first step towards decentralization, thus addressing all three of Skogan's (2008) key community policing concepts. The detachment of the PM from the Army was a theme already present in Cerqueira's work as the PMERJ chief of staff.

The decentralization idealized by Cerqueira was, however, minimal, only foreseeing a certain level of detachment of the Military Police from the Army. In the programs Cerqueira himself studied, decentralization was a means of allowing local officials to decide *in locu* strategies with the participation of the communities they patrolled. This was part of the plan, "*para que os anseios de cada comunidade fossem adequadamente compreendidos, realizaram-se inúmeras reuniões com diversas lideranças, quando se decidiu como a polícia deveria proceder, evidenciando a preocupação do coronel em conciliar teoria e prática*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 70). The reform, however, was more conceptual than structural: "*para Cerqueira, não era necessário modificar os condicionantes estruturais (militares) da ação policial, mas tão somente o seu discurso, o que, por sua vez, levaria à completa revisão da prática*" (2015, p. 70). Cerqueira did not see a contradiction between the concept of community policing and the hierarchical and centralized structure of the Military Police, in part because one of the sources of inspiration for his projects was the French Gendarmerie, a police institution that is part of the French Armed Forces, which he had studied on his first official trip as head of the teaching section of the Officer Training School. However, the



documentos disponíveis no arquivo dão a entender que o Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), desenvolvido pela Polícia de Nova Iorque com o Vera Institute of Justice, foi uma fonte de inspiração importante para a implantação do Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário (Cipoc)<sup>3</sup> (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 71)

Even if it were one of the focal points of the programs planned by Col. Cerqueira, a comprehensive structural reform would hardly be feasible given that the dictatorship was still in power and the 1988 Constitution had not yet been written. However, a police reform along the lines of community policing without reforming the structure of the corporation would require new strategies that contemplate the Brazilian reality without simply importing sources abroad. In Skogan's understanding,

o policiamento comunitário não pode ser entendido como um programa ou uma estratégia, mas como um processo de reforma organizacional da polícia, visto que envolve mudança na estruturação da agência, nos fluxos dos processos decisórios e ainda na natureza dos mecanismos utilizados para o diagnóstico dos problemas que suscitam intervenção policial (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 234)

Col. Cerquera's strategy was based, nonetheless, on the Brazilian reality and was mindful of the limitations of the time. He proposed an experiment that aimed to change the institution of public safety mainly through educating the officers themselves.

### 3.2. Urca and City of God

In another study, "*O que os policiais querem dizer com 'policiamento comunitário': Uma análise dos discursos dos oficiais da PMERJ*", Ribeiro and Montandon interviewed several police officers about the meaning and history of community policing (2014). One of the first community policing programs in Rio de Janeiro was carried out in the neighborhoods of Urca, Laranjeiras, and Grajaú in 1983 (2014, p. 238).

Essa iniciativa é identificada nas entrevistas como laboratório de aplicação do método, cujos fundamentos haviam sido

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<sup>3</sup> CIPOC, inaugurated in 1983, was Cerqueira's first attempt to reform the PM along the lines of community policing.

disponibilizados para os policiais militares por meio da tradução de manuais japoneses, canadenses e americanos. Nesse primeiro momento, os policiais são forçados a implantar o programa, mas, na atividade cotidiana de sua execução, as associações comunitárias se apropriariam dessa ideia e, em consequência, viabilizariam sua estruturação em bases que terminariam por garantir sua continuidade (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 238)

Carried out in upscale neighborhoods, there was no need to regain control of territory through violent confrontations, a problem that other reforms would face. These programs wanted to transform police action into a service provider model with the participation of local communities. Urca and Laranjeiras already had strong homeowners' associations, and meetings with the police facilitated rapprochement with the community. Unlike several other attempts at reform along the lines of community policing, *"esse estreitamento de relações entre polícia e comunidade fez, por exemplo, com que o policiamento comunitário da Urca se consubstanciasse no único programa do gênero não descontinuado desde sua instalação"* (2014, p. 239). Referring to Tocqueville's participatory democracy and Skogan's vision of community policing, *"pode-se pensar, com base na teoria e na fala dos coronéis, que o sucesso da experiência na Urca está relacionado à institucionalização da colaboração entre polícia e comunidade"* (2014, p. 239).

While community policing programs in upscale neighborhoods were relatively successful, the experience of the Integrated Community Policing Center (CIPOC) was a different story. Implemented in 1983, the program encompassed the neighborhoods of "Jacarepaguá, Pechincha, Freguesia, Tanque, Vila Valqueire, Taquara, Curicica, Cidade de Deus, Anil and Gardênia" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 240). CIPOC was a broader program that aimed to provide social assistance, health, and education, in addition to promoting the role of police as service providers.

Nessa experiência, os policiais e os representantes comunitários reunir-se-iam para a discussão dos problemas que mais afetam a atividade de manutenção da ordem pública e, em seguida, construiriam estratégias para a solução das causas do fenômeno de tal maneira que ele não mais acontecesse e a comunidade pudesse ficar em paz (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 290)

A major problem faced by the program was the authorities' lack of legitimacy in these areas. The state simply did not control these neighborhoods, and

so the main goal of the various community policing programs of the 1980s was "*a recuperação do domínio da área pelo Estado e, conseqüentemente, a monopolização da violência para uso legítimo por parte desse órgão*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 276). Only after regaining control of territories would the programs attempt to establish a model of community policing more in line with the Skogan ideal.

In order to better understand CIPOC's goals, it is important to understand that it is a legacy of the *Ação Cívico-Social* (ACISO), a policing program of the military regime, whose "proposta era compreender como a dinâmica criminosa estava estruturada na região e, dessa forma, desenvolver estratégias viáveis de retomada do território, garantindo a 'paz social' nessas localidades" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 240). Despite claiming a more social emphasis and a focus on communication strategies, ACISO's goal was precisely to collect information that could facilitate the recovery of these territories. The program was implemented in several areas, including the Araguaia Guerrilla region, which resulted in an operation in which police forces executed dozens of citizens (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 241).

Thus, since the very first attempts at community policing in Rio de Janeiro, which were the first attempts in Brazil as a whole (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 234), specific strategies varied according to the socioeconomic level of the area in which they were to be implemented. In a way, that is predictable, given that the decentralized model of community policing is geared towards adopting local strategies for local problems. However, as will be demonstrated throughout this study, this differentiation between the Urca and City of God programs, for example, created such a gap that even the etymological meaning of the term "community policing" changed:

essa diferença entre os dois programas implementados no início dos anos 1980 é explicada pelo fato de que as três regiões que receberam apenas policiamento comunitário [Urca, Laranjeiras, e Grajaú] eram áreas normais da cidade, enquanto a área na qual se instalou o Cipoc era considerada 'subnormal' (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 241)

With CIPOC, Cerqueira's intent was indeed to implement in underprivileged neighborhoods a model of community policing more in line with Skogan's. According to the 1983 PMERJ Magazine, the objectives of the program were:

assegurar a presença do policiamento em determinadas áreas carentes, onde a presença do policiamento normal, da Unidade Operacional, seja dificultada por qualquer fator; [...] integrar a Polícia Militar à comunidade, sobretudo à mais pobre; [...] [e] prevenir e reduzir tensões sociais, levando a comunidade carente a engajar-se no desenvolvimento social (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 291)

The big difference lies in the ends pursued by the implementation of community policing in favored and in less favored areas. While in Urca, Laranjeiras, and Grajaú, community policing was seen as a model aimed at providing services to the communities, in City of God and the other CIPOC neighborhoods, "*a aproximação com a comunidade se fazia especialmente com o objetivo de viabilizar a identificação e, por conseguinte, a incapacitação de criminosos*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 241). It was only after eliminating criminal elements that community outreach itself was engendered as a major CIPOC goal:

Nas demais áreas da cidade contempladas com outros programas do gênero, a aproximação com a comunidade se fazia desde o primeiro momento. Mais que isso, era elemento estruturante da própria ação policial, que passava a ser modelada de acordo com os anseios da população, bem como avaliada e reestruturada a partir dos feedbacks da própria comunidade, dimensões inexistentes no caso do Cipoc (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 241)

Therefore, since the very first implantations, Rio de Janeiro's community policing programs significantly differed according to the area in which they were implemented. While upscale neighborhoods received models inspired by successful implementations abroad, less favored neighborhoods were treated with distrust and a much less transparent relationship. Over the course of several police reforms which included community policing, this differentiation only grew, resulting in a model of community policing increasingly distant from the Skogan's ideal.

The long-term goal of the CIPOC was, in fact, to change police culture "*e transformar a polícia numa instituição prestadora de serviço, o foco da instituição deveria deixar de ser o 'bandido' e passar a ser a 'comunidade', com a qual a polícia trabalharia em parceria*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 292). The fact that the State lacked autonomy in the less favored neighborhoods was a significant obstacle to the implementation of community policing that demanded a particular strategy to face the specific problems of these areas, among which "regaining control" of territory,

as well as the use of new recruits according to a new and more democratic curriculum. In the end, despite Cerqueira's huge and genuine effort, the program did not obtain promising results. The failure of the CIPOC became a learning experience for the colonel, who considered the program "unsuccessful", as evidenced by the evaluation of the program carried out during his term:

É realmente um trabalho difícil e complexo. [As áreas de policiamento comunitário] São áreas geralmente desassistidas pelo poder público, nas quais os traficantes de tóxicos mantêm redes superorganizadas de terror e de apoio à população local, mantendo-as subjugadas e, às vezes, obrigando-as a não apoiarem o trabalho policial. Por outro lado, o mau policial, às vezes aliando a sua corrupção a uma violência desnecessária e ilegal, dificulta qualquer trabalho de conquista dessas populações. É um desafio que não pode ser abandonado [Relatório de gestão] (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 293)

The State which neglected the local population lacked legitimacy in the eyes of this very population. Thus, "*a tarefa de disciplinar a população situada às margens do Estado [foi] realizada por uma organização que nem sequer o reconhece como fonte de autoridade*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 293). Without recognition or trust in these authorities, it is difficult to implement a community policing program that depends on strong ties between authorities and local associations and community members. As Putnam pointed out, the social capital that strengthens the civic community "refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, p. 171). Without that trust, coordinated action between the community and law enforcement becomes very difficult.

Reis demonstrated how the development of civil society in Brazil, and in Latin America in general, aimed at a close relationship between citizens and the State, making it difficult to form private associations that would enable coordinated action between police officers and communities. Hence, the first attempt at a police reform along the lines of community policing faced institutional obstacles, such as the lack of state control over CIPOC territories and a military police force marked by rigid hierarchy and an undemocratic past; it also suffered from cultural obstacles, such as the lack of police legitimacy, and State legitimacy in general, in the eyes of the population, as well as a civil society that differed greatly from the one on which the model of community policing studied by Cerqueira was based on. The colonel

understood the main obstacles to his program, but the 1985 elections compromised the longevity of his project, and Moreira Franco's popularity marked yet another

movimento de gangorra caracterizado pela alternância repetida de políticas públicas ora pautadas pelo respeito aos direitos humanos, ora marcadas pela filosofia militarista e discricionária com conseqüências geralmente funestas para a sociedade como um todo e para suas camadas mais pobres em especial (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 4)

This movement once again becomes evident after the second Brizola administration with the election of Marcello Alencar. In 1985, therefore, Franco took advantage of the popular perception that viewed Brizola's government's public security policy with growing distrust.

À medida em que o mandato de Brizola avançou, foi se espalhando e consolidando um sentimento difuso de que o governo não agia, de que o poder público se eximira de velar pela segurança da população deixando-a à sua própria sorte. As restrições determinadas às formas convencionais de atuação policial, saudadas inicialmente como um avanço significativo para a nova ordem democrática que se pretendia instaurar, pouco a pouco passaram a ser percebidas como uma espécie de cumplicidade com o crime, gerando um descontentamento cada vez maior. (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 9)

Without straying too far from Brizola's most popular programs, the Franco campaign distinguished itself on the issue of public security, mainly by making attacks on Brizola's policy, which was based on human rights and a democratized security force. Therefore,

Sem apresentar qualquer plano de ação mais efetivo ou mesmo defender abertamente princípios básicos que norteariam sua política, Moreira afirmava reiteradamente que restabeleceria a ordem no estado, comprometendo-se a, através de uma ação dura e implacável, acabar com o crime organizado em todo o estado em cem dias. (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 13)

With the popular rejection of Brizola's strategy, Franco's superficial plan managed to convince voters, but "*Efetivamente, o governo Moreira representou um recrudescimento da antiga política de segurança que Brizola combatera ao longo de seu mandato*" (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 13). Thus, with the election of Moreira Franco in 1986, Cerqueira had to wait another four years to begin his project anew.

### 3.3. General Commander Once More

Brazil in the 1990s was not the same country it was during Brizola's first term. The optimism and enthusiasm surrounding redemocratization had suffered a "lost decade". Although he managed to carry the election in the first round, Brizola's campaign was based on a recycled strategy that lacked the legitimacy it had when he was first elected governor of Rio de Janeiro. For Sento-Sé and Soares,

É exatamente no período de 1991 a 1994 que a idéia de que os níveis de criminalidade e violência cresciam de forma descontrolada chega a proporções tais que os apelos mais contundentes para a adoção de métodos discricionários passam a ser abertamente aceitos por diversos setores da opinião pública. Eficiência! Eficiência a qualquer preço. Se for necessário, para as favas os direitos humanos. (1999, p. 16-17)

It is precisely in this difficult context that, during his second term (1991-1995), Leonel Brizola appointed Col. Nazareth Cerqueira once again as General Commander of the PMERJ. The scenario within the corporation, however, was very different from that of the 1980s, when, elected in an unofficial election, the commander had undeniable support. Cerqueira's appointment for the second time, in 1990, went against an unspoken rule: *"uma vez comandante, para sempre aposentado da corporação"* (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 293). The question regarding the legitimacy of his second command even motivated a popular action that questioned the legality of the nomination causing his inauguration to have to wait until after a "long legal battle".

With CIPOC's failure, which Cerqueira largely attributed to the State's lack of territorial control, the colonel changed his strategy in order to confront criminals (including corrupt police) in these areas and "reconquer" the territories. For this task, he created, in March 1991, a new unit, the Battalion of Special Police Operations (BOPE), whose mission was to dismantle criminal organizations and guarantee state sovereignty: According to his own administration:

Fundamentalmente, a maioria das ações executadas pelo BOPE são [sic] de caráter repressivo, face ao preparo técnico, tático e psicológico de seus integrantes, e em quase todas essas ações ocorrem prisões de delinquentes perigosos, detenções, bem como apreensões de materiais (armamento, tóxicos etc.), o que demonstra a eficácia e eficiência desta Unidade, face à destinação constitucional da Corporação (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 294)

This language demonstrates the gap between BOPE's actions and the principles of community policing. The idea of the police as service providers acting together with the community has little to do with a battalion whose main goal is to carry out repressive actions. The new tactic of Cerqueira's second command was to guarantee sovereignty in certain territories, and then stabilize that sovereignty with community policing programs.

Due to "*especificidades de problemas ocorridos no morro da Providência e do Pavão Pavãozinho*" a specific strategy was developed for these less favored neighborhoods. The *Grupamento de Aplicação Escolar* (GAPE) would be responsible for implementing a community policing program in these neighborhoods, which would begin with repressive actions: "*a proposta era retomar a soberania perdida pelo Estado nessas áreas e, em seguida, promover uma certa articulação comunitária que viabilizasse a prestação do serviço de policiamento*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 296).

GAPE would reinforce local battalions and implement this new vision of community policing. It would be responsible for fulfilling BOPE's role, and only after would it establish stronger ties with the communities. According to the corporation itself at the time: "*Inicialmente, o trabalho [do GAPE] será de erradicação dos problemas de segurança pública e integração com as comunidades*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 296). After "eradicating" these problems, the mission would be "*de prevenir a incidência de delitos e promover uma articulação comunitária forte que possibilite uma sólida defesa à dominação criminosa*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 296). Therefore, Cerqueira made it clear that GAPE could only be classified as a community policing program during this second stage, after the "reclaiming" of the territory (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 74). After the completion of these two tasks, GAPE would stabilize the community policing program until conventional police officers "*pudessem assumir a tarefa de prestação regular do serviço de policiamento e, por conseguinte, a garantia da soberania, da disciplina e da segurança nessa área*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 297).

To train the 150 GAPE police officers, the Community Police School Battalion (BEPC) was created, "*o qual seria a unidade da PMERJ especializada na preparação dos policiais lotados, posteriormente, nos programas de policiamento comunitário e no GAPE*" (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 297). Cerqueira still bet on the



importance of education, but he perhaps overestimated its ability to radically change the PMERJ's activities and its relationship with the citizens of Rio de Janeiro. While GAPE's main objective was to implement community policing in some less favored neighborhoods, Cerqueira's goal was to create an example that could introduce and legitimize the community policing model for the entire corporation: *"Para que esse plano se viabilizasse, a criação de um batalhão específico sobre o tema visava à formação não apenas teórica, mas também prática dos policiais, fazendo-os perceber quando essa modalidade de ação poderia ser mais bem aplicada e porquê"* (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 246). All recruits would have to go through the BEPC, thus Cerqueira institutionalized training in community policing in order to change the institution's culture and escape its repressive past.

GAPE was expanded, in 1993, to the neighborhoods of Mangueira, Borel, and Andaraí, but the outcome of all implementations was less than ideal: *"os relatórios de gestão destacavam, mais uma vez, a incapacidade de os programas de 'policamento comunitário' garantirem a soberania do Estado-nação em áreas de favela"* (RIBEIRO, 2014, p. 296). The population still viewed police officers with distrust, largely because of their role during the dictatorship, and without that trust the program had little chance of success. There were also negative reactions from the police themselves, some of whom had little interest in a democratized corporation. These reactions *"se materializariam, provavelmente, nas duas maiores chacinas cometidas por policiais que o Rio de Janeiro já vivenciou: a da Candelária, ocorrida em 23 de julho de 1993, e a de Vigário Geral, ocorrida em 28 de agosto de 1993"* (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 74). Whether or not they were direct reactions to Cerqueira's reforms, the massacres did little to instill confidence in the PMERJ among the population.

There was a generalized lack of trust between citizens and the police, but also within the police themselves, some of whom strongly resisted the changes proposed by Col. Cerqueira. Joint action between police and citizens demanded a social capital that simply did not exist at the time - which is not surprising given the state's negligence in CIPOC areas and the PMERJ's tradition as an extremely repressive force.

### 3.4. Copacabana

The policing program carried out in Copacabana, on the other hand, represents perhaps the best thought out reform carried out during Col. Cerqueira's two terms as general commander. The program did not survive the political change that came with the election of Marcello Alencar, but it left an important legacy of how to implement a relatively effective community policing program in Rio de Janeiro, despite its limited resources. For those interviewed by Ribeiro and Montandon, the program in Copacabana was "*o primeiro programa efetivo de policiamento comunitário*". This is because the implementation included:

- 1) estudo detalhado da dinâmica do crime e da desordem na área;
- 2) compreensão das causas dos problemas e apresentação de tal diagnóstico à população para que ela o completasse ou refutasse;
- 3) construção conjunta – entre polícia e comunidade – de possíveis cursos de ação policial capazes de desconstruir as causas dos problemas prioritários dessa área; e 4) monitoramento e avaliação da experiência, realizados por agências externas à PMERJ, com a participação da comunidade (2014, p. 244)

This program explicitly included community outreach, the problem-solving methodology, and some decentralization, at least in the sense of transparency and control over the program by citizens. For Ribeiro and Montandon, the difference between Copacabana and neighborhood policing in areas such as Urca "*era o melhor planejamento da intervenção, que foi antecedido por um estudo sistemático da dinâmica da área*" (2014, p. 244). For the interviewed police officers, the program in Copacabana was the first true community policing program, "*pois a participação da comunidade foi contemplada em todas as fases, desde a realização de estudos para mapeamento das causas dos problemas do crime e da insegurança, até a avaliação final da intervenção*" (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 245). Good planning, however, did not mean that the program had no problems or flaws.

The whole experience was closely monitored by two researchers from the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Jacqueline Muniz and Leonarda Musumeci, who were part of the Research Center of the Institute of Religious Studies (ISER), and whose work provides an exceptional source for understanding this unique project (MUSUMECI, 1996). "*Resistências e dificuldades de um programa de policiamento comunitário*", by the two researchers as well as Bianca

Freire and Patrick Larvie, highlights the program's main problems and shortcomings throughout its short existence (MUNIZ et al., 1997). The project had the support of Viva Rio, a "non-partisan civil society movement" that sought a democratic solution to the violence in Rio de Janeiro, and which was instrumental in establishing stronger ties between the PMERJ and civil society.

The initial plan envisaged 6 Community Councils (CCAs), which would enable police officers to formally meet with community representatives and define the issues of *"segurança do setor, avaliar os resultados do projeto e articular com outras agências, públicas e privadas, estratégias para o enfrentamento de problemas que ultrapassassem o âmbito de atuação da PM"* (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 10). Right from the start, the disorganization of civil society in Copacabana represented a difficult obstacle. Unlike the neighborhood policing of Urca, *"um dos problemas encontrados desde o início para organizar os CCAs foi a desarticulação ou desgaste das associações de moradores preexistentes, assim como a fraca estruturação da Associação Comercial e de outras entidades civis atuantes em Copacabana"* (MUNIZ et al., 1997, p. 200). The difficulty regarding the formation of civil associations in Brazil, pointed out by Reis as a result of a national identity being strongly linked to the State (1995), was made evident in Copacabana, to the great detriment of the neighborhood's community policing program.

Viva Rio's existing activities and network enabled the creation of two councils that *"chegaram a constituir, no começo do programa, um forum relativamente rico de debates, onde tanto o movimento VIVA RIO quanto o antigo comando do 19º BPM desempenhavam importante papel educativo ajudando a criar uma "cultura de participação"* (MUNIZ et al, 1997, p. 200). However, with time, these two councils began to lose strength and, in the end, only one council, which sought to discuss the problems of the neighborhood as a whole and later press for the reactivation of the project, was left standing. The councils' dependence on Viva Rio, and their inability to benefit from the participation of a variety of well-established associations (as was the case in Urca), represented a fundamental obstacle early on in the project.

In addition to establishing ties with local communities, another key community policing strategy is to create links with other private and public institutions that can support the problem-solving methodology: "Problem-oriented

policing also recognizes that the solutions to those patterns [of incidents] may involve other agencies and may be 'non-police' in character" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 50). It is inevitable that, in open meetings with community members, problems that have little or nothing to do with police work will arise. Therefore, it is important that officers foster relationships with other agencies that can help in these situations.

In Copacabana, the project's partnership with Viva Rio was crucial for this experience's success. However, the difficulty in establishing closer relationships with other public institutions represented a major obstacle to the police's actions. For Muniz,

A experiência carioca evidenciou a tradicional “esquizofrenia” dos serviços públicos, dispersos pelas esferas municipal, estadual e federal, e demonstrou como a questão da segurança pública tem dividido, muito mais do que conjugado, nos últimos anos, os esforços e interesses políticos (1997, p. 201)

For the researcher and her team, the politicization of public security made it very difficult for public bodies to work together in Copacabana. By becoming an "obligatory issue" for any political agenda, the issue of public security in Rio de Janeiro contributed "*para o acirramento de disputas entre órgãos e entre esferas de poder*" (MUNIZ et al., 1997, p. 201). Despite its efforts, the project was not able to establish a single partnership with any municipal level agency. Some of the reasons behind that rejection include: "*o ineditismo do programa, o desconhecimento de seus reais objetivos e a ideia de que colaborar com o Policiamento Comunitário significaria transferir dividendos políticos para a PM, ou para o VIVA RIO, ou para um partido rival, ou para uma esfera de poder concorrente*" (MUNIZ et al., 1997, p. 202). This may not fully capture the reality of the program's issues, however, as João Trajano points out, "*[c]onfundida com partidismo e sanha eleitoral, a política é vista como um mal de que devem se proteger*" (2016, p. 208). The politicization of a political issue should not necessarily be seen as an evil in itself. As Tocqueville pointed out, conflict is an integral part of politics, and only becomes an issue when it reaches the level of antagonism. In this context, self-interested, political infighting certainly contributed to serious problems in Copacabana's community policing efforts, but it ought to be mentioned that community policing and civil participation in public security are

inherently political mechanisms, and the idea of an apolitical implementation thereof is not an ideal worth striving towards.

Amoral familism at the political level is evident in these problems, in which political gains are seen as a zero-sum game, making any collective action between different actors in favor of common interests difficult. There was widespread mistrust even among public bodies in Rio de Janeiro. Potential partners treated the officers with suspicion, suspecting that they only wanted to steal the spotlight and sway public opinion, depicting an obviously antagonistic game. The inexperience of the police themselves in dealing with problems of a political and inter-institutional nature represented yet another obstacle: the police "*desconheciam trâmites e rituais burocráticos; não dominavam linguagens e códigos do serviço público civil; não dispunham sequer de uma lista atualizada de endereços, telefones e atribuições das agências estatais mais importantes*" (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 197). This added to the climate of distrust, seriously undermining the project's capacity to solve problems and to outline long and medium-term strategies.

Other significant obstacles to the project came from within the corporation. The already scarce resources of the police were misused, as pointed out by Musumeci, which was illustrated by problems such as:

precariedade logística; fraca articulação entre as companhias no interior dos batalhões; ineficiência (e não número excessivo) dos serviços internos responsáveis por essa articulação; ausência de planejamento; precária estrutura de levantamento, distribuição e processamento de informações; escalas de trabalho dessincronizadas; rigidez do regimento interno em vigor (herança obsoleta da ditadura militar); centralização e padronização ao extremo (até a comida dos batalhões tem de ser idêntica em todo o Estado do Rio) (1996, p. 129)

Countless similar obstacles existed and represented generalized difficulties in the corporation that clearly affected the effectiveness of the community policing project in Copacabana.

In addition to material precariousness, there was also cultural and structural resistance to the project. As pointed out by Skogan, decentralization and greater autonomy for the lower ranked police officers working alongside the public are fundamental for the well-functioning of community policing programs. The model did not necessarily have to tear down the existing military hierarchy in the PMERJ,

but it would have needed to make this hierarchy more flexible in order to grant stronger decision-making power to the lower ranked agents working in the community. The PM in Brazil, however, "*continua sendo regida por um regulamento interno do tempo da ditadura militar*", which is exceptionally rigid and relies on strict hierarchical subordination and the "law of silence", which prohibits any soldier to publicly manifest himself without the authorization from the General Staff of the Military Police. As a fundamental principle, severe penalties are applied to "*quaisquer situações que possam ser interpretadas como 'indisciplina' ou 'desrespeito' às normas de conduta institucional*" (MUNIZ et al., 1996, p. 205). This bureaucratization and centralization "*acaba resultando em perda de agilidade dos batalhões, desconexão entre as companhias no seu interior, morosidade das divisões de serviço interno, impossibilidade de planejamento e, portanto, perda de eficiência do conjunto*" (MUNIZ et al., 1996, p. 205). The police working in the lower ranks of the hierarchy are the ones who suffer most in this environment, suffering from a lack of autonomy and a constant fear of punishment: "*sob ameaça permanente de castigo, o policial aprende que não deve fazer nada além do que lhe é expressamente ordenado; não deve perguntar, apenas responder; não deve falar, apenas ouvir*" (MUNIZ et al., 1996, p. 206). To inspire these officers to act with the autonomy required by the community policing model proved difficult in this hostile environment.

Muniz and collaborators argue that the project had the capacity to inspire important reforms, both in the sense of better organizing material resources as well as changing the corporation's culture itself. In fact, program agents felt freer, without, however, reaching the sufficient level of autonomy required by the community policing model: "*'Autonomia' traduziu-se, assim, em 'maior liberdade para falar' e em relação menos verticalizada com os oficiais supervisores, mas não num acréscimo de poder decisório nos degraus mais baixos da hierarquia*" (MUNIZ et al., 1997, p. 206).

Other problems also represented obstacles to the program. The project only had two sergeants responsible for all 52 police officers, "*o que inviabilizava o acompanhamento individual do trabalho dos soldados*" (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 137). Lack of adequate training for recruits and the absence of criteria to evaluate the performance of the program made the implementation of the project very

difficult. Despite all these obstacles, however, the researchers considered the experiment to be "successful":

Os muitos e sérios obstáculos até aqui ressaltados, em vez de levarem a concluir que a experiência de Copacabana era inviável, e por isso fracassou, levam, pelo contrário, à valorização dos efeitos positivos que apesar de tudo ela produziu: desde o próprio esforço de mudança empreendido, até alguns resultados concretos na redução de delitos e distúrbios, e na melhoria das relações Polícia/comunidade (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 142)

For the researcher and her team, *"a experiência representou um avanço significativo no sentido de ampliar, diversificar e aprofundar o conhecimento a respeito da desordem e suas causas"* (1996, p. 142). This was evidenced by the fact that lower rank agents working directly with the community began to analyze and evaluate community issues with a more refined eye. Often occurrences began to be seen as "signs" or "symptoms" of disorder instead of as an end in itself, enabling a greater capacity to predict and prevent crime instead of simply reacting to them. The planning and resolution of problems in the medium and long term became a fundamental part of the project, resulting in a concrete reduction of several crimes, from small thefts to the elimination of planned, mass muggings in a specific sector, and even the elimination of thefts in an overcrowded building, *"exemplo único durante a vigência do projeto, mas indicativo da potencialidade de resolução de problemas em espaços domésticos, quando se conta com apoio direto da comunidade moradora"* (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 147). This last example is reminiscent of the CPO MacGregor case in Harlem, as told by the Vera Institute of Justice and summarized at the end of the first chapter of this study.

According to Musumeci, these successes, in addition to several others pointed out in his research, *"apontam para o grande potencial de controle da desordem e redução da insegurança contido na forma comunitária de policiamento, capaz de alterar condições pouco sensíveis ao patrulhamento comum, quando este se limita a intervir reativa e emergencialmente em 'ocorrências' pontuais"* (1996, p. 148). Despite the restrictive budget and the various problems already pointed out, the program had promising initial results and some important achievements.

Since the very start of the program, Viva Rio's active participation was fundamental to the project's success. This deviated from the Skogan model, in which the police themselves were responsible for organizing joint action with the community as a whole. However, Viva Rio was a necessary support for a public institution with little experience with the community and other public institutions. Nonetheless, Musumeci highlights some promising victories achieved during the short period of time the project was in place. The PMs achieved “*amplos contatos com a população trabalhadora*”, and “*uma redução de suspeitas e resistências genéricas em relação à Polícia*”, creating more trust between the community and the police (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 150-151). Networks were also created with *flanelinhas*, street vendors, the homeless, and more specifically homeless children, illustrating an "expansion of the 'community'" and a more democratic take on public security. Even though the PMs did not manage to create a wide network of contacts with civil entities, they attempted and achieved stronger ties with associations and NGOs, and the attempts themselves “*evidenciou uma disposição efetiva de incorporar demandas e participação de 'comunidades' institucionais preexistentes*” (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 151). Two Local Community Councils carried on even after Copacabana's community policing program was terminated, showing the program's potential to inspire civil organization on a more lasting basis. The enthusiasm of the members of the CCAs became evident in an episode that took place after the end of the Brizola government:

Em dezembro de 1995, quando a Comissão Especial de Segurança Pública da Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio convocou uma reunião com o Secretário de Segurança e o Comandante-Geral da Polícia Militar para discutir o destino do policiamento comunitário (àquela altura, já desmontado na prática), a “comunidade” se fez representar por ex-conselheiros e por líderes de associações de moradores, que exigiram das autoridades a retomada do projeto - responsável, segundo seus depoimentos, por mudanças positivas e significativas nas condições de segurança da região (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 151)

These statements, unfortunately, were not enough to convince the new governor to continue the project. The CCA members' reaction illustrates the fact that those who actively participated in the project felt its positive effects. All the testimonies collected by the researchers from people directly involved with the project “*realçavam a 'maior segurança' trazida pela presença e pelo trabalho dos*



*policiais comunitários nos quarteirões*" (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 153). The mere existence of a well-known police officer in charge of daily rounds increased these interviewees' sense of security, and it is not hard to imagine that a greater sense of trust between police officers and the community was built throughout the program. The change in the way the police was regarded was recognized within the battalion, *"mesmo por policiais não muito simpáticos à proposta comunitária"* (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 155).

Transparency increased within the corporation: *"houve algum 'efeito de retorno' sobre a estrutura interna do batalhão, no sentido de tornar mais conhecidos do 'mundo exterior' os imensos obstáculos e deficiências que entravam a melhoria dos serviços da Polícia Militar"* (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 153).

Se não foi suficiente para modificar tais condições e nem mesmo para garantir a continuidade do projeto, permitiu, ao menos, que se conhecessem melhor algumas das causas de ineficiência dos serviços de segurança pública, normalmente omitidas pela retórica oficial (quando enfatiza apenas a “falta de homens e equipamentos”) e pelas críticas generalizantes que tudo atribuem à inércia ou à corrupção. (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 153)

This evidences the truth behind Skogan's comment "Community policing often involves increases (sic) 'transparency' in how departments respond to demands for more information about what they do and how effective they are" (SKOGAN, 2008, p. 47). If the project had continued, perhaps it would have inspired some concrete gains in terms of greater efficiency in the use of resources and greater bureaucratic flexibility within the PMERJ. The project pointed to the potential of a new police model:

uma nova postura diante dos problemas e um novo tipo de relação entre polícia e “comunidade” permitiram ampliar o alcance da atuação policial e intervir em focos de distúrbios muito pouco sensíveis ao policiamento comum. Obtenção de informações; extensão do raio de vigilância e controle para além da presença física do policial, através da participação dos parceiros; ênfase na prevenção de reincidências, mais que na repressão pontual; abordagem seletiva dos problemas; estratégias flexíveis de intervenção; busca de soluções negociadas, não-violentas: eis os pressupostos fundamentais do aumento de eficácia e qualidade no modelo comunitário que, apesar de tantas limitações, os policiais de ponta conseguiram experimentar, com relativo sucesso, nas ruas de Copacabana. (MUSUMECI, 1996, p. 154)

The corporation's increasing transparency along with a high level of interaction with the community in Copacabana were fundamental ingredients for an increase in the level of trust between the PMERJ and the community. The picture of "*uma polícia disposta ao diálogo, acessível, flexível, substituindo a de uma autoridade fechada, distante e todo-poderosa*" certainly aligned with Cerqueira's idea of a police that aims to provide services instead of repression. Unfortunately, when the election came, the campaign promises of then-candidate Marcello Alencar painted another picture.

By the end of Brizola's second term,

A rejeição ao governo e a insatisfação que chegava à beira da histeria quanto à política de segurança acabam dando espaço para a retomada de bandeiras como a defesa da pena de morte e a jargões políticos do tipo 'bandido bom é bandido morto'. Iniciativa inovadores, como a criação do policiamento comunitário, estratégia utilizada em vários países e implementada graças ao empenho do então comandante da Polícia Militar, Coronel Nazareth Cerqueira, eram encaradas como insuficientes, quando não com escárnio, pela opinião pública. Nas corporações, amplos setores viam iniciativas como esta como uma espécie de amesquinamento do trabalho policial (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 18)

Alencar's inauguration marked the return of the "*gangorra*" and the resumption of a "hard-handed" view of policing that had little patience with experiences such as the community policing program in Copacabana: "*A vitória de Marcello Alencar e a nomeação, poucos meses após a posse do novo governo, do General Nilton Cerqueira para o comando da segurança no estado representou a retomada da política pautada pela força, com componentes fortemente discricionários*" (SENTO-SÉ E SOARES, 1999, p. 19). His infamous "Western bonus" created an incentive to increase police lethality, and Cerqueira's democratic discourse had no space in this environment. The new governor extinguished the community policing program within the first months of his administration, which marked the end of the last community policing program created directly by Col. Cerqueira (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 75). With the end of the Brizola government, Cerqueira retired from the PMERJ, but would continue to work in academia, continuously seeking to improve law enforcement in Brazil.

Os primeiros meses de sua aposentadoria foram marcadas por várias viagens ao exterior, para conhecimento de novos modelos de policiamento comunitário e relato dos desafios da PMERJ rumo a uma polícia cidadã. Sua primeira missão foi a visita ao National Prevention Council of Canada, em abril; ao Police Foundation nos Estados Unidos, em maio, e a Roma, em setembro. Participou também da avaliação do Proerd, na condição de colaborador do Programa Interuniversitário de Pesquisas e Demandas Sociais (Prodeman), da UERJ (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 1995, p. 76)

Up until the end, Cerqueira "*procurava veicular textos que poderiam servir como grandes fontes de inspiração para a estruturação de um novo padrão de policiamento, específico para o caso brasileiro*", writing a series entitled "*Polícia do Amanhã*". This project was interrupted when Colonel Cerqueira was murdered in 1999, a crime that was never solved (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2015, p. 76).

### 3.5. Conclusion

The legacy of community policing left by Cerqueira is of fundamental importance in Brazil. He was the first to try to implement the model in the country in aims of creating a professionalized public security apparatus that included participation by the community it serves. From an early age, Cerqueira worked to create a more professional, transparent police institution. Given its initial trajectory, the concept of community policing was strongly aligned with his ideals, which valued participation, criticized corruption, and benefited from what he learned from his travels abroad.

Throughout his career, Cerqueira valued education and saw its potential to transform his world, be it by offering an exemplary career for a boy from humble beginnings or removing the inherent injustices of the institution to which he dedicated his life. It is not surprising that he used education as a key element in his attempt to reform the PMERJ and create a more professionalized institution, which was especially depicted in his work in the Batalhão Escola de Polícia Comunitária (BEPC), but which was already evident even earlier in his career, when he worked at the Recruit Training Center, at the Private Training School and at the Officer Training School, the latter of which he criticized in *Futuro de uma Ilusão*.

The faith he placed in education perhaps helps explain the lack of emphasis he placed on structural change. Inspired by the model of the French Gendarmerie, he believed that his reforms could succeed even without creating a substantially more decentralized institution. However, the obstacles faced by the community policing program in Copacabana highlight the difficulty of creating a community policing program in a rigidly hierarchical institution. He wanted the PMERJ to provide services to the city's citizens, but the institution was, and still is, a military institution more strongly linked to a confrontational ideology than to a democratic one.

Perhaps the most profound legacy left by Cerqueira's reforms were the two distinct forms of community policing implemented. While the final goal was the same, the fact is that Cerqueira produced two different models throughout his career: that of the policing program in Copacabana, an upscale neighborhood, and that of CIPOC and GAPE, implemented in less privileged neighborhoods. It is important to highlight that Col. Cerqueira did not consider the policing operations that aimed to regain territory control and assert the authority of the State to be community policing. For him, they represented a necessary step for the later implementation of a true community policing program. Unfortunately, he also left an ironic legacy in the creation of a highly repressive model of policing, the BOPE, created during the reforms that aimed at a more professionalized public security institution.

Reis argues that

entre os setores sociais mais ricos parece estar crescendo a tendência para definir o espaço da comunidade em termos limitados. Quanto maior é a distância entre os segmentos sociais, mais abstrata se torna a preocupação dos que estão em cima com as dificuldades dos que estão embaixo. Teoricamente, aqueles que têm alguma coisa a perder associam diretamente a violência e a insegurança com seus temores frente à pobreza e à desigualdade (1995, p. 41)

This fear seems to have become institutionalized and is evident in the unequal treatment provided across territories differentiated by the State as "normal" and "subnormal", as discussed by Ribeiro and Montandon (2014, p. 241). The history of the institution cannot be ignored either. Operations such as ACISO, which sold themselves as social actions but were in fact intelligence operations

aimed at identifying and incapacitating "criminals", helped to undermine any remaining State legitimacy in these less favored territories. The Candelária and Vigário Geral massacres, likely reactions to Cerqueira's reforms, are an extreme example of yet another major obstacle the program faced: resistance from the police themselves.

Despite the various difficulties and failures of Cerqueira's reforms, it is important to note the relative successes of Copacabana's community policing program. The program's ability to create trust and obtain concrete results shows that, even with extremely limited resources, there is potential in Cerqueira's program. Unfortunately, the legacy of this program is relatively weak, in part because of its almost immediate termination by the Alencar administration. Without due recognition, the achievements of this program were not fully exploited and failed to influence subsequent reforms.

What has largely influenced the legacy of community policing in Brazil “*é que as políticas que adquirem maior penetração na mídia e, por conseguinte, terminam sendo reconhecidas como de policiamento comunitário, são as que guardam menos relação com essa categoria tal como prescrita pela literatura especializada*” (RIBEIRO AND MONTANDON, 2014, p. 257). That is, what ended up being most recognized were the programs that aimed to regain control through force. This had extremely important implications for the reforms that came after Cerqueira's death, especially those of the GPAE and UPP. The next chapter will discuss the influence of Cerqueira's legacy on more recent reforms and attempts at implementing community policing by institutionalizing civil participation in public spaces at the state-wide level and at more local levels through CONSPERJ and the community security councils.

## 4. Rio de Janeiro Security Councils

Col. Cerqueira's passing marked the end of the initial attempts to professionalize PMERJ and establish enough State legitimacy to implement a true community policing program. As shown in the preceding chapter, despite some important gains, the success of his reforms were limited at best, with a clear and problematic differentiation between reforms implemented in wealthier areas and those implemented in less favored regions. The importance of these attempts, however, cannot be ignored, and more recent improvements in Rio de Janeiro policing bear the mark of Cerqueira's legacy. While Rio de Janeiro's initial police reforms tended to focus on professionalizing the police, with a few attempts at implementing more truly community policing initiatives, such as the Copacabana program, truly democratizing the police force would require an effort to actively include citizens in the public security debate and allow some level of direct influence over the actions and strategies of Rio de Janeiro police agencies.

Avritzer (2008) demonstrated a few examples of how Brazil has managed to institutionalize civil participation in public spaces. Notably, Brazil's health councils, a form of managing council, have proven to be a relatively successful version of power sharing, in which civil society is invited to participate in a public, decision-making institution alongside State actors. As we saw earlier in this study, power sharing occurs "*através da constituição de uma instituição na qual atores estatais e atores da sociedade civil participam simultaneamente*" (AVRITZER, 2008, p. 46). A multi-pronged, organic civil movement led to the passing of law 8,142, which institutionalized public health councils and provided the important tool of economic sanctions to municipalities that refused to faithfully implement the law. The model allows for the maintenance of civil participation in public spaces even in the face of a hostile local government, as shown in the case of Sao Paulo's failed attempt to dilute public influence in the decision to privatize health care, though power sharing does require active, healthy public backing. It also sacrifices some of the direct civil power demonstrated in the bottom up example, limiting civil participation to a seat at the table which influences rather than guides decision-making.

The analog to Brazil's health councils in the area of public security are embodied in Rio de Janeiro's *conselhos comunitários de segurança*, or community

security councils (CCS), and the *Conselho de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*, or the Rio de Janeiro State Public Security Council (CONSPERJ). The final chapter of this study will focus on how these security councils built upon Cerqueira's vision and attempted to bring community policing and more robust civil participation to Rio de Janeiro's security apparatus.

#### 4.1. Rio de Janeiro Security Councils

In "Conselhos de Segurança no Brasil Contemporâneo: Balanço" (2016), João Trajano de Lima Sento-Sé and a team of researchers studied the implementation of these security councils in Rio de Janeiro and across Brazil. After laying the theoretical groundwork for their study, the team first analyzed the legal framework that laid the foundations for Brazil's public security councils in each state. They then studied the implementations and efficacy of the security councils in each state, comparing their effectiveness and their adherence to the spirit of the law.

Agreeing with Skogan's view of the basic definition of community policing, Sento-Sé affirms, "*Como destaca a literatura especializada, o policiamento comunitário, a despeito dos inúmeros significado e interpretações que se deem a ele, implica necessariamente participação e alguma dose de protagonismo local*" (2016, p. 14). Despite the varied models that community policing has taken over the years, local participation is a consistently necessary element. Despite this,

É a polícia que dispõe, ao fim e ao cabo, do poder decisório e da prerrogativa de definir estratégias. Aqui, os conselhos de segurança reportam-se a um tipo de participação de natureza muito diferente. Eles se referem, ou deveriam se referir, a uma forma de participação política, não profissional, e necessariamente atravessada por contradições e conflitos o que, naturalmente, não exclui também acordos e cooperação (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 14)

The police have more decision-making power in this relationship, making Avritzer's bottom up design less realistic in this case. The power sharing design, where civil participation is institutionalized as an equal partner to State actors, lends a more intuitively appropriate model for community policing. However, as Cerqueira's trajectory makes clear,

Historicamente enquadrada como atividade em que se configuram as mais brutais manifestações de dominação e privação a que são submetidas pelo Estado as parcelas subalternas da sociedade brasileira, a segurança pública pena para se inventar como campo reconhecido de provimento de direitos, o que já indica o caráter problemático do encontro de que se pretende tratar (SENTOSÉ et al., 2016, p. 16)

The contradictions of Cerqueira's attempts to bring Brazil's policing model closer to that of community policing already proved the difficulty in making a historically repressive apparatus approach democratic ideals. This chapter will consider the successes and the limitations of the security council model in its attempts to fulfill Cerqueira's vision and bring community policing to Rio de Janeiro.

Regarding the legal structure of Rio de Janeiro's security councils, Sento-Sé points out that the "*constituição estadual do Rio de Janeiro prevê que os órgãos de segurança pública sejam assessorados pelo 'Conselho Comunitário de Defesa Social', estruturado na forma da lei, guardando-se a proporcionalidade relativa à respectiva representação*" (2016, p. 46). Notably, the members of this "community council" should be appointed by the head of the State's executive branch, demonstrating a legal focus on the state level rather than a more local approach. This formed the legal foundations for the *Conselho de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*, or the State Public Security Council of Rio de Janeiro (CONSPERJ).

Created in 1999 during the Garotinho administration (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 197), CONSPERJ initially included 15 seats for public institutions and only one for civil society. It was restructured in 2012 under the Cabral administration to consist of 30 seats, with 9 representatives each for public authorities and public security workers, and 12 members of civil society, including one representative of the state's CCSs (SENTOSÉ et al., 2016, p. 47). Sento-Sé notes its two most relevant responsibilities:

competem ao órgão convocar e coordenar a conferência estadual de segurança pública e, ainda, articular as pautas dos conselhos comunitários e municipais de segurança com a formulação e execução da política estadual de segurança. No segundo caso, interessa ressaltar a atribuição de receber, encaminhar e acompanhar denúncias relacionadas à ação das instituições policiais. Isto é, fiscaliza, mas não confunde a missão



institucional com as atribuições das corregedorias de polícia. (2016, p. 48)

CONSPERJ was designed to guarantee civil participation in both policy formulation and, to a limited extent, the oversight of police strategies and actions on a statewide level.

The community security councils (CCS) are designed for local representation and participation on a consultative level. They were originally envisaged in the State Constitution of 1989, though their actual implementation would only begin 10 years later during the Garotinho administration (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 91), and would help coordinate public security in *Áreas Integradas de Segurança Pública*, or Integrated Public Security Areas (AISPs), local regions whose borders were defined in the same resolution that implemented the CCSs. Sento-Sé notes that,

Os CCS são entidades criadas pelo poder público, sem personalidade jurídica definida. Os conselhos são instituídos por iniciativa de seus dois membros natos, que correspondem aos representantes das polícias militar e civil no território da AISP. Eles estão vinculados à Secretaria de Segurança Pública (SSP), e devem responder às diretrizes e à coordenação do Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP) (2016, p. 92)

In their original format, the CCSs were designed largely with the needs of the state security institutions in mind: *"Uma consequência imediata dessa concentração de poder nas mãos dos representantes das instituições policiais é que, pouco a pouco, os CCS foram sendo desativados em razão de um gradual e sintomático processo de esvaziamento"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 169).

In 2003, a new resolution was passed *"com a perspectiva de revitalizar os conselhos comunitários das AISP. A resolução tinha apenas seis artigos, e parecia mais uma espécie de 'declaração de intenções'"* than a legal document (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 92). It did, however, provide for better mechanisms for interaction between the state security actors and civil society, including *"cafés comunitários"*, in which the military police would host regular meetings with the civil police and members of the community within their AISP outside of the formal CCS meetings: *"encontros mensais entre a Polícia Militar e a população compreendida na área da Aisp, a qual o batalhão está circunscrito, denominados cafés comunitários, que*

*também contam com a participação da Polícia Civil"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 169).

Finally, in 2005, Resolution SSP N. 781/2005 fully regulated the CCSs in the state. Sento-Sé notes that,

O regulamento deixa claro o caráter consultivo destes colegiados, reafirmou as finalidades citadas anteriormente, e incluiu novas finalidades, como a definição de prioridades de atuação policial nas AISP, a promoção de campanhas educativas e programas de instrução e a realização de 'eventos comunitários que fortaleçam vínculos'. (2016, p. 92)

16 years after they were initially sketched out in the state constitution, the CCSs finally had a fully defined legal framework in Rio de Janeiro.

## 4.2. CONSPERJ

It is worth noting that, despite the formally defined cooperation between CONSPERJ and the CCSs, the relationship between the two has historically been checkered at best. As Poncioni points out, "*o que se observa no campo é uma acentuada dificuldade de interlocução entre o Consperj e os CCS*" (2016, p. 199). The difficult relationship appears to have stemmed from a disagreement regarding the representation of CCS within CONSPERJ,

A origem da contenda, em princípio, remete à divisão territorial do estado em Risps e Aisps. Afinal, o Rio conta no total com sete Risps, que são constituídas pela reunião de Aisps, sendo que, para cada Aisp, existe a previsão de instalação de um conselho. Ocorre que o Consperj destinou uma vaga à representação dos CCS, mas estes reivindicavam ao menos sete vagas, uma por Risp, de modo a possibilitar que todas as regiões estejam representadas no Consperj. No entanto, os gestores da Seseg alegaram que esse pleito não poderia ser atendido porque comprometeria a paridade entre os segmentos que compõem a plenária (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 199)

Each of the seven *Regiões Integradas de Segurança Pública* (RISPs) in the city of Rio de Janeiro consist of a group of AISPs in a specific geographic region. As each of the 65 AISPs has its own council, this makeup allows for a single representative for all 65 CCSs. This perceived lack of representation led to a boycott of the election for the CCS representative in CONSPERJ, leading to only a handful

of the 65 CCSs voting for the first representative (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 200). The result of this was that,

ainda que, do ponto de vista normativo, tenham sido observadas as formalidades legais, no que tange à legitimidade entre os seus pares, isso não ocorreu: os integrantes dos CCS não reconheciam a validade do processo eleitoral, assim como não concebiam o Consperj como um espaço legítimo de articulação e participação social (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 200)

Frustration with the legal framework for participation therefore led to a further lack of representation of CCSs in CONSPERJ and a strained relationship between the local and state representatives. This led to a situation in which, "*Até o momento, pode-se dizer que os titulares da cadeira (um em cada mandato) desempenharam a função de representantes de sua entidade, no caso, o CCS a que são vinculados, e não a do conjunto de conselhos comunitários*" (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 201).

The nine seats reserved for public security also led to setbacks in terms of creating a more complete, participatory environment with CONSPERJ. Only three entities presented candidates in the first election. In a second round of voting, five more entities presented candidates, so that all eight candidates were elected by acclamation:

Isto é, ao final de dois processos eleitorais consecutivos, o Consperj iniciou suas atividades com um assento não preenchido neste segmento. Para além da vacância inicial, há que ressaltar ainda que, entre os conselheiros indicados neste segmento, verificava-se a menor adesão às propostas de participação nas comissões ou grupos temáticos, além de ser considerável o grau de absenteísmo desses conselheiros nas sessões ordinárias do colegiado (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 201)

The seats for public authorities also experienced difficulties in the first election: "*a vaga destinada à Casa Civil, no período da coleta de dados, nunca contou com um representante nas reuniões do conselho*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 201). The governor's office never even named a representative. Important institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Public Defender's Office, as well as *Secretaria de Estado de Administração Penitenciária*, responsible for administering the state's prisons, were excluded from CONSPERJ despite complaints from councilmembers (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 201).

Despite these initial difficulties, CONSPERJ met for its first official session in September 2013, and one of the first tasks for the council put forward by its president, José Mariano Beltrame, was to develop its internal regulations. The council's first attempt at consensus, however, was not a smooth process, and it took another two months and a session dedicated entirely to the subject before CONSPERJ passed a preliminary version of its internal regulations: "*a leitura integral do regimento só chegou a ser concluída em uma sessão ordinária, convocada exclusivamente para a finalização do RI, em 5 de novembro de 2013*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 203). For Poncioni, many of the difficulties of these first sessions were at least in part caused by a lack of experience among the councilmembers:

uma das razões pelas quais a elaboração do regimento se prolongou por várias sessões residia, entre outros motivos, na própria inexperiência dos atores políticos envolvidos no processo. Havia, em certo sentido, uma face didática nas sessões iniciais: aprendia-se a agir politicamente ao mesmo tempo que se estruturava o Consperj (2016, p. 203)

For example, some civil society representatives attempted to impose deliberative responsibilities on CONSPERJ, despite the fact that it was legally defined as a strictly propositional and consultative council. A similar issue arose when councilmembers voted en masse against installing the legally mandated Ethics Commission:

observamos que tanto os representantes dos trabalhadores da área de segurança pública como os da sociedade civil convergiram para uma mesma posição: não havia a necessidade da instauração de uma Comissão Permanente de Ética nem de seu respectivo código de condutas. Contudo, apesar de o colegiado ter deliberado pela não elaboração do código de ética, um dos conselheiros tomou para si essa atividade e, após produzir uma primeira versão do documento, encaminhou-o à secretaria executiva, que o distribuiu ao colegiado (via e-mail) em 2 de novembro de 2013 (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 204)

As shown by Poncioni, the first meetings were marked by legal misunderstandings and strained relationships between some councilmembers. Despite this, however, the internal regulations were finally fully approved on 4 December, 2013.

The next step was to define the composition of CONSPERJ's working groups. Perhaps the most striking element of this process was the lack of interest shown by public security workers. The approved internal regulations called for the installation of four permanent working groups: "*i) Articulação dos Conselhos Comunitários de Segurança; ii) Estudos, Acompanhamento e Avaliação das Políticas de Segurança Pública; iii) Legislação, Orçamento, Modernização e Desenvolvimento; e iv) Direitos Humanos*". The first group, "Articulation of the CCSs", included one representative from PMERJ. However, "*nenhum órgão de classe dos trabalhadores das polícias Militar e Civil se fizeram representar*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 209-210). For the second working group, "Studies, Accompaniment, and Evaluation of Public Security Policies", there was a similar lack of interest from the public security institutions. More worrying was the gap between the interest of public institutions and civil society in the fourth group, dedicated to "Human Rights", and that of the public security workers:

O quarto grupo temático, Direitos Humanos, foi aquele que mais captou o interesse dos conselheiros oriundos das instituições públicas e da sociedade civil organizada. Ao mesmo tempo, foi um grupo de trabalho que não despertou o interesse de nenhuma das organizações que representam os trabalhadores da segurança pública (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 211)

This generalized lack of interest borders on outright hostility, betraying the importance of implementing a power sharing design as defined by Avritzer (2008), and the likely failure of any attempts at a bottom up design. Although State institutions showed support for the group, the lack of interest from public agencies specific to the working group's area demonstrate an important lack of institutional backing. For Sento-Sé,

os profissionais de polícia antecipam certa hostilidade potencial nas posições e linhas de orientação do conselho em relação a suas respectivas corporações, o que acaba gerando um vácuo nos canais de diálogo e debates internos (2016, p. 200)

Even without any conflicting interests from public security interests, however, the "Human Rights" working group proved to be the least productive overall: "*embora vários conselheiros tenham manifestado interesse em participar efetivamente do quarto grupo temático, na prática, este foi o grupo que apresentou o menor rendimento em termos de resultados*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p.

211). The Human Rights group was the only working group unable to submit a strategy proposal for 2013-2015.

Overall, there appeared to be a general gap in the enthusiasm shown by participating councilmembers: "*enquanto alguns conselheiros se candidatavam a mais de um grupo temático, outros não se entusiasmavam em participar*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 212). The generalized lack of interest from public security professionals is even more problematic considering that, in the view of most councilmembers, "*a tendência é considerar a segurança pública um problema exclusivo das polícias e, portanto, não concernentes a outras esferas do poder público*" (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 201).

The relationship between CONSPERJ and the CCSs is unfortunately a strained one. Beyond the issues of representation and frustration with the perceived lack thereof on the part of the CCSs, "*existe certo mal estar da parte de alguns conselheiros quanto ao que consideram um excessivo protagonismo da Secretaria de Segurança na condução da agenda e dos trabalhos do conselho*" (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 202). They not only feel underrepresented, but also a lack of empowerment when it comes to guiding the group's tasks and goals. The council president, in charge of setting the agenda, is nominated by the public security secretary's office. Despite the president's broadly defined power, the public security secretary did not seem to prioritize CONSPERJ, further straining the council's relationship with civil society groups:

Os conselheiros, sobretudo parte daqueles vinculados a associações da sociedade civil, questionam tanto a titularidade da presidência quanto da mesa diretora. Por outro lado, questionam igualmente a pouca atenção concedida pelo secretário ao CONSPERJ, o que seria atestado em sua ausência de praticamente todas as atividades do conselho. (SENTO-SÉ et al., 2016, p. 202)

This lack of interest was demonstrated by the rarity of the visits made by then security secretary, José Mariano Beltrame, although it would be a mistake to blame him entirely for the council's difficulties:

pode-se perceber, a partir de apuração junto a conselheiros e gestores vinculados à secretaria, uma tendência à desarticulação e parca mobilização do colegiado em geral. Aparentemente, além do baixo grau de articulação dos quatro grupos de trabalho, as

próprias reuniões mensais têm tido quórum baixo e dificuldade de definição de um rumo para conduzir o conselho (SENTOSÉ et al., 2016, p. 2020)

While growing pains cannot be denied, it is important to note that these observations were made in 2016, when CONSPERJ was still an exceptionally new endeavor, and that major progress was made already in the beginnings of the initiative. CONSPERJ managed to define a stable, public forum for debate; an important public space which had not existed before. During the infamous Maré operation, for example, CONSPERJ invited the:

Comandante da Força Militar que ocupou uma parte do Complexo da Maré, no ano de 2014. Na ocasião, além do comandante, que atendeu ao convite, estiveram presentes em plenária do conselho lideranças de quinze comunidades que compõem o complexo, além de outros atores vinculados a entidades de defesa dos direitos humanos (SENTOSÉ et al., 2016, p. 203)

Although no concrete initiative came of this meeting, the fact is that CONSPERJ managed to unite more than a dozen actors together in one room to discuss a controversial, relevant public act and attempt to find a solution through participative democracy. As noted by Sento-Sé, this begets a significant potential for growth and action. At the time of the report, however, the council "*revela baixa capacidade de definir uma linha de atuação*" (2016, p. 203). Tension between civil society councilmembers and the public security secretary, as well as an underwhelming interest on the part of public security professionals, are major obstacles towards more concrete outcomes, and the council in general has shown itself to be one, "*com baixa organicidade interna, pouca capacidade de articulação de propostas e demandas, e frágeis canais de articulação interna e para fora de seus limites*" (SENTOSÉ et al., 2016, p. 203).

In their 2019 article, "Participação e democratização da segurança pública no Brasil em perspectiva comparada: os casos de Rio de Janeiro e Pará", Sento-Sé and Marinho study some of the progress CONSPERJ had made since 2016. At the time of this newer study, the four working groups still had not managed to establish a stable schedule: "*esses grupos ainda não conseguiram estabelecer uma rotina de atividades e, conseqüentemente, não chegaram a formular propostas*" (SENTOSÉ

and MARINHO, 2019, p. 92). The CCSs continued to feel underrepresented in CONSPERJ:

Essa reivindicação perdura até os dias de hoje e suscita ainda muitos debates, conforme frisado em entrevista pelo próprio representante dos CCSs, quando da realização da pesquisa de campo, de maneira que muitos conselheiros comunitários não concebem o Consperj como um espaço legítimo de participação cidadã, chegando até mesmo a evitá-lo (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 93)

Public security workers continued to show an unfortunate lack of interest, as well: *"Naquilo que diz respeito aos trabalhadores de segurança pública, é preciso salientar que a sua participação também não se dá conforme o que se esperava quando a estrutura do Conselho fora imaginada de forma tripartite"* " (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 94). Even a few years in, they did not seem to perceive CONSPERJ as an important forum for making public security decisions. Sento-Sé and Marinho point out two principle reasons for this lack of participation on the part of public security workers, the first of which being that *"é bastante difícil que todos os assentos destinados a esse segmento sejam preenchidos pelo simples motivo de que ainda há poucas entidades que representem os agentes dessa área"* " (2019, p. 94). Without an organized, active environment of organizations representing these workers, it is difficult to expect them to provide candidates for CONSPERJ.

The second, perhaps more worrying, reason is that the organizations that do exist do not see CONSPERJ as a legitimate space for representing their own interests, because *"[m]uitos consideram que este seria um espaço em que os policiais seriam apenas alvo da hostilidade da sociedade civil e no qual não haveria um diálogo profícuo com as autoridades governamentais"* (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 94). Rather than a public space for healthy debate, they see CONSPERJ as a hostile organization in which productive dialog is difficult to come by.

Other Rio de Janeiro state institutions represented in CONSPERJ, including the Office of the Chief of Staff and the secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights, have shown a low interest in regularly participating in the council, as well. It is important to note, however, that



a inclusão de outros órgãos para além daqueles que constituem o sistema de justiça criminal pode ser entendida como um indicativo de uma concepção de segurança pública mais ampla, que compreende que o campo não está restrito às instituições que tradicionalmente são a ele associadas (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 95)

This demonstrates an understanding of public security that is more in line with community policing; one that comprehends public security in a far broader sense than strictly policework. This more inclusive definition of public security has led to successful dialog between actors that would not normally have a public space dedicated to these kinds of interactions:

a participação de atores representantes de pastas como as de Educação, Cultura e Assistência Social, por exemplo, áreas em que a relação entre Estado e sociedade civil organizada tende a ser menos hostil, têm possibilitado algumas articulações entre estes e representantes de entidades civis na formulação de propostas de intervenção do conselho que possuam caráter interinstitucional (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 95)

Despite various obstacles and setbacks, the fact is that CONSPERJ represents an important public space with the undeniable potential for democratic dialog through broadly defined participation in an area that is notoriously difficult to democratize. As Sento-Sé and Marinho summarize,

a sensação compartilhada de que a participação via conselhos no campo da segurança pública é um projeto inacabado, que ainda necessita de aprimoramento e de maior tempo de prática, para que sejam estabelecidas rotinas e desfeitas desconfianças e dicotomias que impõem posturas mais beligerantes e tensionadas entre os diferentes atores (2019, p. 96)

These initial difficulties should not be seen as a reason to discount the progress made through CONSPERJ, but rather as a learning process that requires further patience and effort. The very creation of CONSPERJ required fruitful collaboration between civil society and state actors: "*a cooperação entre instâncias da sociedade civil e agentes do Estado foi importante para que o Consperj saísse do papel e se tornasse uma instituição efetivamente existente*" (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 96). It also includes important, if underutilized, methods for transparency without which participative democracy is entirely unfeasible:

as atividades do Conselho Estadual de Segurança Pública são publicizadas, por meio do website do colegiado. Nele é possível ter acesso às peças legais que normatizam o Conselho, ao seu histórico, às atividades que são desenvolvidas, aos grupos temáticos que o compõem, dentre outras informações. Ainda que seja pouco conhecido, trata-se de uma ferramenta que tem potencial para estimular a participação da sociedade (SENTO-SÉ and MARINHO, 2019, p. 94)

It is difficult to imagine this hard-earned progress without the larger context of Brazil's trend towards institutionalizing participative democracy paired with the groundwork laid during Col. Cerqueira's reforms.

### 4.3. Community Security Councils (CCSs)

The CCSs represent the institutionalization of civil participation at a more local level than CONSPERJ. As has already been mentioned, there are 65 CCSs each generally representing a specific AISP, a region which corresponds to the territory controlled by a specific military police battalion (BPM). In the city of Rio de Janeiro, some AISPs encompass more than a single CCS, but the majority of AISPs contain only one CCS (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 167-168). Following Cerqueira's service providing model, the original 1999 CCS resolution

parece sugerir que a participação social era então concebida a partir das relações de consumo nas quais o cliente – a 'sociedade' – opinaria sobre a qualidade da prestação do serviço policial, indicando aperfeiçoamentos (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 168)

Civil society's consultative role would serve to improve the services rendered by public security institutions and inform potential improvements. They were also designed with the goal of bringing public security institutions closer to the community, a key aspect of community policing which aims to foster the trust which is so important for the functioning of any participative democratic institution.

This participation is limited to a certain extent by the member hierarchy laid out in the design of CCSs in Rio de Janeiro: "*eles devem contar com três categorias de integrantes: membros natos, efetivos e participantes. Esses membros são tratados de modo diferenciado no tocante aos direitos e às obrigações que portam*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 171). *Membros natos*, or natural members,

include only representatives of police institutions within the AISP, such as the PMERJ battalion commander.

Na condição de membro nato, tais integrantes não podem ser destituídos de seus cargos. Além disso, eles não votam nem podem ser votados durante o processo eleitoral para a composição da diretoria, cabendo a eles, porém, fiscalizar todo o pleito. Ao membro nato é facultada a possibilidade de solicitar ao ISP que, na ausência de um CCS implantado em sua Aisp, homologue a instalação de um conselho naquela circunscrição (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 171)

It is important to note that this leaves a significant power imbalance in the hands of public security actors, as there are no natural members who represent civil society. Natural members are obligated to attend all CCS meetings, though in practice they often send representatives in their place.

*Membros efetivos*, or sitting members, must be over 18 years old and live, work, or study within the region represented by the CCS. They also must possess a clean criminal record, an arguably questionable criteria for entrance into participative politics, and one that can lead to sometimes arbitrary exclusion from the CCS (see PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 170). Sitting members can vote and run for positions on the council, and tend to be "*membros da comunidade, representantes religiosos, associações de moradores, associações comerciais e industriais, prestadores de serviços públicos e privados etc*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 171).

The lowest rung of the hierarchy is reserved for *membros participantes*, or participating members: "*Não sendo membro nato nem membro efetivo, todos os demais cidadãos que frequentem as reuniões do CCS serão denominados de membros participantes – estes não votam nem podem ser votados nas eleições para integrar a diretoria do conselho*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 172). This does add an important level of transparency, as any citizen can attend the meeting as a non-voting participating member and be allowed to speak.

The monthly meetings themselves have a set schedule stipulated by the 2005 CCS Resolution 781/2005, and an overarching goal in line with Skogan's view of community policing:

Pretende-se que sejam usadas as estratégias de policiamento voltado à solução de problemas, cujos princípios seriam: identificação das questões preocupantes, proposição da divisão de responsabilidades entre os atores envolvidos e monitoramento das soluções propostas (PONCIONI and SILVA., 2016, p. 173)

The meetings should identify important local issues, decide which members of the CCS should be responsible for attempting to solve them, and monitor the implementation of proposed solutions.

To evaluate how this ideal worked out in practice, Poncioni and Silva analyzed the minutes from the CCS representing the 31st AISP, which includes wealthier neighborhoods from the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro city, such as Barra da Tijuca, as well as middle to lower class neighborhoods, including Recreio dos Bandeirantes and Vargem Grande. The team studied the digital archives from 2005 to 2012, though it is important to note that these archives were not complete, and contained several significant gaps. This lack of organization is also present in the content of the archives:

A leitura das atas do CCS da 31a Aisp no longo prazo, entre 2005 e 2012, produz no leitor alguma confusão mental, pois a todo momento a composição da diretoria e a relação dos membros efetivos constante nas atas se confundem. A impressão que se tem é de que ambas têm a mesma composição. Ocorre que, se isto for verdade, todo membro efetivo era também integrante da diretoria do conselho, o que colocaria um dilema para a alternância de poderes (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 178-179)

With time, however, the quality of the minutes standardized and improved, providing the team enough information to provide a quality analysis. Despite the less than ideal record keeping, there were some positive indications regarding the functioning of this CCS. It counted on the consistent presence of an important core of members: the natural members nearly always attended the meetings, though it was unclear how often they sent representatives in their place. There was a consistent group of participating members in attendance as well, according to Poncioni: *"eles apresentam pouca alternância ao longo dos anos: são quase sempre os mesmos moradores, síndicos de condomínios, representantes de associação de moradores e proprietários de estabelecimentos comerciais"* (2016, p. 179). The CCS meetings also often included important representatives of the local government, including city council members, the subprefect, members of the Public

Defender's Office, and public social assistance agencies, among others. Thus, the monthly CCS meetings regularly included a broad range of participants from civil society, local government, as well as important representatives from the public security institutions.

Unlike CONSPERJ, the minutes demonstrated a generally friendly and cooperative atmosphere at the meetings:

observa-se que tanto os membros efetivos como os demais participantes, no café ou durante as reuniões, usam recorrentemente a expressão 'quebra de barreira' para destacar a melhoria da relação entre a polícia e a sociedade naquela região. Por sua vez, o comandante do batalhão, em todas as reuniões de que participou, reiterou gratidão pelo apoio que vinha recebendo dos moradores da região (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 179)

Participation between the civil and military police also seemed to be uncharacteristically high in the region: "*Os membros natos também ressaltam a singularidade de haver uma maior integração entre as polícias nesta Aisp*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 180).

The main subjects of the meetings often focused on how to prevent crime through infrastructure, and generally centered on property crime rather than violent crime:

constata-se que as reivindicações dos participantes das reuniões têm um tema central: a preservação das instalações físicas e a implantação de novas tecnologias que possam garantir mais segurança aos habitantes da região. Solicita-se o reparo dos sinais de trânsito e dos radares de fiscalização eletrônica inoperantes. Pedem-se a instalação de sinais luminosos, a pintura de lombadas e, em especial, a revitalização dos espaços abandonados (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 180)

The friendly relationship between effective and natural members is demonstrated by their shared interest in key CCS themes. Property crimes against automobiles and local businesses are a priority to both groups, allowing for effective communication and cooperation during the monthly meetings. The meetings therefore focus on mutually beneficial efforts: "*os integrantes do conselho centram suas ações e reivindicações na manutenção das instalações de segurança pública existentes na região, assim como na busca pela implementação de novas instalações*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 181). The researchers noted the

recent inauguration of a new police station in the region, which improved the morale of the CCS: "*a inauguração da nova delegacia era pensada pelos integrantes do CCS como resultante da ação deles, fruto da articulação das proposições do colegiado e da negociação com os representantes do poder público*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 181).

The cooperation and perceived effectiveness of this CCS, however, hints at a flavor of Reis' amoral familism:

A partir da leitura das atas, constata-se que os integrantes do CCS apoiam a manutenção e a implantação de novos postos de trabalho para os policiais, assim como incentivam a aquisição de equipamentos modernos para estas organizações. Todavia, em troca, requerem uma evidente seletividade na prestação dos serviços: os equipamentos e as instalações ofertadas devem ser usados em consonância com as demandas dos moradores da região ali representados e presentes (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 181)

The efforts are focused on local improvements, which is certainly the goal of each CCS. This focus on themes that personally benefit the community, however, seems to be limited when the model is applied beyond the more local region of the AISP and implemented statewide for a much larger community, as in the case of CONSPERJ.

Interestingly, unlike the earlier success stories of community policing initiatives in wealthier neighborhoods such as Urca, the mixture of social classes present in the region seemed to be well-represented at the meetings: "*a impressão de que ali estariam reunidos indivíduos de segmentos sociais distintos, mas que buscam um objetivo comum: a melhoria na prestação do serviço de segurança pública*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 179). This is an important step forward from Cerqueira's time, in which the only successful programs were implemented in wealthier areas, and shows important promise towards breaking this limitation, which has also been noted in Skogan's work (2008, p. 49). The mixture of trust and cooperation led the researchers to note:

percebe-se que as reuniões transcorrem em clima amistoso, tendo os moradores uma clara percepção de que os representantes das organizações policiais são gestores de serviços que devem ser prestados aos moradores da região (PONCIONI and SILVA, p. 182)

To further test their findings, Poncioni and his team studied two CCSs in the field: the 5<sup>th</sup> AISP, located in Rio de Janeiro city's central downtown area, and the 23<sup>rd</sup> AISP, which encompasses the wealthiest neighborhoods in Rio, including Leblon and Gavea, as well as two of its largest favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal.

#### 4.4. 5<sup>th</sup> CCS

The CCS in the 5<sup>th</sup> AISP did not run quite as smoothly as the 31<sup>st</sup>. The CCS president ignored the meeting guidelines laid out by ISP, leading them according to an idiosyncratic schedule. Moreover, the president,

além de determinar quem poderia fazer uso da palavra, também delimitava por quanto tempo, em que momento e sobre que assunto as intervenções seriam admitidas. Neste sentido, apesar de todos os participantes portarem o direito à fala, a presidente instituía, a partir de seus critérios idiossincráticos, os limites destas intervenções (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 184)

Despite the lack of formality and the president's undue power of influence, however, the councilmembers and participants appeared to accept her form of organization without open hostility, and the meeting was open to a fair amount of participation from civil society. There were two main recurrent themes: the use of sidewalks by informal workers and the unhoused to sell goods (*shopping-chão*), and the lack of patrols in key areas (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 186-190). The first represents a predictable and interesting problem in that it is not directly related to policework, though is very much a problem which community policing is meant to help solve, and the second is directly related to policing.

The CCS' problem with the *shopping-chão* was twofold: the participants from civil society expected the police to solve their issue, despite it being beyond their scope of influence; moreover, the police themselves seemed content to deny responsibility for the problem while refusing to direct it to the proper authorities. As noted in Chapter 1, Skogan affirms "Problem-oriented policing also recognizes that the solutions to those patterns [of incidents] may involve other agencies and may be 'non-police' in character" (2008, p. 50). Rather than commit to this problem solving approach, however, the police representatives at this particular CCS, *"Enfatizam que o shopping-chão diz respeito à questão do ordenamento público,*

*não sendo, portanto, atividade para ser resolvida pelas polícias"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 187). On the other hand, *"alguns participantes insistem para que eles tomem alguma providência. E a questão segue em aberto, retornando a cada nova reunião, sem que encaminhamentos alternativos sejam propostos"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 187). Instead of cooperating to find a solution, both sides of the issues pointed fingers and waited for the other side to give in.

The recurrent demand for more patrols betrays a similar difficulty in finding common ground. Riachuelo, a street in the historical, central downtown district of Rio de Janeiro City near the famous 18<sup>th</sup> century aqueduct, *Arcos da Lapa*, was a notable theme of the CCS meetings. The street was also the location of an abandoned police cabin, which *"havia sido doada pela associação de moradores de um dos bairros abrangidos pela Aisp, a Associação de Moradores e Amigos da Riachuelo"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 188). In the face of a perceived growing number of muggings in the area, the region's residents and business owners repeatedly demanded a response from the police: *"Em uma das reuniões, uma participante idosa, moradora da rua do Riachuelo e membro efetivo do conselho, se dizendo indignada, esbravejou: 'estamos entregues às baratas. Eu quero saber, cadê a polícia?'"* (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 188). This aggressive attitude betrays a far less friendly atmosphere than that shown in the minutes of the CCS in the 31<sup>st</sup> AISP. The fact that the police cabin was largely unused was a notable sticking point, with the military police commander countering that the cabin could not be utilized due to personnel cuts:

No período em que se observaram os encontros mensais nesse conselho, notou-se que essa reivindicação, apesar de reiterada a cada encontro, nunca era atendida a contento, razão pela qual os moradores decidiram solicitar à Polícia Militar que lhes devolvesse, formalmente, a cabine doada (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 188)

In their frustration with the perceived lack of police response, the homeowner's association planned on hiring a private security firm to man the cabin instead. The fear of the shopping-*chá*o mixed with this turn toward privatized security at Riachuelo strongly reminds us of Reis' affirmation noted in the first chapter of this study:



aqueles que têm alguma coisa a perder associam diretamente a violência e a insegurança com seus temores frente à pobreza e à desigualdade, enquanto, na prática, a incapacidade do Estado para garantir a ordem, a segurança e o bem-estar incentiva à adoção de medidas de proteção privada (1995, p. 41)

The complaints about the shopping-*chão* specifically include an authoritarian angle that combines well with Moisés' observations about Brazilian citizens' relationship with democracy and authoritarianism. Poncioni and Silva note, "*Na percepção dos integrantes do CCS, seriam vagabundos que vendem quinquilharias e produtos de procedência duvidosa pelas calçadas e, com isso, atrapalham a circulação dos pedestres – estes, sim, pessoas de bem*" (2016, p. 186). Without any real evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the vendors, the councilmembers demanded their removal because they see the vendors as second-class citizens undeserving of their universal and constitutional human rights: "*Os participantes exigem – sim, exigem – uma ação repressiva direcionada da polícia. Pedem que os moradores de rua sejam retirados das proximidades de suas residências e famílias*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 186). On a micro level, this attitude betrays an acceptance of authoritarian, repressive responses over the democratic, egalitarian ideals of community policing. Neither side seems to have even considered a non-repressive solution to the community's complaints.

As far as the everyday functioning of the CCS in the 5<sup>th</sup> AISP, the work in the field showed a clearly strained relationship between civil society and the police in this region: "*a aproximação entre as polícias e a sociedade era um dos principais objetivos do projeto. No 5º CSS, a partir das reuniões que observamos, podemos afirmar que o desafio ainda está posto*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 189). With these two examples, it is clear that the problem-solving aspect of the 5<sup>th</sup> CCS still requires improvement, as well, and this is not necessarily unrelated to the hostile atmosphere of the meetings: "*há uma permanente hostilidade em relação ao representante da polícia militar, para o qual são direcionadas as críticas, as reclamações e as 'ordens' dos moradores e dos comerciantes*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 189). The CCS does still represent a recently created public space dedicated to institutionalized civil participation, however, along with the potential for cooperation and improvement that ought to continue to be fostered.

#### 4.5. 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS

The 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS, which encompasses such diverse neighborhoods as Ipanema and Rocinha, represents a notably wide range of social classes: "*Uma característica singular na composição deste CCS é o contraste social em relação ao meio social do qual seus participantes são oriundos: vielas, favelas, e condomínios de luxo localizados em bairros nobres*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 190). The council is a true test as to the capacity of the CCSs to overcome the differential treatment historically rendered upon Brazil's wealthier and less favored neighborhoods, as was made clear even in Cerqueira's plans to professionalize the police and the vast differences between, for instance, community policing in Copacabana and CIPOC.

The meetings themselves were well-organized and tended to follow ISP guidelines. Attendance by natural and effective members was above average, and civil society was decently well represented, including representatives from various homeowners' associations. Even the researcher from Poncioni and Silva's team was asked to register her presence and offered the chance to speak (2016, p. 190-192). The location of the meetings was not fixed, and the normal itinerary betrays one of the main issues of this particular CCS:

O 'itinerário' percorrido pelo conselho no semestre estudado foi o seguinte: avenida Ataulfo de Paiva, no Leblon; avenida Afrânio de Melo Franco, no Leblon; novamente a avenida Afrânio de Melo Franco, no Leblon; avenida Niemeyer, em São Conrado; avenida Ataulfo de Paiva, no Leblon; e rua José Linhares, no Leblon. Observa-se no trajeto descrito que o conselho raramente se reúne na favela da Rocinha (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 190)

Despite demands from Rocinha's residents, at the time of this study in 2016, the meetings were rarely held within the boundaries of Brazil's largest *favela*, even though it represents an extremely significant proportion of the population residing within the bounds of the 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS. At least in part due to this geographical inequality, "*Embora sempre houvesse um ou outro morador da Rocinha ou do Vidigal, havia uma clara predominância dos moradores das áreas nobres – Leblon, Ipanema, Gávea, Jardim Botânico, Lagoa e São Conrado*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 193). Although this CCS officially represented an institutionalized public space for civil participation, that participation seemed to vary worryingly in accordance with social class.

The geographical location of the meetings, however, is not sufficient to explain the lack of participation on the part of Rocinha residents:

observou-se nas reuniões do conselho que as lideranças comunitárias destas favelas, quando presentes, são menos participativas do que os representantes dos bairros nobres; mas, quando vencem o constrangimento simbólico, logo esbarram no descaso com que suas demandas são tratadas (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 193)

Poncioni and Silva demonstrate this lack of respect through the example of a specific demand presented by a community leader from Rocinha. He asked for a response from the police representatives on the council regarding the rape and murder of a young Rocinha resident during the Carnaval celebrations:

o comandante do batalhão disse que responderia ao morador após a reunião, 'por ser a Rocinha um local diferente dos outros' e, assim que encerrou sua fala, foi seguido pela intervenção da presidente do conselho: 'lá tem UPP' (caderno de campo da auxiliar de pesquisa, reunião de 31 de março de 2014). Ou seja, apesar de a Rocinha pertencer formalmente à circunscrição da Aisp, os próprios integrantes do conselho, entre os quais os representantes das polícias, reservam-se o direito de dar tratamento diferenciado às demandas oriundas da favela (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 194)

Despite the CCS being the exactly correct forum for such a complaint, the official response from both the president of the council and the police representatives was that, specifically due to the fact that the crime occurred in Rocinha, this subject was not worthy of their time during the meeting. This despite the fact that, "*Paradoxalmente, entre os temas debatidos na reunião de março de 2014, nenhum deles estava tão intrinsecamente vinculado à questão da segurança pública como a solicitação da moradora da Rocinha*" (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 194). While issues regarding excessive sound due to parties and trash trucks were considered acceptable themes for debate, the rape and murder of a young woman within the confines of the AISP was not.

Salta aos olhos que os temas debatidos nas reuniões do CCS correspondem tanto à faixa etária como ao segmento social de origem da maioria dos participantes – residentes nos bairros nobres. Evidencia-se então a exclusão de questões de caráter mais plural ou que contemplem demandas próprias das favelas. (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 194)

Certainly within the context of this CCS, the problem of the State-sanctioned differentiation between "normal" territories, such as Leblon, and "subnormal" territories, such as Rocinha, has not yet been overcome. Equal participation in the CCS should be a guarantee for all residents within the bounds of its region, and themes discussed by the council should be debated based on the merits of the theme itself, not on the origin of the messenger, and the 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS' failure to address legitimate concerns by Rocinha's residents should not be taken lightly. It also betrays Skogan's observation that, often, effective community policing can be hardest to establish precisely in those areas that need it most (2008, p. 49).

Among the other participants of the CCS, however, there did not appear to be a hostile relationship between the representatives of the police institutions and civil society, unlike the 5<sup>th</sup> CCS. The researchers noticed an interesting clue as to the social hierarchy observed at the meetings, however, which may hint as to how this relationship remained stable. Regarding the council president,

Curiosamente, todos os membros efetivos se dirigem a ela chamando-a de 'presidente', mas os membros natos apenas a tratam pelo nome próprio. Por sua vez, ela se refere ao representante da Polícia Militar como 'meu comandante' e não admite que críticas mais incisivas lhe sejam direcionadas (PONCIONI and SILVA, 2016, p. 195)

At least theoretically, the seat held by the council presidents should represent an equal seat at the table. That is, the president should not be subordinated to the natural members, but should be able to speak as an equal. By refusing to concede the symbolic respect of her title, representatives of the police institutions are insinuating that they hold a superior position in the council. By protecting her "commander" from criticisms, in turn, the president is allowing herself to take on an inferior, protective role in the council.

This is perhaps a reflection of the legislative predominance of natural members, which by definition do not include any representatives of civil society, but also begs the question of the capacity of a CCS to truly inspire change. The effectiveness of the CCSs appear to at least partially stem from the willingness of the public security representatives to take the councils seriously. The most effective CCS studied here was the 31<sup>st</sup>, which seemed to enjoy the friendliest relationship

between civil society and the public security institutions. Its successes, however, also stemmed from mutually beneficial projects. It would be interesting to further explore the capacity of CCSs to solve much more complex, structural problems in which there is not an obviously mutually beneficial solution, such as demonstrated by cases of police brutality or, like in Riachuelo, cases of perceived police negligence.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

Despite important successes, CONSPERJ and the Rio de Janeiro CCSs studied here show significant problems and room for improvement. The relationship between civil society and public security institutions proved to be a noticeable sticking point, as well as civil society's relative immaturity in participating in institutionalized public spaces. Brazil's marked inequality continues to be a long-lasting obstacle to sustained, participative democracy, and a clearly unequal power relationship between civil society and State actors proved to be another significant difficulty in achieving the full potential represented in these novel, participative public spaces.

Both CONSPERJ and the CCSs studied here demonstrated clear examples of resistance from the public security institutions. CONSPERJ was plagued by a lack of interest on the part of public security workers, as clearly evidenced by the lack of candidates for working groups as well as a high level of absenteeism. The fact that many police see these spaces as hostile environments where they will only be attacked is especially worrisome, given any improvement requires at minimum the willingness to participate in good faith and with the hope that participation leads to constructive dialog. For the police to see themselves as service providers, an important element of community policing that was a main goal of Cerqueira's reforms, they must be willing to accept criticism from their 'clients', in this case civil society, and this has not yet been demonstrated by the literature studied here.

Civil society, on the other hand, initially showed fundamental understanding of its own role, especially concerning CONSPERJ and the attempts to alter the very nature of the council from consultative to deliberative. Debates surrounding the shopping-*chão* betray a misunderstanding of the role of the police, as well. Both of

these issues can be relatively easily resolved with time and practice, however. The shopping-*chão* issue, more specifically, is a common issue with participative democracy that can be easily solved within the context of community policing through the participation of, for instance, social welfare agencies and organizations in the council that could offer direct help, or through efforts by the public security representatives to call the relevant actors into action.

A more difficult problem is demonstrated by significant power imbalances, which reflect broader societal issues. The inferior treatment delegated to public security issues in Rocinha reflects a wider, differential treatment between wealthier and less-favored Brazilian neighborhoods on the part of State institutions. The distinction between 'normal' and 'subnormal' areas of the city was already more than clear during Cerqueira's reforms, and has clearly not been overcome in the time since. It is worth noting that the council president of the 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS also endorsed this distinction.

The fact that the police hold the true decision-making power in both CONSPERJ and the CCSs makes the relationship between civil society and the public security institutions an integral element for the success of the councils. This paired with lack of interest on the part of public security actors leads to a difficulty in creating any structural change, and a focus on mutually beneficial improvements that betrays the flaw in community policing that Skogan himself pointed out: it often has the most difficulty improving public security in the areas that most need it.

Despite these shortcomings, it is important to note the important success of establishing an institutionalized, public space where civil society is invited to debate important public security issues. Successes earned in councils such as the 5<sup>th</sup> CCS should be learned from and improved upon. They demonstrate a potential for greater reform through participative democracy, and as noted by theorists such as Putnam and Uslaner, trust takes time to build. With time, these relatively new spaces could perhaps build more trust and lead to greater change and a more egalitarian, more just public security apparatus in Rio de Janeiro.

## 5. Conclusion

On January 1st, 2019, as one of his first official acts, the newly elected Governor Witzel published his vision of a restructured CONSPERJ, effectively removing all seats destined to actors from civil society and once more betraying the tottering nature of Rio de Janeiro's attempts at police reform observed by Sento-Sé and Soares (1999, p. 4). Elected on the heels of a widespread populist wave led by Jair Bolsonaro, Witzel's brief tenure marked a return to the brutality of Moreira Franco's vision for public security, as experienced after Brizola's governorship and Cerqueira's reform attempts. It also represents the difficulty of harnessing Giddens' juggernaut, and the democratic process' painfully indirect line of progress. Moisés' study of the relationship between ambivalence and authoritarianism can perhaps provide clues to this *gangorra*, and it is hard to ignore the 2018 uptick in ambivalent and authoritarian voters paired with the election of a former judge who campaigned on murdering potentially suspicious citizens without even the absolute minimum level of due process.<sup>4</sup> The end result of all these influences was a significant democratic backslide and serious setback for the trend of increasingly participatory democracy in Brazilian politics.

Moisés studied the authoritarian roots that have long marked Brazilian society, and his Latinobarometer analysis betrayed a worrying trend when updated for the 2018 elections. His concern with ambivalent voters proved its relevance with the election of Witzel in Rio de Janeiro, demonstrating the unfortunate truth that a healthy democracy requires actively engaged, actively democratic voters. Reis' study of amoral familism and the difficulty of creating a wider sense of community in Brazil seems well represented by a governor who campaigned on division and violence against citizens who are not deemed worthy of basic human rights, and it is difficult to forget her quote, "*aqueles que têm alguma coisa a perder associam diretamente a violência e a insegurança com seus temores frente à pobreza e à desigualdade*" (1995, p. 41), when considering the Witzel campaign's treatment of *favela* residents as guilty until proven innocent. Promoting a truly participatory

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<sup>4</sup> see <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/eleicoes/2018/noticia/2018/10/10/witzel-cita-bolsonaro-e-volta-a-afirmar-que-vai-mandar-abater-quem-for-pegado-de-fuzil.ghtml>

democracy is difficult with significant trends of ambivalence, authoritarianism, and distrust among citizens.

Despite this, there has been incredible progress in creating a healthier, more participatory democracy in Brazil over the past decades. Cerqueira's reforms represent a herculean effort to turn a historically repressive public security apparatus into a professionalized police force which sees itself as providing a service to its citizen-clients and which respects the democratic concept of human rights. The second chapter showed the difficulty with which Col. Cerqueira rose through the ranks and the unlikelihood of him reaching a position in which he could carry out his vision, and the continued difficulty in him actually implementing his reforms within a corporation that was largely unfriendly to change.

Despite the myriad obstacles, however, Cerqueira managed to harness the juggernaut for a time and steer it towards a police force more appropriate for a redemocratizing Brazilian society. Giddens' unintended consequences, which took shape in Sento-Sé's concept of a *gangorra*, arose with the elections of Franco and Alencar, but despite these setbacks, Cerqueira made much of his time in power. He brought the concept of community policing to Rio de Janeiro, and the model survived through the 21<sup>st</sup> century, notably through the implementation of CONSPERJ and the community security councils. Unfortunately, the differential treatment of "normal" and "subnormal" territories also continues. Rio de Janeiro's problems with inequality certainly did not begin with Col. Cerqueira, but his reforms were incapable of ending a legacy that has long treated the 'asphalt' with much kinder terms than those for the *favelas*.

Even a theoretically egalitarian, public space such as that of the 23<sup>rd</sup> CCS betrays the enduring legacy of this social chasm. CONSPERJ and the Rio de Janeiro CCSs represent the most complete attempts at instituting community policing through participatory democracy, while following a trend noted by researchers such as Avritzer (2008) and Gohn (2007; 2011). The groundwork laid by Cerqueira's reforms allowed for some significant success in the implementation of these democratic spaces. Though CONSPERJ faced significant obstacles in its first years of existence, it showed promise that could one day be harnessed in order to create a more democratic, statewide vision of public security in Rio de Janeiro. The CCSs showed the capacity for civil society and state security institutions to cooperate in



policymaking decisions, especially in councils like the 31<sup>st</sup>, though power imbalances continued to be enshrined in legal frameworks, and the unequal treatment of citizens quickly led to disfunction and a lack of trust in CCSs like the 23<sup>rd</sup>. As Uslaner and Putnam pointed out, however, trust takes time and effort to build, and institutionalized spaces like the CCSs are a perfect forum for building this trust and creating a more democratic public security apparatus on a local level.

The election of Wilson Witzel marked the return of the *gangorra* and essentially ended civil participation in CONSPERJ. This is not the first time, however, that progress has been hampered by a reactionary governor, and it is important to remember that neither Alencar nor Franco were able to stem the larger tide of participatory democracy that led to the implementation of CONSPERJ and the CCSs in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As has been said many times before, progress is not a straight line, and despite their limitations, the recent experiences of the Rio de Janeiro security councils can and will be learned from in order to continue to create more just, more democratic public security institutions. Considerable effort and a little luck led to marked improvements in the historically repressive police corporations, and with time the lessons learned from these efforts will serve as the groundwork for further reform and new designs and models. The juggernaut cannot be truly harnessed, but hopefully this paper has shown the importance of shoving it in the right direction from time to time.

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